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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this research was to identify the determinants of corporate 
turnaround feasibility and their effect (in terms of their state of existence and their 
existence) on the probability of corporate turnaround feasibility in Successful and 
Non Successful Turnaround Companies. The other objective was the development of 
an empirical model of the determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility capable 
of predicting the feasibility of corporate turnarounds. 
One hundred ' troubled companies' were identified out of two hundred and eleven 
publicly listed companies of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange through 
observations of their share price performance, earnings before interest and tax, 
earnings after interest and tax and by the the Malaysian Z - Score (PNB Score) 
failure detection model test. They were further demarcated into 57 Successful 
Turnaround Companies (STC) and 43 Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
(NSTC). These two groups were then compared on the determinants of 
turnaround feasibility. The study confirms that the feasibility of corporate 
turnaround of an organisation is dependent on the existence (exists or non existant) 
and the state of existence (whether favourable or non favourable) of a set of 
variables or determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility i.e. Causes of 
Decline, Severity of Crisis, Company's Historical Strategy, Industry 
Characteristics, Company's Cost Price Structure, Commitment of Shareholders, 
Commitment ofBankers, Commitment of Creditors, Commitment ofEmployees, 
New Competent Management, Viable Core Business, Bridge Capital and Realistic 
Turnaround Plan. In identifYing the existence and the state of existence of the key 
determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility in the STC and the NSTC, it was 
found that the STC had higher occurrences of favourable states of existence for the 
key determinants than the NSTC. STC's were also found to experience higher 
occurrences of existence (exists) in the key determinants compared to the NSTC. 
A ' Corporate Turnaround Feasibility Intensity Model ' was developed to test 
corporate turnaround feasibility intensity level. Subsequently, the empirical model 
or the multivariate logistic regression model was then applied to finalise and 
reaffirm the feasibility of the corporate turnaround of the organisation. The 
qualitative and empirical models complement each other in their application, or 
used on their own can test the feasibility of corporate turnaround. The availability 
of both qualitative and empirical models above to test and to predict the feasibility 
of corporate turnaround from this research can help solve one of the biggest 
dilemmas facing numerous shareholders, top management, management 
consultants and bankers, namely, deciding whether to go ahead with the 
turnaround process or not. The models can help save costly errors in terms of 
money, labour cost, psychological turmoil, time and wasteful resources due to 
wrong decision making. They also constitute a new contribution to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
<·i 
" 
INTRODUCTION 
The decades of the SO's and the 90's have been periods of harsh realities. No 
longer can organisations remain complacent about their business strengths and 
market shares. In times of economic rece-~sion and even in nonnal times, 
'Coi"j!panies may decline because of environmental advershies or internal 
inefficiencies. Once this becomes serious, companies make efforts to work their 
way back to profitability and financia1 good health. Some succeed in these efforts 
and bounce back to prosperity while others fail to negotiate their way out and end 
up insolvent. The efforts to halt the process of decline and generate new life into 
organisations is popularly known as corporate turnaround. 
l.l RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
This research .focuses on corporate turnaround. Specifically, corporate turnaround 
' 
strategies and the key factors for a successful turnaround are examined to identify 
the detenninants of corporate turnaround feasibility. In this work, an attempt will 
be made to identify the existence and the state in which these detenninants exist in 
Successful and Non-Successful Turnaround Companies. The ultimate liim is to 
develop an empirical predictive model of corporate turnaround feasibility using the 
Logit modelling approach. 
16 
1.2 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
The bulk of previous research has concentrated heavily on strategies used in 
corporate turnarounds. Attempts via empirical approaches were not far different 
from non-empirical ones, where models were developed to assist the prediction of 
corporate turnaround based on turnaround strategies. Some researchers developed 
models of turnaround by considering certain detenninants (e.g. industry 
characteristics) in their modelling approach. However, the models developed were 
not comprehensive enough to capture all aspects of the practical realities of a 
turnaround. 
A model must take into consideration as many factors as is feasible to enhance its 
predictive power. A' wholesome ' and ' realistic ' model for predicting the 
" feasibility of cornorate turnaround is expected to be highly useful to a number of 
groups in the corporate world. The biggest dilemma facing numerous 
shareholders, top management, management consultants and especially bankers in 
the context of a troubled company is whether or not to keep supporting a troubled 
company. If the company ultimately goes into bankruptcy, such support would 
have only made all the groups worse off. This is the common predicament faced by 
everyone concerned with a troubled company. In many instances, decisions have 
been made based on limited infonnation and 'gut-feeling '. And in some cases a 
price has been paid in terms of money, man-hours, psychological tunnoil, ti'lle and 
wasted resources. 
l7 
Thus, the 'lVailability of a model that can predict the feasibility of corporate 
turnaround is timely and can contribute to a more effective diagnosis of troubled 
companies in tenns oft he chances for survival. 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research are as follows: 
• To identify the key success facton (determinants) of corporate 
turnaround fea!ibility. 
• To determine the effl~ct of the key determinants of corporate turnaround 
feuibllity (in terms of their state of niJtence and their eJ.istence) on the 
probability(,( corporate turnaround succeJs. 
• To develop an empirical model to predict the feasibility of corporate 
turnarounds. 
1.4 BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.4.1 CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
Corporate turnaround has been defined among others by Goldston (1992) 
Schendel, Patton and Riggs {1976), Slatter (1984) and Sloma (1985). 
However, the definitions given by the different authors and researchers on 
corporate turnaround have similar and common elements, n!lDlely; 
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I. Turnaround deals with troubled companies, featured by poor financial 
perfonnance, probably with losses and are in a downturn phase of the 
business. 
2. Turnaround deals also with the need to counter the problems of the 
troubled companies by taking measures, steps and corrective actions to 
reverse its situation into an upturn business phase. 
3. That if no action is taken !o tum the company around, it will most likely 
race financial disaster and become a failure. 
1.4.2 PHASES OF CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
Slatter (1984) presented four strategic phases in corporate turnaround: 
I. The Analysis Phase; This phase involves problem identification, 2. The 
Emergency Phase: This phase involves those actions necessary to ensure survival, 
3, The Strategic Change Phase: This phase involves the emphasis on operational 
factors, 4. The Growth Phase: This phase involves growth either organicaUy 
through new product development and market development or via acquisition or 
both. 
1.4.3 CORPORATE TURNAROUND STRATEGIES 
To give it the best chance or rejuvenation company must have the right 
turnaround strategies. 
" 
Slatter (1984) found that the key strategies used in corporate turnaround were 
Asset Reduction, Change ofManagement, Financial Control, Debt/ Financial 
Restructuring, Improved Marketing, Organisational Change, Product-Market 
Change, Growth via Acquisition and Investment. Davis (1988) stated four 
turnaround strategies similar to the ones in the study above. Improvement in 
human resource was also considered as a strategy in turnaround (Eisenber~ 
1972). Silver (1992) cited strategies that were in support of Davis's and 
Eisenberg's mentioned above. Carrington and Aurelio (1976) indicated that in 
addition to cost cutting, renegotiation oftern1s with creditors was another key 
strategy iu turnaround. Kilroe (1981) found that the turnaround strategies 
employed were similar to strategies of companies with low market share. 
There are others who have mentioned strategies for corporate turnaround such as 
Hamennesh (1976), Hileman (1979), Hofer(19SO}, Har.1brick and Schecter 
(1983 ), Ramanujam (1984), Melin (1985) and Firsirotu (1985) but the strategies 
put forward were very similar in nature with those cited before. 
According to Bibeault {1982) among other factors such as objectives, tactics and 
review methods, strategies incorporated in a turnaround plan vary from one stage 
of the turnaround to the next. Taylor (1983) found that different strategies were 
implemented according to what he called ' Contraction ' or immediate corrective 
actions to ensure sutvival, and • Expansion ' or the long term actions to effect a 
substantial and sustained improvement in performance. 
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1.4.4 KEY FACTORS IN TURNAROUND SUCCESS 
According to Slatter (1984) there are o\her elements and key factors which can 
;: 
dictate the right strategy or combinat~.Cm orstmtegies to be used for a successful 
twnaround Sloma (1985) commented that a successful turnaround must consist of 
only two elements. These are one, there must be a turnaround plan and two, the 
plan must be communicated. 
Zimmennan (1991) created a model that described successful turnaround as a 
function of three principles (Low Cost Operation, Product Differentiation and 
Appropriate Turnaround Organisation). Slatter (1984) found six sets of factors 
that detennine which generic strategies are required to effect corporate recovery. 
They are the Causes of Decline, Severity ofthe Crisis, Attitude of Stakeholderr~ 
Company's Historical Strategy, Industry Characteristics and the Company's Cost-
Price Structure. 
Bibeault (1982) stressed that there are certain key elements that lead to turnaround 
success and in their absence a turnaround effort is highly risky. These key 
elements are New Competent Management with full auth01ity to make all the 
required changes, an economically and competitively Viable Core Operation, 
'Bridge Capital 'from external and internal sources to finance the turmrround ami 
a Positive Attitude and motivated people so that the initial turnaround momentum 
is sustained. Silver (1992) added that damage done by creditors can cause the 
turnaround plan to go amiss. 
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1.4.5 CLASSIFYING CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
Slatter {1984) pointed out four types of recovery situations and further categori~ed 
them into Non-Recoverable Turnarounds and Recoverable Turnarounds: Non-
Recoverable 1im1arou1uis: I. The No Hopen; Despite the efforts put in, they 
simply can no longer exist as viable business entities. 2. Short Term Sun'ivors; 
Despite succeeding in improving real profits temporarily, they eventually go into 
insolvency. Recoverable Turnarounds: l. Mere Survival: Despite sustainability 
of recovery, the value of investment is questionable. 2. Sustainabl~ Recovery: 
Making above average profits and embarking onto the growth phase of the 
turnaround process. 
1.4.6 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Various statistical failure identification models have been developed for predicting 
corporate failures and the main techniques being used are as follows: 
Univariate analy~·isfor paired samples e.g. Fitzpatrick {1932, cited in Failure 
identification models, l!.l89, p.l) and Beaver (1966), Decomposition analysis 
e.g. Lev {1973), The gambler's min model e.g. Wilcox {1971), The catastrophe 
model, Sub)ectivdy determined ratios and weights e.g. Tamari (1966), Multiple 
regression analysis (MRA) e.g. in the USA i.e. Meyer and Po fer (1970), 
Hambrick and Schecter {1983), Edmister (1972) and in the U.K, the Bank of 
England model developed by Marats (1979), Multiple discriminant analysis 
{MDA) e.g. Altman (1968) and ramer (1982). 
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1.4.7 CORPORATE TURNAROUND MODELS 
Models have been developed to predict corporate turnaround e.g. by 
Ramanujam (1984), Pant ( 1986) and Akaradejdachachai ( 1993) using both 
Multiple Discriminant (MDA) and Legit techniques. However, the drawback in 
using the MDA is that there are a host of statistical problems associated with it, 
rendering the results somewhat problematic (Altman, 1993). 
Wilson (1989) indicated that there was often a ' grey area ' associated with the 
MDA and stressed that various technical problems needed to be overcome for the 
model to be statistically vaiid. The Legit technique on the other hand is a powerful 
alternative, which does not require the use of non· linear estimation techniques 
(Ohlson, 1980) and gives significantly better probability estimates than the MDA 
(Martin, 1977). 
Pant and Akradejdachachai have developed corporate turnaround models using the 
Logit technique othPJ' than the MDA. 
However, their models were based on data gathered during the Uptum phase of 
the turnaround and concentrated heavily on one particular determinant of 
corporate turnaround -Industrial Structure. The models were unable to predict 
corporate turnaround feasjbjlitv. 
" 
1.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The first limitation of this research pertains to the information gathered through 
the questionnair;, interviews with the CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) ofthe 
'tro_ul>!r..J companies '.The accuracy and validity oft he information gathered rest 
on the the honesty, sincerity and integrity of each oft he CEOs responding to the 
questions asked. The second limitation could be due to the type of' troubled 
companies' that were studied. All of the' troubled companies' are basically 
publicly listed companies of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
The third lirrutation of this research could be that the study was made based on 
the general publicly listed companies of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(excluding the Financial and Extractive Industries) and was not according to their 
respective industrial sectors (as this was not the main intention of the research due 
to constraints on resources and time). 
The fourth possible limitation is related to the element of culture found in this 
research pertaining to the Malaysian corporate scene, thus the usage of its findings 
for the corporate scene in other countries may be subjective. The fifth possible 
limitation could be due to the exclusion of governmental influence in the corporate 
turnaround process of certain politically linked companies. 
Despite verification by external auditors, annual accounts may contain elements of 
window dressing. This is viewed as the sixth limitation. 
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The seventh Hmitation, possibly the last foreseen limitation is that the whole 
research, its findings and outcomes are based on the Malaysian scenario. 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
In identifYing the' troubled companies ', the share prices trend indicator 
(Financial Times Exte~ C.D Rom), the earningr; before interest and tax (EBIT) and 
earnings after interest and tax (EAIT) trends were observed in terms oftheir 
Downturn and Upturn phases. 
The final confirmation on' troubled companies 'was achieved by using the PNB-
Score (Malaysian Z..Score), a composite failure identification model. 
Subsequently, a comparative analysis ofthe Return on Shareholders Funds (ROSF) 
and tl.e Commercial Banks Fixed Deposit Rates was carried out in order to further 
classifY the ' troubled companies ' into Successful and Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies. 
The determinants or key success factors of corpomte turnaround feasibility were 
analysed further in terms oftheir existence and state of elcistence in Successful and 
Non Successful Corporate Turnaround companies. Personal interviews with the 
respective ChiefExecutive Officers of the identified' troubled companies' using a 
structured questionnaire were carried out. 
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Data pertaining to each determinant were analysed in order to help understand 
how each determinant and combinations of determinants contributed to the 
feasibility ofcorpomte turnaround. 
The State of Existence (Favourable f Non Favourable) of Category A 
determinants and the Existence (Exist I Non Existant) of Category B determinants 
in Successful (STC) and Non Successful Turnaround companies (NSTC), were 
further classified using measurements prescribed. 
The application assumptions for using the multivariate logistic regression model 
were tested to ensure that the usage of the model was appropriate for the study. 
Several multivariate logistic regression models were analysed in terms of their 
logic, appropriateness and suitability for predictive usage purposes using test and 
diagnosing statistics to find the" best" and final model. Subsequently, the model 
was tested for its validity and predictive power using the Data Splitting technique 
and the Lachenbruch method. 
1.7 THESIS OUTLINE 
The thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 examines three areas of literature 
relevant to the understanding of corporate turnaround. The first area is con~imed 
with' troubled companies '; corporate decline, failure, collapse and bankruptcy 
11.nd their definitions, The causes of decline and failure are also reviewed. 
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The second area examines corporate turnaround; its definition, phases, strategies 
used in corporate turnaround, the key success factors of successful turnarounds 
and corporate turnaround classifications. The third area critically reviews previous 
empirical work on failure identification and corporate turnaround models. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used to identifY the ' troubl{'{) 
companies ', to analyse the detenninants of corporate turnaround feasibility and to 
develop the empirical model for predicting corporate turnaround feasibility. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings and interpretation on the identification of the 
' troubled companies '. 
Chapter 5 pres::nts the findings and interpretation on the analysis ofthe 
detenninants of corporate turnaround feasibility. Chapter 6 presents the findings 
and interpretation on the development ofthe empirical model for predicting 
corporate turnaround feasibility. Chapter 7 summarises the findings and 
interpretation, concludes the research and proposes possible future research 
opportunities. 
CHAPTER 2 
" 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter exanUnes three areas oflit(:rature relevant to the understanding of 
corporate turnaround. It focuses on' troubled companies'; corporate decline, 
failure, collapse and bankruptcy and their definitions, where the causes for decline 
and failure are reviewed. It also examines corporate turnaround; its definition, 
phases, strategies used, the key SUC(:eSS fllctors of successful turnarounds and 
corporate turnaround classifications. Previous empirical works on failure 
identification and corporate turnaround models are reviewed and subsequently the 
(( 
rr.search theoretical framework and hypotheses are also addressed. 
j! 
Business glory and success oh corporation at a particular time, period and place 
are no longer the determinants ofits existence in the future. The periods of the 
80's and the 90's have been the periods ofharsh realities. No longer can 
organisations stay complacent or become myopic of their business strengths and 
market shares. Globalization has invited in harsh competitors from other parts of 
tho world. Nowadays, a business is concerned about more than just staying at the 
top or continuing to survive within its familiar territories. 
Competition and survival today means that the organisation will have to defend 
itself from alien market share raiders and competitors and to some extent the 
organisation itaelfwill have to 11dopt the similar tactic ofbusiness and market 
share expansion into international and uncharted territories. 
" 
In this harsh competitive era organisations are faced with threats snd 
opportunities from externalities and strengths and weaknesses from within. Threats 
and weaknesses are the two main dangers for any organisation today especially to 
those who are not sensitive enough or too complacent to respond to them. These 
eventually make corporations susceptible to corporate crisis, decline, failure ai!d 
eventually bankruptcy. Corporations, that are quick and conscious enough to 
respond to the symptoms of trouble, are expected try their best to reverse the 
process of decline,.a process that is known as- Corporate Turnaround. 
2.1 TROUBLED COMPANIES, CORPORATE 
DECLINE, FAILURE, COLLAPSE AND 
BANKRUPTCY 
Troubled companies, corporate decline, failure, collapse and bankruptcy are words 
often heard and used in the business world. They are ' real situations ' and not 
mere theories or business jargon. Historically, between the period 1955 and 1965 
itself, the numbers ofbusini,;Ss failures in the United States ranged between 13,000 
and 17,000 firms each year (Dun & Bradstreet, 1966). 
Argenti (1976) found that the average number of companies on the British register 
was 586,000 between 1969 to 1974. The average number of new registrations 
each year was 43,000 or 7% of companies registered. The e.verage number 
dissolved and struck off was 26,000 or 4.5 %. 
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The comparable figures for the United States was that of approximately 9% 
removal from the register each year. He suggested that 20,000 of the 26,000 
companies removed from the register each year were failures. He also suggested 
that the process of failure took 2.5 years and thus the number of companies that 
have collapsed or were in a statr of failure in any average year was 50,000 or 10% 
of all companies.. One out of 10 companies would be seen to be a failure for Britain 
and America since their profitability was so poor that they were bound to become 
insolvent within the avemge of2.5 years. 
Slatter (1984) pointed that statistics in Britain for the period between 1971 to 
1982 itself indicated how business failures had increased (refer to Table 1). 
Table I 
Busine!!l Failure In EnaJand And Wales f 1971-1982) 
y..,. 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Failures 
3506 
3063 
2575 
3720 
5398 
5939 
Yw 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Failures 
5831 
5086 
4537 
6890 
8607 
12067 
Source: Slatter, S. (1984}. Corporate Recovery. England: Penguin Books Ltd 
(p.!8). 
" 
Work undertaken by Perfonnance Analysis Services Ltd e~o1imated that among the 
850 largest U.K manufacturing concerns, about 15% to 200/o were in the risk of 
insolvency at any one time. 
Altman (1993) states that: 
During the unprecedented length of time of economic expansion of 
the 1980's, business failed at stubbornly high levels every year in 
the United States of America. With the increase in corporate 
distress of the early 1990's, business failures and bankruptcy 
soared, (p. 3) Since 1980, there have been over 224,000 ' Chapter 
II ' filings in total with just a bit over 1,200 involving publicly 
traded companies. Liquidation under ' Chapter 7 ' reached a record 
number of over 650,000 in 1991 alone, (p. 8). 
Dun & Bradstreet (1991) compiled an index which measured the number of 
failures recorded per 10,000 firms listed with Dun & Bradstreet which was an 
excellent barometer of corporate distress in the United States. The data covered 
the period from 1971 to 1991 involving over 5 million finns. 
The number of failures rose in 1991 to over 87,000, a 44% increase over 1990. 
The 1991 total was 68% larger than that in 19&4. The lingering recession in 1991 
contributed strongly to those results. 
" 
Despite the unprecedented length of Gross National Product (GNP) expansion 
from 1983 to 1990, the nation's business failures were high and the business failure 
rate was over 100 per 10,000 during 1984 to 1987. 
The failure rate surged dramatically in 1991 by over 41%, reaching 106 and failure 
liabilities topped $100 billion for the first time. Through the first seven months of 
1992, business failures increased by about 16% over the comparable period in 
1991. 
2.2 DEFINITION OF TROUBLED COMPANIES, 
DECLINE, INSOLVENCY, FAILURE, 
LIQUIDATION, RECEIVERSHIP 
AND BANKRUPTCY 
As mentioned earlier, the terms troubled companies, decline, insolvency, failure, 
liquidation, receivership Md bankruptcy have been used and quoted by both the 
academic and corporate sectCira synonymously. This research will attempt to define 
them more clearly in accordance with their real meaning in usage. Argentl (1976) 
found that it was difficult to draw hard and fast lines between failure and collapse. 
He claimed that the most definite words are insolvent, liquidation, receivership and 
bankruptcy. In Britain companies do not go bankrupt (that is a term reserved for 
people only), they become' insolvent ' which means they cannot pay their debts as 
they fall due or that their net assets are of negative value. It is an offence to 
continue to trade while insolvent and directors and others who do so are liable to 
severe penalties. 
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Instead, the bank usually calls in a ' Receiver ' who takes over the management of 
the company and then does one or two things. The Receiver either continues 
trading with the pennission of the creditors and others, in the hope ofbringing the 
company (or parts of it) around to profitability again, or puts it into ' liquidation ' 
which means the company stops trading and all its assets are sold off for the 
benefit of the creditors. The word failure (or fail, failing ... etc.) he suggested should 
be used to refer to a company whose performance is so poor that sooner or later it 
is bound to have to call in the receiver or cease to trade or go into voluntary 
liquidation, or which is about to do any of these, or has already done so. He 
further stressed that a company can be a failure without ever having been a success 
but it can only collapse if it was once successful but now is not. 
Altman (1993) has a similar definition to Argenti and elaborated the definitions to 
include not only failure, insolvency and bankruptcy but also the term ' default '. He 
said that their meanings are interchangeable although they are distinctly different 
in their formal usage. 
Altman (1993) stresses that: 
Failure, by economic criteria, means that the realised rate of return 
on invested capital, with allowances for risk consideration, is 
significantly and continually lower than prevailing rates on similar 
investments. Somewhat different economic criteria have also been 
utilised, including insufficient revenues to cover costs and cases of 
the average return on investments being below the finn's cost of 
"'!'ital, (p. <). 
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(Dun & Bradstreet, 1991, as quoted by Altman, 1993) has adopted the term 
' busineu failure ' to describe various unsatisfactory business conditions. 
According to Dun & Bradstreet, business failure includes: 
Business that cease operation following assignment or bankruptcy: 
those that cease with loss to creditors after such actions as 
execution, foreclosure, or attachment: those that voluntarily 
withdraw, leaving unpaid obligation: or those that have been 
involved in court actions such as receivership, organisation or 
arrangement: and those that voluntarily compromise with creditors, 
(p. 4). 
Insolvency, Altman (1993) stresses: 
Depicts negative firm performance and wh-.iit the firm is not able to 
meet its current obligation. Signifying a IRCk ofliquidity and 
insolvency, in a bankruptcy sense, is when a firm's total liabilities 
exceed a fair valuation of its total assets. The real networth of the 
fum is, therefore, negative, (p. 4). 
It is observed that the definitions for insolvency by Altman above are somewhat 
inline with that of Argenti (1976), where he stresses that" default on the 
otherhand is characterised by the violation ofthe finn towards a condition of an 
agreement for example, the violation of a loan covenant. But such default are 
usually renegotiated and are used to signal deteriorating finn perfonnance" 
(p. 5). 
FinaUy, Altman divided bankruptcy into two types; one type ofbankruptcy is 
described as above and refers to the net worth position of an enterprise. 
" 
A second, more observable type, is a finn's fonnal declaration of bankruptcy in a 
U.S. Federal District Court, accompanied by a petition either to liquidate its assets 
or attempt a recovery program. The latter procedure is legally referred to as a 
bankruptcy reorganisation. 
Bibeault (1982) viewed the definition offailure and decline from a slightly different 
context. Business failure was defined from at least four standpoints: social, 
economic, legal and managerial. The social impact of the business failure definition 
deals with the human suffering aspects when such a phenomenon occurred. A 
company's decline and fall took on a different, more human perspective when it 
was perceived at floor level, so to speak, where men and women were fighting for 
their livelihood as well as for the survival ofthe organisation. From the economic 
standpoint, he added, failure represents a situation where the realised rate of 
return on invested capital is significantly and continually lower than the prevailing 
rates on similar investments (this definition offailure from the economic 
standpoint is seen similar to Altman's definition offailure based on economic 
criteria). 
Legal failure, according to Bibeault was where an entrepreneur discontinued 
operations for a variety of reasons, such as loss of capital, inadequate profits, ill 
health. or retirement, but if his creditors were paid in full, the entrepreneur was 
not tallied as failure by Dun & Bradstreet (usually classifies about 4% of 
discontinuances as failures). 
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Decline from the managerial standpoint, he streued , is defined 11s business failure. 
A business can be a failure from a managerial standpoint before it is an economic 
failure and certainly long before it is declared a legal failure. Management usually 
receives pre.uure when profitability plateaus or declines and several back to back 
years mean real trouble. If decline leads to large write offs and to losses at the 
bottom line, there usually is intense pressure for a change in management. 
Bibeault ex~ained that decline in his study was concerned with several years of 
deteriorating profits. In four out of five cases decline included one or more years 
of unprofitable operation3, large non operating write offs or both. 
From the definitions used above, it is clear that the research is not interested in 
corporations or business which have failed and ceased to be in operation or 
existence. This is probl!bly due to the non existence of efforts by the business to 
revive or turnaround their fate. However, if turnaround efforts did exist, then they 
will definitely fall within the ambit ofthis research. The definitions of failure that 
are of interest to this research are the economic and managerial failure definitions. 
It may also be worthwhile at this point to further explore other definitions that 
may knit well into the interest of this research. 
Argenti (1976) had, for instance, defined three types of corporate failure; 
Type I companies are small companies that never rise above a poor level of 
perfomwu:e. They usually have a very short life span. 
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Then there are the Type 2 companies that definitely get off the ground and usually 
do so in a spectacular manner, otlen shooting upwards to fantastic heights before 
crashing down again. They attract attention far beyond their social or economic 
significance because of the squeals of delight from the press on their way up and 
again on the way down. Type 3 companies are professionally managed but are 
mature, sluggish Md have lost touch with their markets or the needs of their 
customers. The larger of them, can be called institutions, have lost their 
competitive edge and usually have a number of management and control defects. 
Perhaps the nearest of the defined decline or failure types of corporations that is 
clear and is ofinterest to this research is what Bibeault defined as ' Troubled 
Companies '. According to Bibeault they ranged from mild (but sustained) 
underperformance to severe viability that may lead to bankruptcy reorganisation 
and I or liquidation. In general, it i easy to think of three levels of trouble: 
1. Mild- Perfonnance problems related to return of equity and below industry 
performance. 
2. Moderate- Losses and potential liquidity problems. 
3. Severe- Viability problems and possible bankruptcy. 
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Bibeault continued by elabomting the degree of seriousness of troubled companies 
by dividing them into three stages: 
STAGE I 
STAGE2 
Continuing Losses 
STAGE3 
Survival 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Declining Business Position 
Losing Market Leadership 
Declining Market Share 
Declining Profitability 
Return on Equity Low for Industry 
Balance Sheet Strong 
At least One Year of Loss 
Prospect for More Losses 
Balance Sheet Deteriorating 
Decreasing Equity 
Margins Unsatisfactory 
Unused Capacity 
Losses Threaten Existence 
Liquidity Crisis 
Balance Sheet a Mess 
Equity NC/lfly Exhausted 
Debt Piling Up 
Morale Low 
Danger of Bankruptcy 
Source: Bibeault. D.B. (1982). Corporate Turnaround: How Managers 
TumLosers Into 'Jinners. New York; Me Graw HiU (p. 67). 
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It can be observed from the characteristics oftroub!ed companies and their degree 
of seriousness that they encompass not only the obvious ailing companies (in Stage 
3) but also those that may well think that the scenario they are in is nothing to be 
alarmed about until the situation worsens (Stage 1). At this point it is important to 
stress thst the research will focus on' Troubled Companies' as defined by 
Bibeault as a guide for further identification of companies that require turnaround. 
2.3 WHY DO COMPANIES GET INTO TROUBLE? 
(CAUSES FOR DECLINE AND FAILURE) 
It may perhaps be appropriate to understand in the first place as to why companies 
get themselves into trouble, in other words the causes of decline and failure- since 
there would not be any need for a turnaround if they weren't in trouble in the first 
place. It is not the intention ofthis research to elaborate on each ofthe causes in 
detail since each major cause of decline can be a potential research topic by itself. 
Instead, a summary on this topic from a number of interesting literature and 
research is subsequently presented. 
In a 199: survey of over 1,300 turnaround managers, Buccino & Associates, a 
Chicago based turnaround consultant (as quoted by Altman, !993) found that the 
quality of management was identified by 88% of the respondents as the primRl)' 
difference between success and failure and the overwhelming cause of individual 
firm failuru was some type of managerial incompetence. 
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Argenti (1976) listed 12 major causes of corporate decline in his book 
' Corporate Collapse '. Failure is seen as a sequential process involving a 
progreosion ofsteps towards the ultimate demise ofthe firm. 
The causes for decline are as follow!!: 
I. Poor management, including one-man rule, a non participative board of 
directors, an unbalanced top management and lack of management depth. 
2. Defective accounting information, including erroneous cashflow 
forecasts, costing systems and assets valuations. 
3. Exposure to change, including competitive, economic, social 
and technological change. 
4. Externally induced constraints, including governmental, union, public 
opinion and consumer constraints. 
5. Overtrading. involving expansion that is faster than cashflow or profits wiU 
penni!. 
6. The' Big Project ', in which cost and time are underestimated and revenue is 
overestiillBlted. 
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7. Excessive gearing up, in which the company borrows more money than the 
volume ofbusiness can reasonably support. 
8. Bad financial ratios, which, with t~aditional financial analysis, indicate 
slippage in the firm's competitive position. 
9. Creative accounting, involving the delayed publication of financial 
information, capitalised research and development costs, payment 
of dividends from borrowed money, reduction of maintenance on capital 
equipment, treatment of extraordinary income as ordinary income and 
incorrect vllluation of assets. 
10. Normal business hazards, involving strikes by suppliers and fires or other 
disasters for which the finn is unprepared. 
11. Non financial symbols of decline, including low morale, poor 
maintenance, poor house keeping and slippage in quality service. 
12. "Last few months" indicators, including low stock prices, management's 
denial of circumstances and callous disregard for customers. 
Slatter (1984) in his study of forty U.K tumarri'und situations identified eleven 
frequently occurring factors which were the principal causes of corporate decline. 
" 
He admitted that these factors were somewhat similar to the factors identified by 
Argenti, which he developed by summarising the literature and talking to receivers 
and others involved in failing companies situations. The causes of decline he 
identified were compared with those identified by Argenti (1976) in the U.K, 
Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976) and Sigoloff(1981) in the U.S. A comparative 
table (Table 2) is referred here without Argenti's, since this has already been 
discussed earlier. 
Robert DiGiorgio, Chairman ofDi Giorgio Corporation (1978, as quoted by 
Bibeault, 1982) stated that the problem does not arise from external conditions, 
but a change of external conditions causing the unbalance internally. The problems 
come from an internal source, but the triggering mechanism that suddenly makes 
things that formerly worked no longer work is a change in external things ... - a 
condition of tight money, a condition ofhigh interest rates, a condition offaltering 
indust1y sales, or any combination of those things. It works on the company's 
\ internal problems such that the company can no ionger live with them, and so the 
company has at this point to either fall by the wayside or correct the internal 
problems. 
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Table 2 
Causes OfCo!J!OOl(e DecUne 
S!itw: .Schendel. Patton & Rig!U fugQ!Qff 
Lack of financial control Lack of control 
Inadequate management Management problems Peter principle, 
Management without guts 
Interpersonal conflict at 
decision making level 
Competition Increase competitive Change in technology firm 
pressure, Lower revenues hostage to current product 
markets 
High cost structure relative Higher costs Development oflocational 
to competitors disadvantages 
Changr.s in market demand Demand declines Change in market place 
Adverse movements Increasing cost of debt 
(eg. commodity,interest) 
Operational marketing Market problems Poor distribution 
problem 
Big projects Dependence on single 
customer 
Wrong acquisitions 
Financial Policy Limited financial resources 
Overtrading Sales growth faster than 
working capital 
Strikes 
Source: Slatter, S. (1984), Corporate Recovery. England: Penguin Books Ltd 
(p. 26). 
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Bibeault supported the statement made by Robert Di Giorgio, that decline and 
troubles were both externally and internally triggered. In his survey of eighty one 
turnaround company ChiefExecutives, Apri\1978, he found out the principal 
reasons for corporate decline to be as foUows (refer to Table 3). 
Bibeault divided external factors into five categories: 
• Economic Change 
• Competitive Change 
• Government Constraints 
• Social Change 
• Technological Change 
Table3 
Principal Reasons For Corporate Decline 
Reasons 
Sheer Bad Luck (Dun & 
Bradstreet, 1977) 
Percent 
External Factors beyond Management's 8 
Control 
Real Balt>:.ce of ExtemaJ and Internal 24 
Factors 
Internal Problems Triggered by External IS 
Factors 
Internally Generated Problems within 52 
Management's Control 
Total 100 
Source: Bibeault, D.B. (1982). Corporate Turnaround: How Managers 
TumLosers Into Wrnners. New:Mc Graw Hill (p. 25). 
" 
However, Bibeault's outlook towards internal reasons for decline strongly 
emphasised bad management. His findings were backed up by extensive surveys 
and discussions he held with over I 00 turnaround leaders where seven out often 
decline cases were internally generated and 85% of the time caused by bad 
managl!ment. Among the characteristics of bad management quoted were 
incompetence, narrow vision, displacement activity, management errors, one-man 
rule, one-man band, lack of management depth, management change problems, 
inbred bureaucratic management, unbalanced top management team and non 
participative board of directors. Apart from bad management, Bibeault has aJso 
quoted a weak finance function within the organisation as another internal cause of 
decline. 
Similar reasons for corporate decline were cited by Davis (1988) who, like 
Bibeault, divided the causes of decline into two categories i.e. Internal causes and 
external causes. Problems related to management, similar to those quoted by 
previous authors, such as one-man rule, complacency, panic paralysis, incompetent 
management, myopic syndrome, quality and skills of executives and lack of proper 
direction, were among those cited. Other intern<!. I causes of decline discussed were 
poor financial control, operational problems (production and marketing) and 'one-
off' causes such as catastrophic capital project and unwise diversification . 
.. 
As for external causes, Davis summarised them into problems with competition, 
market decline and 'one off' catastrophic external cases such as sudden change in 
the movement of commodity prices, an' oU shock ', major political impact, 
shortage of foreign currency or even civil war. 
Summarising the causes for corporate decline, it is obvious that the reasons given 
by several authors on the causes of corporate decline are basically similar and for 
categorisation purposes they can be divided into internal and external cause3 of 
decline. 
2.4 CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
Most business firms at some time suffer decline. Some die, others recover and go 
on, maybe to anoth('r crisis, and as such the circumstances where companies 
decline then recover and survive w a turnarourxl was in perfonnance. 
Corporate turnaround is not a new subject; no doubt it became a" buzz word" in 
the SO's and especially in the 90's when incidences of corporate decline were on 
the increase. Firms in both traditional and high tech industries for example; ICL 
Computers, Dunlop and BSR in the U.K :Peugeot, Waterman on the Continent : 
Westinghouse, Control Data, Walt Disney Co and United Airlines in the U.S have 
been known to implement turnaround strategies (Hoffinan, 1989). Similar claims 
were made by Alderman (1998) for Paragon and by Bowman (1998) for 
Scandinavian Airlines System. 
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But corporate turnaround is not something new. Zinunennan (1991), for instance, 
studied databases on significant finns operating in the automotive and agricultural 
industries since the tum of the century and their attempts to turnaround. Table 4 
depicts the result of his analysis. 
Another study in the United States concerning corporate records of the 4000 listed 
companies of the New York Stock Exch~nge (NYSE), the American Stock 
Exchange and the NASDAQ I over -the• counter (NASDAQ I QTC) was 
undertaker. ~y Donald B. Bibeault for the period i967- l 976. This was in order to 
overcome the paucity of data on decline and turnaround. About 1,100 of these 
were companies found to have de<.:lined to the point of sustaining losses in net 
income or experienced severe losses in earnings (80% or more). Of these, about 
370 had turnarounds during the same period. Table 5 depicts Bibeault's study in 
relation to the U.S economy. 
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Table 4 
Cases In The Turnaround Sample 
Case 1. Buick 1906-1925 
Case 2. International Harvester 1966-1985 
Case 3. Jeffrey Motors 1911-1930 
Case4. WillysOverland 1916-1935 
Case 5. American Motors Corp 1951-1970 
Case 6. Ford Motor Co. 1975-1988 
Case 7. Kaiser Frazer 1944-1956 
Case 8. Cadillac 1897-1916 
Case 9. Hudson Motor Co. 1927-1946 
Case 10. Chrysler Corp 1975-1988 
Case II. Arne/Renault 1971-1987 
Case 12. Maxwell Chalmers1916-1935 
Case 13. Allis Chalmers 1965-1986 
Case 14. Packard 1929-1948 
Case 15. Studebaker Packard 1949-1966 
Case 16. Deers & Co. 1927-1946 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Unsucces.gfuJ 
Successful 
Source: Zimmennan, F.M. (1991). The Turnaround Experience. New York: 
Me Graw Hill Inc (p. 32). 
In the United Kingdom about 20% of quoted companies and probably a greater 
percentage of smaller independent companies, have been in need of turnaround 
(Slatter, 1984). The author undertook a study of publicly quoted finns in the U.K 
in 1978 over a fifteen year period ( 1961 - 1976). HE: found that 20"/o of the 
approximately 2,100 firms that were publicly quoted for part or all of the period 
1961- 1976 were classi6ed as in need of turnaround. Ofthe 437 finns so 
identified, only 102 continued to show a fourth year of profit decline, and only 18 
showed five and more years of consecutive decline. On average, about one in four 
of the firms managed successful recovery. Table 6 depicts the findings above. 
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Table 5 
A Perspective (JfBibeault's Stydy Related To The U.S Como rate Economy 
Number of person in the labour force 
Number of economic units (business 
professionals .. etc) 
Number ofbusiness establishments 
Number of corporations filing with the U.S 
TreMU<y 
Number of public companies 
Number oflisted companies 
Percent median income of listed companies 
with losses (1967-76) 
Number oflisted companies with losses 
(1967-76) 
Number oflisted companies with 
turnarounds (1967-76) 
Number of turnaround companies 
responding to questionaire 
Number of additional companies covered in 
indepth interviews 
100,000,000 
13,000,000 
4,100,000 
2,::100,000 
11,000 
4000 
90 
1094 
369 
81 
16 
Sources: Bibeault, D.B. (1982). Corporate Turnaround: How Managers Tum 
Lossers Into Winners. New York: Me Graw Hill (p. 12). 
Table6 
Change Of Successful Recoveries 
No. of years 
of declining earnings 
(in 1970 prices) 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Tom! 
No. of firms 
needing recovery 
335 
84 
13 
5 
437 
No. of firms 
successfully 
recovered 
81 
22 
2 
I 
107 
Recovery 
success(%) 
24 
27 
15 
20 
24 (Average) 
Source: Slatter, S. (1984). Corporate Recovery. England: Penguin Books Ltd 
(p. 19). 
2.5 DEFINITION OF CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
A variety of definitions are given to corporate turnaround. Some are basically 
qualitative in nature, some quantitative in nature. 
Bibeault (1982) defined corporate turnaround as the substantial and sustained 
positive change in the perfonnance of the business and in most cases the 
turnaround followed several years of declining profitability. 
"When a company is in' trouble' and is in need of a turnaround, the whole world 
seems to know it and the entity becomes something of a spectacle for t!te business 
community to feed upon. The true art of management is in reading the symptoms 
of a company headinf!; for trouble and taking the appropriate steps to fend off 
disaster" (Goldston, 1992, p. :3). 
Whitney (1987} has a rather interesting way to define corporate turnaround 
that is: 
By forsaking old habits and embracing a disciplined rehabilitation 
program. the recovered patient may acquire even greater vitality 
than it had before it became ill. And by taking its turnaround 
medicine before the ambulance is called, the company slipping into 
trouOie may avoid the trauma of management change or 
reorganisation, {p. v). 
Successful turnaround is when the fum takes urgent action to stem losses, and also 
refocuses strategy in order to effect a substantial and sustained improvement in 
perfollJllUK:C.' (Henley's Strategic Management Notes, 1990). 
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Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976) defined turnaround as the changing of the 
downturn phase of the busine!ll back into the upturn. Another definition of 
corporate turnaround as cited by Slatter (1984) is" the company whose financial 
performance indicates that the firm will fail in the foreseeable future unless short 
term corrective action is taken" (p. 14). Sloma (1985) has a similar definition 
which is" a business that faces financial disaster unless action is taken to prevent 
the occurrence ofthat financial disaster" (p. II). 
Observing the definitions given by different authors and researchers on corporate 
turnaround, it is easily detectable that they all have similar and common 
denominators in them; 
I. Turnaround deals with troubled companies, featured by low financial 
performances, probably with losses and are in downturn phase of the 
business. 
2. Turnaround deals also with the need to counter the problems of the troubled 
companies by taking measures, steps and corrective actions to reverse its 
fate into an upturn business phase. 
3. That if no action is taken to turnaround the company, most likely it will face 
a financial disaster and become a failure. 
" 
---------
The definitions of corporate turnaround above will act as one of the key tools in 
identifYing potential turnaround candidates in the research. The research will 
address the technique of identifying turnaround candidates in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.6 PHASES OF CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
Corporate turnaround is a process that will require time to bring the company from 
the' red' to' black'. It cannot be completed in a very short period of time. 
Larger companies are known to take nearly a decade to turnaround while smaller 
companies can be turned in six months (Bibeault, 1982). 
Just as there are a number of phases leading to crisis, so there are a number of 
typical phases that a company goes through in achieving recovery (Slatter, 1984). 
The two authors mentioned above, have addressed the phases in corporate 
turnaround in detail. 
Slatter (1984) presented four strategic phases in corporate turnaround: 
Tbe Aaaly1ll Pbue: This phase involves problem identification, deciding the 
appropriate mix of turnaround strategies needed for short term survival and 
developing a detailed action plan. The actual time available tOr analysis is 
determlned by the severity of crisis and the size and complexity of the business. 
" 
The Emergency Phase: Consists ofthose actions necessary to ensure survival and 
focuses on generic strategies that can most easily be implemented in the short 
term. The emergency phase is often characterised by surgery, divesting 
subsidiaries, closing plants, employee redundancy, firing incompetent managers, 
reducing surplus inventories, cutting out unprofitable product lines ... etc. -all 
actions designed primarily to improve the cashflow and stop the losses. It is also 
the time when the company seeks additional financing to implement its recovery 
strategy. This phase typically lasts from six to twelve months. 
The Strategic Change Pha1e: Whereas the emergency phase emphasises 
operations] factors, the strategic change emphasises on product- marKet 
reorientation. By the implementation of the appropriate recovery strategy in the 
emergency phase, the rompany now has more assurance on short term survival and 
can begin to think about the longer term. 
It is al110 at this phase that management and I or shareholders may realise the long 
term viability of the finn looks doubtf . .LI, or that the investment of money and time 
required to achieve sustainable recovery is not worth the risks involved. They may 
therefore, decide to look for a suitable purchaser for the business. However, if the 
product - market reorientation appears viable, the strategic change phase is 
characterised by: 
• An increased emphasis on profits in addition to the early emphasis on cash. 
" 
• Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is unlikely to be satisfactory at this phase 
even though losses have been eliminated. 
• Continued improvements in operational efficiency. 
• Organisation building • bearing in mind that the organisation may have been 
traumatised in the emergency phase. 
The Growth Ph•se: By this time of the turnaround process, the balance sheet 
would have improved and it is now that the company needs to grow either 
organically through new pr1::duct development and market development or via 
acquisition or both. 
Slatter stressed that there may be considerable overlay between the four phases of 
turnaround. He added that not all companies go through each phase of the 
turnaround in sequence since conditions may demand that the company go 
through the phases all at once. The length of each phase may also vary depending 
on the industry's cycle. 
The phases in corporate turnaround stated by Bibeault (1982) are very similar to 
that of Slatter' a, with the exception of the Management Change Stage in 
Bibeault's. Slatter did not give much emphasis on this stage but did mention that it 
takes place before the Analysis Phase - that is the recovery phase would begin 
when the new ChlefExecutive is appointed, 
" 
Understanding and appreciating the different phases in corporate turnaround will 
enable the research to identifY better in terms of companies who are actually 
undergoing a tumsround exercise and the phases they are in. 
2.7 CORPORATE TURNAROUND STRATEGIES 
From the definitions given earfier on corporate turnaround, it is obvious that 
turnaround deals with the turning of the company's downturn phase back to its 
upturn phase. However, as easy as it may sound the process can be tiring and 
complex. And like any other key factors in business, the company must have the 
right turnaround strategies to enable it to change the course of its fate. 
Many authors and researdlershave presented their views on what constitutes 
corporate turnaround strategies. 
Slatter (1984) studied forty United Kingdom public companies in the 1970's, thlrty 
of which were successful turnaround situatiollB and ten were failures. He found the 
following as key strategies used in corporate tumarourxl: 
1. Asset Reduction 
2. Changeofmanagement 
3. FmanciaJ Control 
4. Cost Reduction 
5, Debt Restructt!ring I Financial 
6, Improved marketing 
" 
7. Organisational Change 
8. Product-Market Change 
9. Growth via Acquisition 
10. Investment 
A detailed comparison of Slatter's findings is depicted in table 7. 
Table 7 
Comparison Of Successful And Unsuccessful Recovmy Strategies 
Asset reduction 
Change of management 
Financial control 
Cost reduction 
Debt I Financial Rest. 
Improved marketing 
Organisational changes 
Product-market changes 
Growth via-acquisition 
Investment 
Finns using generic turnaround strategy (%) 
Successful recovery 
situations 
93 
87 
70 
63 
53 
so 
47 
40 
30 
30 
Failed recovery 
situations 
so 
60 
50 
90 
20 
so 
20 
30 
10 
10 
Source: Slatter, S. (1984). Corporate Recovery. England: Penguin Books Ltd 
. (p. 121). 
" 
Slattel' also mentioned that his study for the U.K compsnies in comparison with 
twentyCalifornisn companies bore similar patterns of generic strategy usage. 
A similar study to the one by Slatter was undertaken in 1976 on fifty four 
manufacturing companies by Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976). Generic 
strategies used in turnarounds were observed to be as follows: 
I. Organisational and Management Change 
2. Marketing Strategy 
3, Plsnt Expenditures 
4. Efficiency Increases 
S. Diversification 
6. Divestiture 
7. Vertical Integration 
However, their results differ from that of Slatter's, in that they found a much 
higher incidence of new product development, major plsnt expenditure and 
diversification and a much lower incidence of new control systems. 
a 
It is also interesting to note that the gap bet\I;Elen these two studies was somewhat 
lllUTowed when Schendel, Patton and Riggs· .. (1976) undertook another study in 
that same year snd found that additional strate/Pes such as sales growth, capital 
investment, cost cutting and acquisition wer.i also used in corporate turnarounds. 
" 
'\ ) 
Davis (1988) stated four turnaround strategies similar to the ones in the two 
studies above. Apart from the strategies above, improvement in human resource 
issues was also considered as a strategy in turnaround (Eisenberg, 1972). Silver 
(1992) cited strategies that were in support of Davis's and Eisenberg's. Carrington 
and Aurelio (1976) in a case study ofa small U.S firm indicated that other than i·' 
cost cutting, renegotiation of terms with the creditors was another key strategy in 
turnaround. 
In a study often South African companies, Kilroe (1981) fou~:l. that the 
turnaround strategies employed were similar to strategies of companies with low 
market share. 0' Neil (1986) in his study of fifty one U.S banks found a rather 
contrasting strategy from some of the ones mentioned above and that the 
restriction of growth was one of the key strategies in banking turnaround. 
Among the key strategies for turnaround stated by Sloma (1985) in his book 
" The Turnaround Manager's Handbook", was the reduction of people-related 
ext:enses or employment layoffs. This strategy was obviously in contrast with that 
ofDavis's, where the human resource strategy was one of maintaining employee 
motivation. There have been others who have written on strategies for corporate 
tumaroundsuch8!1 Hamenr,esh(l9761 Biteman (19791 Hofer (1980), Hambrick 
and Schecter (1983), Ramanujam (1984), Melin (1985) and Firsirotu (1985), but 
the strategies put forward were very similar in nature with others cited before. 
" 
Bibeault (1982), however, had interestingly categorised the key strategies for 
turnaround according to the corporate turnaround phases. According to Bibeault, 
among other factors such Ill! objectives, tactics and review methods, strategies 
incorporated in a turnaround plan vary from one stage of the turnaround to the 
next (refer to table 8). 
Table H 
Contrasting Elements In The Business Plan By Turnaround Stage 
Planning 
Objective(s) 
Strategies 
Tactics 
Review & Control 
Emergency Plan 
Sur:vival,retum to 
positive cashflows 
Liquidation! 
Divestment product 
elimination, head 
count cuts 
Numerous 
"Hands-on" 
management, daily 
and weekly cash 
reports 
Stabilization Plan Return-to 
Growth 
Plan 
Profit improvement 
earn acceptable ROI 
Divestment,product-
mix,enchancement, 
impmve operations, 
reposture the 
business 
Numerous 
Managerial 
accounting 
emphasis, weekly 
operations 
review,monthly 
controls, quarterly 
proiJt and loss 
reviews 
Growth and 
development 
Growth in Market 
Share 
Acquisition, new 
products, new 
markets, increase 
market penetration 
Numerous 
In addition to 
stabilization 
planning reviews 
Source: Bibeault,D,B. (1982). Corpomte Turnaround. New Yolk: Me Graw Hill 
(p. 239). 
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An almost similar study was undertaken by Taylor (1983). Taylor studied the 
characteristics of successful turnaround strategies in a number of companies and 
had identified a pattern of steps that needed to be taken. First, he looked into a 
wide variety of strategies necessary in a turnaround situation. Second, he observed 
the tenor or tone of how these strategies were being used. Different strategies 
were implemented according to what he called ' Contraction ' or immediate 
corrective actions to ensure survival and ' Expansion ' or the long term actions to 
effect a substantial and sustained improvement in performance 
(refer to table 9). 
2.8 KEY FACTORS IN TURNAROUND SUCCESS 
Having identified and implemented the strategies to turn around the company, it 
will not be sufficient to guarantee the success of the company's turnaround. This is 
because the way in which these strategies are combined to provide a .compBl1y with 
an overall recovery strategy can vary enormously 
(Slatter, 1984). 
There are other elements and key factors which can dictate the right strategy or 
combination of strategies to be used for a successful turnaround. The common 
thing that comes to the mind of the person or team handling the turnaround is the 
turnaround plan. A successful turnaround according to Sloma (1985), consists of 
only two elements" first, there must be a turnaround plan and second it must be 
communicated" (p. 35). 
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Table 9 
Steps Towards A Successful Recoyecy Stra~ 
Contraction Expansion 
Industry structure Reduce no.offirms Arrange mergers 
Concentrate production Co-operative supply 
capacity agreement 
Finance and Liquidity Reduce overheads,costs Reestablish profitability 
working capital, Sell off Raise cash for investmer 
"'"" 
Management and Cut back administration and Appoint 'entrepreneurs' 
organization central staff Hold them accountable 
Planning and control Eliminate five -year planning Re-allocate resources 
control on tight monthly based on strategy for 
budget each operation 
Product I markets Prune existing product line Invest in fewer key 
Close marginal business products/markets, 
Introduce more cost 
effective products 
Production/ operations Fewer models, simpler Invest in latest 
designs, close capacity machinery, Involve 
Reduce manning, move work force in improved 
labour-intensive operations quality productivity 
Technology Close obsolete plant Invest in modern 
Withdraw outdated process and new 
products products 
PersoMel Reduce manning. Eliminate Increase productivity re-
inefficient methods train,increase pay 
Socia- practical Collaborate to build new Collaborate to minimise 
businesses social problems 
Source: Taylor, B. (1982/3), Turnaround, Recovery And Growth, Journal Of 
General Management, 8 (2) 5-13. 
" 
Zimmerman (1991) created a model that described succenfillturnaround as a 
function ofthree principal factors: 
I. The firm's effectiveness as a low cost operator. 
2. The firm's effectiveness u a provider of increasing differentiated products. 
3. Existence of leadership as the turnaround agent with the significant and 
relevant industrial experience. 
(Details on Zimmerman's model is depicted in Figure 1). 
Slatter (1984) in his study of forty U.K public companies found six sets of factors 
that determine which generic strategies are required to effect corporate recovery. 
They are: 
l. Causes ofDecline (as discussed in the earlier part ofthis research). 
2. Severity of the Crisis i.e. the degree to which the firm has progressed 
towards insolvency. 
3. Attitude of Stakeholders involved in the turnaround pracess i.e.; 
the groups of people who influence the company or are influenced by it 
(e.g. shareholders, management, employees, customers, suppliers I creditors, 
banks, government, local community, competitors, trade union ... etc.). 
6l 
1. Operational Efficiency \ 2. Inventory Efficiency A 
3. :M:>dest Overhead I LOW COST 4. Lower Cost thro Design. OPERATION 
1. Distinguishing Features \ 2. Reliability &Performance B 
3. Product Quality 
-7 PRODUCT 4. Muicet Continuity DIFFERENTIATION 
1. Focus on Operations 
2. Managerial Stability c 
3. Experience in the ln<lwltly \ APPROPRIA1E 4. TeclmicalF..xperience TURNAROUND 
5. Knowledge Exploration I ORGANISATION 6. Increnr.ntal Changes (lEADERSHIP) 
7. FairPlay 
Figure 1. Framework of a Successful Turnaround Process 
Source: Zimmerman, F.M. (1991). The Turnaround Experience. 
New York: Me Graw Hill (p. 13). 
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\ 
I SUCCESSFUL 
TURNAROUND 
I 1\ 
4. Company's Historical Strategy (even if the historical strategy was not a 
cause of decline). The company's historical strategy directly influences the 
appropriate recovery strategy. Both the company's product market scope 
and the deployment ofits assets innuence which generic strategies are 
feasible. 
5. Industry Characteristics i.e. the nature of the product, market segmentation, 
relative size and strength of competitors, exit barrier, bargaining power of 
suppliers, bargaining power of customers, threat of retaliation, rate of 
technological change, capital intensity and industry growth rate. The 
characteristics of an industry in which the firm competes always influence 
strategy formulation, whether the company is in a turnaround situation or 
not. 
6. The Company's Cost-Price Structure (which in tum is determined partly by 
the industry characteristiC3 llJid causes of decline). The cost-price structure 
is extremely important in determining whether management should focus 
short term attention on cost reduction strategy, marketing improvement 
strategy, or both to achieve rapid improvement in profit rna. ""gins. 
(Zimmerman's low cost operator strategy is parallel to Slatter's cost-price 
structure strategy). 
" 
Bibeault (1982) stressed that there are certain key elements that lead to turnaround 
success and in their absence a turnaround effort is highly risky, and they are the 
following: 
I. New Competent Mnnagement with full authority to make all the required 
changes. 
2. An economically and competitively viable Core Operation. 
3. "Bridge" Capital from external and internal sources to finance the 
turnaround. 
4. A positive attitude and motivated people so that initial turnaround 
momentum is sustained. 
Bibeault added that all the factors above are important and interact in creating a 
successful turnaround. 
Key fllctors for successful turnaround have also been cited in other literature. Both 
Davis (1988) and Silver (1992) cited similar key factors as Slatter's and 
Bibeault's. However, Silver added that negative publicity, writ of attachment or 
blistering lawsuit can cause the turnaround plan to go amiss. These were the 
degree of darr.ages done to the company by creditors, the press and internal 
discussions. 
66 
2.9 CLASSIFYING CORPORATE TURNAROUND 
Just as in the case with any event, the turnaround has its own outcomes. Not all 
corporate turnarounds result in success. Some fail while some others land in the 
zone of" uncertainty". Possibly the best work done in classifying corporate 
turnaround is by Slatter (1984). 
Slatter pointed out four types of recovery situations and further categorised them 
into Non-Recoverable Turnarounds and Recoverable Turnarounds: 
Non·Recovt~rahle Turnarounds 
Basically he sees two types namely: 
1. Tbe No Hopen; Companies characterised by a serious attempt at 
turnaround, although they soon become insolvent or are acquired, because 
despite the efforts put in by management, they simply can no longer exist as 
viable and independent business entities even in the short period of time. 
2. Short Term Survivon; Companies that may well have succeeded in 
improving real profits for four successive years or more bot eventually go 
into insolvency due to their inability to develop sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
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R«<verabl.! Turnarounds 
It implies survival and has its own set of degrees: 
l, Mere Survival: Companies who have survived the trough of decline and 
are moving into the upward ph115C. However, the sustainability of recovery 
of these companies are doubtful and the value of money and time for 
investors is questionable. 
2. Sustainable Recovel)': Companies who have successfully implemented 
recovery strategies that pennit them to make above average profits in the 
long tenn and possibly embark into the growth phase of the turnaround 
process. A graphic representation of the above classification is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Types Of Corporate Recovery, 
Source: Slatter, S, (1984). Corporate Recovery (p. 117). 
2.10 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL WORK 
Various statistical failure identification models have been developed
1
-'the main 
I ' ,y 
teclmiques used being as follows: 
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2.10.1 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR PAIRED SAMPLES 
The original study using this technique was that of Fitzpatrick (1932, cited in 
Failure idEintification models, 1989, p.l ), who examined financial ratios of 19 pairs 
of failed and non-failed companies and found persistent differences at least 3 years 
prior to failure, with Net profit I Net worth and Net worth I Debt being the best 
discriminating indicators. 
Beaver (1966) examined trerxls in ratios for 79 failed firms, paired by industry and 
size, with 79 non-failed companies. To eliminate the worst effects of 
muticollinearity, Beaver chose the most repr.-:sentative ratio in each of the six 
groups and then studied trends over 5 years prior to failure to see which 
discriminated the best in terms of identifying the failed firms. Cash flow I Total 
debt classified correctly in 900111 of cases one year prior to fltilure; and 78% five 
years before hand; and Net income I Total assets 88% correctly I year prior to 
failure and 75% five years before hand. 
2.10.2 DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
Lev (1973) used the Theil entropy measure on Beaver's sample, postulating 
(I) that a current/ non current balance sheet classitil.'-ation of assets and claims was 
potentially economicnlly significant; and (2) that the ~tructural changes in such 
balance sheet categories of failed companies were likely to be larger for failed 
companies as bankruptcy approached. His results were slightly superior to 
Beaver's in *scriminating between failed and non-failed companies. 
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1.10.3 THE GAMBLER'S RUIN MODEL 
This model employ's Markov chain techniques and is based on the notion of 
p:obabiflties of alternate states of the world. This considered a finn faced with 
various possible states of liquidity over a future time horizon. The worst possible 
state is insolvency (zero liquid wealth). The model is concerned with the 
probabilities ofthe state ofliquidity changing from one period to the next. Assume 
the existing state, g, at .!3! is 3. The possibilities can then be mapped out for 3 
periods. 
Using this simplified version of the model (as used by Wilcox, 1971), the firm's 
liqllidity position is expected to change each period ·a steady state is not 
pennitted (which is perhaps unrealistic). The really disastrous probability path 
(which leads to gambler's ruin) is marked by a broken line, where the probability 
for the nelrt period is always that liquidity is going to get worse until it reaches the 
insolvency ' floor '. (The model only has a lower bound, not an upper one and the 
insolvency state is the only one where the state for the next period cannot change. 
it is known as the ' absorbing state'). Formally, the probability of failure, !. can be 
expressed as : 
P(F)={ l ifp<q 
{ ( q I p )N othenvise 
To estimate the parameters Nand W using accounting data, a finn's average 
gain or li:iss of liquidity during an accounting period is assumed to be a. Suppose 
this is $20,000, and the cash balance, .s;, at~ is $60,000. 
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Then if the firm loses all the 'gambles' over 3 periods, the cash balance will be zero 
at EJ:. The ratio g,1R relat~ to average 'cash flow' and is described as a 'drift 
rate'. The drift rate per period along the sequence of states in cash flow terms is 
!J!:g}_Q: . Thus, 
q/p=(I-c/o) I {l+c/a) 
and !1. can be defined as -J (mean cash flow)2 + variance of cash flow 
It is of course possible to collect data showing companies' cash position and cash 
flow; and then analyse past failed and non-failed finns to see whether differential 
trends in liquidity over time are good indicators oflikely bankruptcy. Wilcox did 
this for 52 failed and non-failed companies paired by asset size, industry and period 
over a five year time span prior to failure. The results were better at ' identifYing ' 
failure than those obtained by using Beaver's ratios. 
2.10.4 THE CATASTROPHE MODEL 
Catastrophe theory is a mathematical concept which can help to explain the nature 
of various social systems. Basically the theory is concerned with different points of 
potential equilibrium in a system, and analysee the effects of sudden, discontinuous 
changes following periods of smooth changes. The concept can best be explained 
in terms of a diagram representing a length of cloth. A fold in the cloth at one side 
represents a catastrophe minifold, which can be expressed mathematically. 
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. {. 
The control variables are the explanatory variables (e.g. ROCE and Risk): gradual 
changes in these represent a movement across the surface of the cloth until (say) 
point A on the state variable (non-failure) is reached, when there will be a sudden, 
predpitous drop to point Bon the lower (failed) level of the state variable. The 
catastrophe model as such, though it can be fonnulated mathematically, is not 
strictly operational, rather it offers a broader perspective of how other models can 
be viewed. 
2.10.5 SUBJECTIVELY DETERMINED RATIOS AND 
WEIGHTS 
Tamari (1966) developed a multivariate model based upon survey evidence from 
bankers, and then adjusted the parameter weights to find the best discriminating 
function. 
Six ratios were included in the original version (maximum scores in brackets): 
(I) Equity I Total assets (25 points} (2) Trend of Profits I Value of production 
(i.e.; Sales+ changes in finished goods stocks and work in progress) (25 points) 
(3) Current ratio (20 points) (4) Value of production I Stocks of raw materials 
and finished goods and work in progress (10 points) (5} Sales I Trade debtors (10 
points) (6) Value of production I Net current assets (to points). Scores for each 
ratio depended on the ratio values (e.g.; for (1}: 25 points if the value were >50%; 
20 if they were in the range 41% to 50%; IS in the range 21% to 40%; etc.) . 
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The closer a company's score is to the maximum I 00, the ' safer' it should be. In 
a aample of 130 Israeli companies, 52% of those scoring <30 points went 
bankrupt, and only 6% of those scoring between 30 and 60 points faced the same 
fate. 
2.10.6 MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS (MRA) 
The MRA model with a two point dichotomouR dependent variable 
(e.g.; O=failed: I =non-failed) is an alternative to MDA (Multivariate Discriminant 
Model, to be discussed subsequently) which gives similar results even though the 
assumptions which underlie it are technically different. 
In most respects, however, the requirements and problems are effectively the same 
as those with the MDA The technique has been used in the USA [e.g.; Meyer and 
Pofer (1970), Hambrick and Schecter (1983), Edmister (1972) ] and in the U.K 
the Bank of England model was developed by Marais (1979). 
2.I0.7 MULTIPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS (MDA) 
In simple terms this technique identifies two types of companies (failed and non-
failed) and evaluates them in terms of their characteristics. Assuming just two 
explanatory variables, i.e. current ratio, P ; and return on capita1 employed 
(ROCE), Q; aline fitted statistically that best discriminates between the two types 
of companies. 
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This technique selects stepwise from a set of variables, establishing the optimal 
discriminating parameter weights, until it determines the best combination. Thus, 
assuming that the variables P and Q above are chosen, it will establish the 
parameter values for a and bin the equation: 
Z=aP+bQ 
So, if it is found that the model discriminates optimally when a = 1.5 
and b = 3, the Z scores for companies in terms of their current and ROCE ratios 
can be calculated. In some versions of the model a critical Z score has to be 
calculated, above which the finn is likely to be a' non-failure ' and below which a 
' failure '. In other versions the cut-offpoint is set at zero by rescaling. 
The first MDA model applied to failure identification of manufacturing companies 
was that of Allman in 1968, but it was a very crude model, not the least of its 
imperfections being that it derived from a sample of only 33 bankrupt companies 
and their pairs pooled over a 20 year period, 1945-64, during which time economic 
conditions changed con.;iderably. Nevertheless, Altman was able to claim that the 
model discriminated correctly in 95% of cases one year prior to failure; and in 72% 
of cases two years. Subsequently, Altman has produced a more refined, ZETA 
model; while other researchers have produced alternative models e.g.; for small 
firms or for particular industries; or including CPP indicators or variances of ratios 
in the data set. In the U.K, a number of similar models have been developed, the 
chief exponent being Taffier (1982). 
" 
According to the Journal of Banking and Finance (1984) the procedures for the 
use of the model have also been reviewed for several other countries e.g. France, 
Netherlands, and Japan 
However, the fact remains that the models themselves really only provide an 
' autopsy of failed finns '. Thus, it is not very surprising that a common 
characteristic is that ROCE is a major explanatory variable in MDA models, since 
bankrupt firms are typically not earning large profits. 
The fact that a model identifies a failed finn as such is quite probably not news to 
market agents -the accounting indicators after all are merely reflecting economic 
events already known to them. The real test of the model's potential value is to see 
whether they convey news at least as early as it appears to be reflected in market 
indicators, such as relative share price, or bond and credit ratings. 
2.10.8 MULTlPLEDISCRIMlNANTANALYSIS MODELS 
FOR TURNAROUND 
While extensive empirical work has been done by previous researchers, they have, 
however, concentrated on the area of predicting corporate failure and collapse. 
Very little has been done in the area of corporate turnaround. 
O'Neil (1986) undertook an analysis ofthe turnaround strategy in commercial 
banking. 
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Discriminant analysis was used to test the predictions of turnaround strategies in 
the banking industry. Two hypothese~ were tested- one consisting of twelve 
turnaround variables in order of their predicted magnitude; the other to test the 
non-existence of relationships between local market concentration and turnaround 
performance. Some of his findings are that turnarounds in banks were indeed 
fuelled by both revenue generation and cost control. Successful turnaround banks 
exhibited elements ofboth selective product-market pruning and piecemeal 
productivity. O'Neil's findings are consistent Hofer (1980), Schendel et al. (1976) 
and Hambrick & Schecter (1983). 
The declining banks were found to have higher interest costs, higher loan loss 
experience, have fewer loans per deposit dollar and have higher costs in general. 
They also showed lower levels of cash and treasuries I deposits, earned more from 
loans but were not able to control costs. The turnaround banks were found to be 
paying their employees more resulting in higher productivity. According to O'Neil, 
his model was successful with an 82% predictive rate of accuracy. 
A study of corporate turnaro~o~nd using the probability of bankruptcy was 
undertaken by Arkaradejdachachai (1993). He took a different approach to study 
turnaround where the probability of bankruptcy instead of profit rates was used as 
a turnaround criterion. Discriminant analysis ofbankrupt and non-bankrupt firms 
was first done to develop a bankruptcy model. 
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The model was then used to calculate the probability ofbankruptcy for the firms in 
the database. Finns that reduced the probability ofbankruptcy over periods of 
time were identified as turnaround finns. Hypotheses testing and statistical 
modelling were subsequently carried out to develop a turnaround model. The 
turnaround model was then used to identify actions taken by troubled firms that led 
to a lowering of their probability ofbankruptcy over time. He found that 
turnaround finns did not have the same mean rates of return during the distress 
period, the recovery period and the return to normal period. 
Secondly, groups ofturnaround firms with different du~ations did not have 
different mean rates of change of the probability of bankruptcy. Thirdly, the rates 
of change ofthe probability of bankruptcy before the turnaround and during the 
turnaround period were found to be positively correlated with the probability of 
bankruptcy at the beginning of the pre-turnaround. Lastly, the growth rate ofthe 
industry, size of the industry, cost cutting and product initiative affect turnaround 
duration (the length of time it took for troubled firms to turnaround). 
Pant (1986) studied corporate turnaround by focusing on structural characteristics 
ofturnaround frrms and their industries (sample of 137 mixed U.S Industrial firms 
was taken for the period 1970 to 1983). Variables suspected to capture these 
characteristics were used in developing models to predict turnarounds, Variables 
used for industrial characteristics included seller concentration, barrier to entry, 
industry growth and R&D expenditures of total industry. 
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Variables used for finn characteristics included market share, change in market 
share, size, level of diversification, leverage and capital intensity. Two other 
variables i.e. ownership control and profit margins were also considered. 
Her findings indicated that four characteristics i.e. size, R&D, external control and 
interaction variable combining margin and advertising were included in models 
developed by MDA. These models also provided help in distinguishing between 
the two groups. Several changes in turnaround flnnJ were also observed. 
Turnaround finns had substantially increased their revenue, decreased their 
leverage and capital intensity and increased their market share and margins. They 
were also finns that invested more heavily in R&D. However, the industry growth 
was negative for both the turnaround and non-turnaround groups. She added that 
both groups experienced change in control type i.e. some turnaround finns 
changed from being externally controlled to being owner controlled and some non-
turnaround finns had changed from being owner controlled to being externally 
controlled. 
2.10.9 DRA WHACKS IN USING THE MULTIPLE 
DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS (MDA) 
The drawback in modelling using the WA is that there are a host or statistical 
problems associa.ted with it rendering the results somewhat problematic 
(Altman, 1993). 
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The potential problems, he explained can be categorised as follows: 
• Violations of the underlying nonnality and independent assumptions of the 
classical linear regression or discriminant approaches. 
• Reduction of dimensionality issues. 
• Interpretation of the relative importance ofindividual variables. 
• Specification of the appropriate classification algorithm. 
• Time series prediction test interpretation. 
Wilson (1989) indicated a common problem with the multivariate model and the 
MDA, namely, there was often a' grey area ' in which the classification as 
' failed ' or ' non-failed ' was determined. This was unsatisfactory, since it would 
often be more helpful to the user to classify such problem companies as a separate 
category. He stressed that various technical problems must be overcome for the 
model to be statistically valid and these have gradually been recognised by 
researchers over the years. These are listed as follows: 
• How wide should the data set be from which the variables are related? Should 
it include macro economic indicators, since companies arc more likely to fail at 
different points in the trade cycle? Should it include industry dummies, since 
different types offinns are vulnerable at different times and have different 
compositions of assets and claims? A!l regard to company specific infonnation, 
should it include non-accounting information, such as increasing lags before 
publication of accounts; qualified auditors reports; or resignation of auditou, 
etc.? 
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Or, to take the argument to its logical conclusion, should it include share price 
indicators, which· if market is infonnationally efficient- will impound all other 
information contained in the other indicators? In fact it has not proven feasible 
to include macro-economic indicators - instead models have had to be 
reformulated for different periods (which nevertheless \lave been derived from 
data pooled over lengthy periods). 
• As for the industry aspect, dummies have; br.en used to represent broad 
industry categories, but it has been more usual to develop models for specific 
sectors (e.g. railways, banks, savings and loan, engineering, retailing and 
distribution), In a few studies 'non-accounting' and share price residual 
indicators have also been included in the variable set- but there are problems 
in calculating the latter. 
• Factors included in the variable set ought to be stable in representing particular 
characteristics of the finn over time if the model is to be applied to data for a 
number of years. Thus Cash flow I Debt may correlate strongly with ROCE 
one year before failure; but with gearing ratios more than 3 years before 
failure. Such stability can be idertified using a form offactor analysis known as 
'principal component analysis'. If instability exists in a particular ralio it should 
be excluded from the variable set. 
• The ratios or their transformation should be normally distributed. 
81 
• The optimal discriminant function may in fact be curvilinear rather than linear. 
However, experiments have shown that this is unlikely to be the case. 
• Most models have been based on data for companies "i;ne year prior to failure. 
It could be argued that it might be more helpful to see whether failing finns 
exhibited different characteristics from their non-failing counterparts. When • 
earlier base years have been tried, the characteristics ofthe models have been 
somewhat different, emphasising liquidity rather than gearing. 
• Certain statistical requirements should be met for the models to be valid; most 
obviously that the group dispersion (variance- covariance) matrices should be 
equal for failed and no-failed groups. 
• The statistical power of the model has to be tested. Overall significance is 
measured by theE-test while the relative importance of the individual 
explanatory variables can be measured in various ways (broadly equivalent to 
the I-test in regression); standardised coefficients; Mosteller and Wallace 
scores; conditional deletion procedures, and Mahanalobis's D2 distance 
statistic (hold outs). 
• The problem of sample selection bias is a major one, since the researcher 
typically selects his failed company sample first and then chooses a non-failed 
control sample. (In fact, the latter is often done matching for size, industry and 
I or period, which excludes these potential explanatory variables). However, 
the control sample does not have to be equal in number to the failed sample, 
but it would be inconceivable that it should be as high as say 950- which is 
what it would need to be if the prior probability of failure was 5% and the 
failed company sample was 50. In an attempt to allow for this, some 
researchers t.ave calculated the cost ofmisclassif:Ying a company, given the 
prior probabilities of failure. 
• The robustness of the model can be tested in various ways- e.g. split the 
sample into two, derive the model from one half and see whether it performs 
well on the other (hold out test); derive the model over one period oftime and 
then test it intertemporarily on a sample from another period; or use the 
Lachenbruchjack-knife procedure- i.e. with n sample companies, proceed 
iteratively to see whether, when including each company in tum, a model 
derived from the other n-1 companies classifies it correctly. 
Furthennore, the limitations of the use of MDA and the absence of any 
underlying theoretical model suggest that either alternative techniques or 
different data are required if significant improvements in predictive power 
are to be obtained (D. Storey, n.d). 
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2.11 ALTERNATIVE STATISTICAL 
MODELLING TECHNIQUE 
Just to classifY firms as ' failed ' or ' non-failed ' is oflimited interest. it would be 
far more useful if a likelihood of failure index could be devised and indeed, Taffier 
(I 982) has produced a Perfonnance i\,nalysis Score (PAS), which uses the Zi value 
as one of its 3 inputs, the other two being number of years at risk and trend. 
A purpose oft he general regression model is to determine the probability of a 
particular outcome when the dependent variable Y is limited to two values, 0 and 
1, representing binary choice, the regression model has to be modified, the simplest 
modification being to use the linear probability model. 
Y:=a+bX+e where X can be only 0 or I. 
The probability distribution f of X can be described as 
E (Y) = 1 (P) + 0 (1-P). 
Unfortunately, this fonnulation means the error tenn will be heteroscedastic, since 
there wiU be higher variances in e where X"' l/2 then when X"' 0 or 1. This does 
not produce biased or inconsistent parameter estimates. But it will result in loss of 
efficiency. Correlation by weighted least squares (WLS) gives further problems. 
Therefore, it is better to use the ordinary least squares procedure. 
'' ! I 
84 P. 
However, another problem arises where the estimated regression line is 
misestimated, when the predicted value lies outside the range 0 and 1. 
These problems with the linear probability model can in filet be largely avoided if 
the probability distribution can be transfonned in some way. In order to ensure that 
increases I decreases in the explanatory variable(s) X nre associated with increases 
I decreases in the dependent variable y, it is necessary to use a cumulative 
probability function for transfonnation purposes. There are numerous possibilities, 
of which three are as follows: 
2.11.1 CUMULATIVE UNIFORM PROBABILITY 
FUNCTION 
This is a constrained version of the linear probability function where the model is 
transformed using a cumulative uniform probability function and is hereby denoted 
"'' 
Pi=cx+~Xi 
2.11.2 CUMULATIVE NORMAL PROBABiLITY 
FUNCTION: (PROBIT) 
The Probit model is associated with the cumulative nonnal pruOability function. 
The model assures that there exist!! a theoretical (but not actually measured) index 
~which is determined by an explanatory variable Xi,, as in the linear probability 
model. The index Zi is assumed to be a continuous variable which is random and 
nonnally distributed for the usual econometric reasons. 
" 
The standardised cumulative nonnal function is written as; 
2 
I 
' ·• 
I 2 
Pi (Z) = I 
' 
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Tile Probit model involves non linear estimation and thus added computational 
Work. 
2.11.3 CUMULATIVE LOGISTIC PROBABILITY 
FUNCTION: (LOG IT) 
The Logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability function and is 
specified as; 
I 
Pi (Z)"' 
-(a.+Pxi)"" 
l+o 
In this notation, !l represents the base of natural logarithms, which is 
approximately equal to 2.718. Under Logit ~is the probability of the choice given 
the factor Xi. The dependent variable is simply the logarithms of the odds that a 
particular choice will be made, which applies over the whole range 
0 to 1. 
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Because the slope of the cumulative logistic distribution is greatest at f = 1/2, 
changes in the independent variable(s) X will have their greatest impact on the 
probability of alternative at the midpoint of the distribution and relatively little 
impact at either of its ends. At the limit, where l = 0 or f..= I, the logarithm of the 
odds will be undefined. This means in fact that the Logit model should be 
estimated for each point in the distribution across ,X, with a minimum of 5 
observations per value of X. This is unlikely to be possible where the population is 
small; where variables are continuous; aod where X represents several explanatory 
variables. In such circumstances it will be necessary to use maximum likelihood 
estimates involving non linear techniques. 
Ohlson (1980) pointed out that the Logit model is a powerful alternative. It does 
not require nonnality of the ratio distribution. nor that the variance- covariance 
matrices of the two groups have to be the same. It is also superior due to the fact 
that it is computationally simpler, not requiring the use of non linear estimation 
techniques. (Martin, 1977) found that the Logit model gave significantly better 
probability estimates than the MD A. The only two empirical studies in corporate 
turnaround using the Logit model are by Pant (1986) and Arkaradejdachachi 
(1993). Their research involved the usage of the Logit and the MDA (as previously 
cited) in developing turnaround models. 
/ j 
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2.12 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
f'rom the literature review and the definitions given by severn! authors, corporate 
turnaround can be said to be the process of trying to change the unfavourable fate 
or conditions of a company which is undergoing a Downturn Phase hack to a 
better position in an Upturn Phase. 
Causes of decline in troubled conipanies are complex; ranging from management 
fault, lack of financial control, high cost structure and many more as mentioned by 
researchers like Altman (1993), Slatter (1984), Davis (1988), Schendel et al 
(1976), Sigal off (198\) and Bibeault (1982) in our literature review. The causes of 
decline in a troubled company can be a singular main problem or combinations of 
problems. We also know from Bibeault (1982) that troubled companies can be 
classified by the level of trouble they are in i.e. mild, moderate and severe troubled 
companies. The latter is a serious condition where the troubled company's very 
existence can be threatened. Declining or troubled companies signal or beacon one 
common thing- that something must be done or actions must be taken immediately 
to stop slipping downwards further to the point of no return 
or ' death ofthe corporation '. 
These actions or steps taken by troubled companies to turnaround their 
corporations' fate are what is called ' Turnaround Strategies '. Like the causes of 
decline, there are also several strategies available as the panacea to stop further 
decline and to turnaround the troubled company. 
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As quoted by several authors like Slatter (1984), Bibeault (1982), Davis (1988), 
Schendel et al (1976), Silver (1992), Eisenberg (1972), Carrington and Aurelio 
(1976), they can range from strategies like changes in leadership and management, 
cost reduction, asset reduction ........ to even contrasting strategy like growth 
restriction (O'Neill, 1986). It is also interesting to note that successful recovery 
situations have been characterised by vigorous implementation of those strategies 
(Slatter, 1984). Vigorous implementation of the right strategy or combination of 
strategies alone is of no guarantee for a successful corporate turnaround. 
Bibeault (1982) states that: 
Before a company can cure its problem, it must realise that it has 
major problems and make the decision to do something about them. 
This is what I call reaching the ' Moment of Truth '. At the point 
where a company reaches its moment of truth and decides to make 
fundamental changes, it has gone from absolute decline to potential 
turnaround (p. 93). 
The moment oftruth is an event classified by Bibeault under the ' Management 
Change Stage' of the turnaround phase. 
All stated above, recognising the existence of major problems and analysing them is 
not enough, plans of action or strategies must be identified to be implemented to 
counter the problems. This is usually done under what Bibeault calls the 
' Evaluation Stage ' or Slatter's ' Analysis Phase '. Analysis involves problem 
identification, decidh1g the appropriate mix oftumaround strategies needed for 
short tenn survival and developing a detailed action plan (Slatter, 1984). 
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However, it is interesting to note here that there is a ' missing link 'or gap that 
eKists between the 'moment of truth' in the management change stage and the 
point where decisions are made as to the type and combination of strategies to be 
implemented to turnaround the company in the ' Analysis Phase I Evaluation 
Stage '. Many researchers have ignored this ' gap ' or ' missing link ' and 
concentrated on identifying causes of decline and strategies to counter the decline 
and turnaround of the company. 
As Bibeault (1982, p. Ill) states" there are certain key elements that lead to 
turnaround success and in their absence, a turnaround effort is highly risky. 
All these factors are important and interact in creating a successful 
turnaround ". Slatter (1984) stressed that there are six factors that determine 
which generic strategies and combination of strategies are to be used to effect a 
corporate recovery. The authors above were supported by (Davis, 1988). 
Davis pointed out that in order to assess whether to undertake a company rescue, 
judgements on what was achievable must be made and he suggested that the best 
way to do this was to determine broadly what was necessary to render the 
company viable and to draw up an outline plan to that end. He cautioned, 
however, that for any plan to work five essential key factors must exist. 
Zimmennan (1991) as described in the earlier section of this research cited three 
principal factors that influence successful turnarounds. Howevec, like Davis, the 
key factors or elements were very much similar to the ones described by Slatter 
?! and Bibeault. 
,.,-,, 
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From the literature and the findings made by authors abovr., we can deduce that 
the existence of the key factors or elements not only influence the type and 
combination of strategies to be used enabling them to affect the turnaround 
process but are also actually the key detenninants of a feasible corporate 
turnaround and in their absence the tun.around effort can be highly risky. 
,, 
Based on the literature, the detenninants for a feasible corporate turnaround are 
hereby summarised: 
1. Cause'l of Dedine 
2. Severity of Crisis 
3. Company's Historical Strategy 
4. Industry Characteristics 
5. Company's Cost-Price Structure 
6, Altitude of Shareholders 
7, Attitude of Bankers 
8. Attitude of Creditors 
9, Attitude of Employees 
10. New Competent Management 
11. Viable Core Operation 
12. "Bridg~" Capital 
13. Realittic Turnaround Plan ' ,, II 
I' 
' 
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As mentioned earlier, many researchers on corporate turnaround have ignored this 
area and concentrated heavily on the causes of decline in troubled companies and 
the strategies available and used for successful turnarounds. Thus, a vacuum exists 
which creates an opportunity for research to test the above findings cited by Slatter 
(1984), Bibeault (1982) and Davis (1988). Similarly, empirical research on 
corporate turnarounds have been few. The research that used the' Logit Model' 
function in studying corporate turnarounds (which is the similar statistical 
technique this research will make use of) was by Pant (1986) and 
Arkaradejdachachai (1993). Pant's model was, however, found to be better at 
predicting unsuccessful turnarounds (Hoffman, I 989). 
The limitations of the previous empirical research on corporate turnaround areas 
follows: 
• Based totally on historical data patterns during the Downturn Phase and 
the Upturn Phase. 
• Focused heavily on strategies used for corporate turnarounds. 
• Analysed in-depth one partkular element or determinant of corporate 
turnaround feasibility. 
• Empirical models developed are not for testing or predicting the 
feasibility of corporate turnaround. 
Thus, again an opportunity exists for empirical research to develop a predictive 
model for testing the feasibility of corporate turnaround by taking into account sll 
" 
of the relevant determinants that dictate whether a turnaround will be feasible or 
not through a more integrated and comprehensive approach. 
2.13 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Identil)ring the detuiminants of feasible corporate turnarounds, as stated by authors 
like Slatter (1984) and Bibeault (1982), is simply not enough. It can be observed 
that the authors have not undertaken further observations and analysis on these 
detenninants in both successful and non-successful turnaround companies nor have 
they categorised them. It is important that further observations or analysis be 
carried out to shed new light and understanding with regard to the detenninants or 
key success factors of feasible corporate turnarounds. It is also considered that 
there is a need to categorise these detenninants or key success factors before any 
fonn of hypotheses can be fonnulated and tested. It can be observed that the 
twelve detenninants can be further broken down into 2 main categories. 
The detenninanls under category A are as follows: 
• Causa of Decline 
• Severity of Crisis 
• Company'• Historical Strategy 
• Industry Characteristics 
• Company Cost~Price Structure 
• Commitment of Shareholders 
• Commitment of BRoken 
• Commitment of Creditors 
• Commitment of Employee~ 
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CATEGORY A: HYPOTHESES 
For determinants under category A, the research is interested in the state of their 
existence (i.e. whether the state of their existence is favourable or non~favourablc 
for a feasible corporate turnaround) . The earlier quoted researchers suggested that 
they are pertinent detenninants offeasible corporate turnarounds and the state of 
their existence has an effect on the probability of corporate turnaround success. 
Thus, could it be that if the state of these dctenninants is favourable, a turnaround 
is then feasible, giving a company higher chances of achieving successful 
turnaround? And on the contrary it may have resulted in a turnaround not being 
feasible, and thus a company may not achieve a successful turnaround? Given these 
questions, the research hypothesised the following: 
Hypothesis I 
The favourable state of the detenninants of turnaround feasibility enables 
companies to achieve successful corporate turnarounds. 
Hypothesis II 
The non-favourable state of the determinants of turnaround feasibility 
impedes companies to achieve successful corporate turnarounds. 
The detenninants under category B are as follows: 
• New Competent Management 
• A Viable Core Bu~lness 
• Bri~ge Ca!JIU..i 
• Realistic Turnaround Plan 
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CATEGORY B: HYPOTHESES 
For detenninants under category B, the research is interested in their existence 
[i.e. whether they exist or do not exist (non existant)]. Again, they are quoted by 
previous authors like Slatter (1984), Bibeault (1982) and Sloma (1985) as 
pertinent detenninants of feasible corporate turnarounds and their existence have 
an effect on the probability of corporate turnaround success. 
Thus, could it be that if these determinants exist, a turnaround is then feasible, 
giving a company higher chances of achieving successful turnaround? And on the 
contrary it may have resulted in a turnaround not being feasible, and thus a 
company may not achieve a successful turnaround? Given these questions, the 
research hypothesised the following: 
Hypothesis m 
The es.istenee of the determinants ofturnaround feasibility enables 
companies to achieve successful corporate turnarounds. 
Hypothesis IV 
Nonwexistence of the determinants of turnaround feasibility impedes 
companieJ to achieve suceesdul corporate turnarounds, 
2.14 SUMMARY 
The definitions given by the different authors and researchers on corporate 
turnaround ha\ ..l similar and common elements, namely; I. Turnaround deals with 
troubled companies, featured by low financial perfonnances, probably with losses 
" 
and are in a downturn phase of the business; 2. Turnaround deals also with the 
need to counter the problems oft he troubled companies by taking measures, steps 
and corrective actions to reverse its fate into an upturn business phase; 3. That if 
no action is taken to turn around the company, it will most likely face financial 
disaster and become a fai!ure. 
Corporate turnaround also involves four strategic p!i~ses; I. The Analysis Phase; 
2. The Emergency Phase; 3. The Strategic Change Phase and 4. The Growth 
Phase. Among the key strategies used in corporate turnaround were Asset 
Reduction, Change of Management, Financial Control, Debt Restructuring I 
Financial, Improved Marketing, Organisational Change, Product~Market Change, 
Growth via Acquisition and Investment. Factors such as objectives, tactics, review 
methods and strategies incorporated in a turnaround plan may also vary from one 
stage of the turnaround to the next. Corporate turnaround is also catergorised as 
Non-Recoverable Turnarounds: 1. The No Hopers; 2. Short Tenn Survivors, and 
Recoverable Turnarounds: 1. Mere Survival; 2. Sustainable Recovery. 
There are other key factors (i.e. detenninants) identified, which can dictate the 
right strategy or combination of strategies to be used for a successful turnaround. 
' 
They are the Causes of Decline, Severity oft he Crisis, Attitude of Stakeholders, 
Company's Historical Strategy, Industry Characteristics, Company's Cost~Price 
Structure, New Competent Management, Viable Core Operation, Bridge Capital 
and a Realistic Turnaround Plan. 
However, this was the area ignored by previous authors and researchers and a 
vacuum therefore exists to test the above detenninants in Successful and Non 
Successful Turnaround Companies. 
Various statistical failure identification models have also been developed for 
predicting corporate failures and the main techniques being used are as follows: 
Univariate analysis for paired samples, Decomposition analysis, The gambler's 
min model, The catastrophe model, Subjectively determined ratios and weights, 
Multiple regression analysis (MRA) and the Multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA). There are models developed to predict corporate turnaround using both 
Multiple Discriminant (MDA) and the Logit techniques. However, the drawback in 
using the MDA is that there are a host of statistical problems associated with it, 
rendering the results somewhat problematic. Whereas the Legit technique on the 
other hand is a powerful alternative and gives significantly better probability 
estimates than the MDA. 
Although corporate turnaround models have been developed using the Logit 
technique other than the MD A, these models were based on data gathered during 
the Upturn phase of the turnaround and concentrated heavily on one particular 
detenninant of corporate turnaround~ Industrial Structure. The models were 
however, unable to predict corporate turnaround feasibility. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used to identil)' the' troubled 
companies '. The research methodology used to analyse the determinants of 
corporate turnaround feasibility in Successful and Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies and to develop the empirical model for predicting corporate 
turnaround feasibility is al.so addressed in detail. 
The research adopted a Descriptive study technique using a survey research 
method of personal interviews with a structured questionnaire. Verbal 
confirmations were made with the interviewees to ascertain that tumaround efforts 
were undertaken in reference to their organisations past financial perfonnances. 
Subsequently, the confirmation process above was followed by the administration 
of the structured .. Questionnaire interviews. Corporate turnaround efforts and plans 
were also reconfirmed during the interviews through question 013. Realistic 
Turnaround Plan, in the structured questionnaire. The comparative financial 
\\. analysis, other than to help identify ' troubled companies ' also acted as a detector 
\~ of corporate turnaround. 
<: -..,-_; 
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Results from the smvey were qualitatively analysed and empirically tested and 
modelled. The purpose for using the Descriptive study technique is to provide an 
accurate snapshot of some aspects of the targeted environment, in this case the 
determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility in Successful and Non Successful 
Turnaround Companies. In the Dl."scriptive study technique, hypotheses often exist 
but they may be tentative and speculative. Subsequently, the usage of the Survey 
method through personal interviews is considered an appropriate m~thod under the 
Descriptive study technique (Aaker & Day, 1990). 
3.1 SAMPLING 
The Kuala Lumpur Stock ExchMge has a total of361 companies listed on its 
,, board. The poplllation from which the samples were taken consisted of' troubled 
companies', classified under tbe Consumer, Industrial, Trading & Services, 
Construction, Property Development, Plantations and Hotels sectors with the 
exclusion ofthose under the Finance and Extractive sectors. However, the 
population was not categorised into their industry groupings since this was not the 
intention of the research. The research intends to develop a model that can predict 
corporate turnaround feasibility, which can be of use to most publicly quoted 
companies of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. It was also foreseen that 
difficulties may arise in modelling the multivariate logistics regression should a 
particular industty sample size is small. 
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The research used data from these ' troubled companies ' for the period between 
1975 and 1995. The reason for selecting this time period was because of the high 
incidence of decline in profitability ofa large number of listed companies due (as 
claimed) to the economic downturn in the mid eighties. Some schools of thought 
may not agree with the data of 'troubled companies' in economic downturns. On 
the contrary, economic downturn should not be an excuse for getting companies 
into trouble. 
Argenti (1976, cited in Bibeault, 1982, p. 24) states that: 
A manager who blames external forces for a company's decline is 
like a ship's captain who has not heard the weather forecast. What 
does he expect, a world in which taxes and laws are not changed? 
This is like the captain of a ship which is grossly overloaded 
hlaming a two~foot wave fur the sinking~ and, in one case, he is 
right; it was a two-foot wave that sank it] But what about all the 
other ships near by which are still afloat?. 
Furthennore, a company or organisation does not exist in isolation. Organisations 
are born in a climate of el!:citement and hope: they must survive in a world of test 
and challenge. As in most cases the fault for declining is blamed on something 
other than the organisation itself since most ailing organisations have developed a 
funct\onal blindness to their own defects. They are not suffering because they 
cannot solve their problems but because theoj cannot see their problems (Gardner, 
1965). 
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3.2 IDENTIFYING' TROUBLED COMPANIES' 
3.2.1 IDENTIFYING AND CLASSIFYING THE 
POPULATION OR' TROUBLED COMPANIES' 
While there can be many characteristics and indicators for identifying potentiai 
' troubled companies ' for the research e.g. symptoms of decline and failures as 
cited by authors and researchers mentioned earlier, the practicality aspects of their 
usage should be first established. It would not be that easy to identifY all 
symptoms of decline in prospective companies given that those symptoms can only 
be identified by getting inert details within those companies of which, at this early 
stage in trying to establish the identification, would render the technique as not 
being practical and possibly time consuming. 
In his article ' Strategies for Corporate Turnarounds : What do we know about 
them ', Hoffinan (1989), evaluated seventeen studies concerning corporate 
turnaround strategies and found two key features which can be used to identify the 
potential ' troubled companies '. 
The two key features are turnaround cycle and profitability. He quotes that "six: 
studies suggest a downturn phase average of 2.8 years of decline with a range 
from 2 to 12.5 years. This is followed by an upturn phase in which financial 
perfonnance exceeds the acceptable norm for a period of time (in the turnaround 
cycle). This phase averaged 3.1 years with a range of I to 7.7 years " (p. 48). 
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He added that profitability was agreed as the yardstick for defining turnaround in 
the studies. The most popular indicator of profitability is Net Income and the other 
most frequently suggested measures are ROI and ROA. The research indicated 
that turnaround cycles are detennined by comparing the change in the growth rate 
of a firm's profitability to nonns such as : the firm's prior performance, industry 
profits. riskless government bonds or GNP. For the purpose of this research, the 
.J. approach taken for identifying and classifYing the population (' troubled 
companies ') will be as follows: 
TURNAROUND CYCLE 
Downturn phase of3 years 
Upturn phase of3 years 
(Based on Hoffinan's findings and approximated to the nearest absolute number 
for practical reasons). 
3.2.1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TROUBLED COMPANIES 
I. SHARE PRICES TRENDS INDICATOR (FINANCIAL TIMES EXTEL, 
CD ROM) 
Stock prices can, to some extent be reflective of the earning power of a company 
although there are of course other factors such as payout ratio, market news, 
market pressures and sentiments that influence the stock prices. Brealey (1971) in 
his empirical approach towards proving the key determinants that influences stock 
prices i~~icated that stock prices are determined llY the following variables; 
!.Required Rate ofRetum or a, 
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2.Market Capitalised Dividends Rate orb, 
3.Multiple Applied to Retentions or c. 
The expanded equation would then read: 
Stock Price= a+ b ~:Average Dividends Per Share in 3 prior yean+ c: x " 
Average Per Sbare in 3 prior yean 
It can be clearly denoted ffom the above model for the stock price determinant that 
the base element in all three variables, whether required return, average dividends 
or average retentions, is earnings or profits. 
Thus based on this argument, it can be said that one way that can help the analysis 
in shortlisting 'troubled companies' out of the 300 listed companies (excluding 
those ofthe Finance and Extractive Industries), would be by observing the trends 
in their prices via the Financial Times Extel C.D Rom database. 
2. PROFITABILITY YARDSTICK 
Once shortlisted using the F.T Extel C.D. Rom database they were double cheC".ked 
by analysing their earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and earnings after 
interest and tax (EAIT). At this stage it is important to observe the trends in EBIT 
and BAIT to see whether these trends clearly depict the Downturn and Upturn 
phases. f I~ 
" 
3. PNIJ..SCORE (MALAYSIAN Z-SCORE) 
The final confirmation on the status ofthe shortlisted ' troubled CO~!lanies ' was 
determined by using a composite failure identification model similar to the 
Z-Score of(Altman, 1983) which is the PNB Score (Malaysian Z-Score). 
Bidin (1988) stated that it was important to develop a mathematical model to 
describe the performance of Government companies and it was decided to name it 
PNB-Score model. The derivation of the model for companies operating in 
Malaysia was based on the concept proposed by Dr. E. I. Altman of New York 
university in 1968, 1977, and which was subsequently summarised in 1983. 
In deriving the PNB-Score model, 42 companies were selected for the model 
development and these companies were divided into two groups. The first group 
of21 companies consisted entirely of companies which were known to have 
serious finandal problems. The other group consisted ofthe same number of 
companies, only these were financially sound. The companies selected were 
entirely Malaysian companies and which were undertaking business activities in 
Malaysia. 
The equations derived for the companies facing problems and no problems are as 
follows: 
Mp = 1.38-5.79xR.l-0.2lxR2-1.05xR3-0.05xR4+0.04lxR5-0.00:lxR6+0.26xR7 
Mnp = 9.68+ 17.42xR1 +4.99xR2+ 1.95xR3+0.23xR4-0.05xR5+0.08xR6+1.94xR7 
'"' 
Rl =Operating Profit I Total Liabilities, 
R2 = Current Assets I Current Liabilities, 
R3 :o= EAIT I Paid-up Capita~ 
R4 = Sale~ I Working Capital, 
RS =Current Assets- Stocks· Current Liabilities I EBIT, 
R6 = Total Shareholders' Fund I Total Liabilities, 
R7 =Ordinary Shareholders' Fund I Employment of Capital. 
Mp and Mnp are the equations for problem and no problem characteristics 
respectively. Mdiff= Mnp - Mp. IfMdiff is positive, the status of a yompany is a 
'no-problem' status and ifMdiffis negative, the status ofthe company is a 
' problem ' status. 
The application of the PNB-Score model was found to be suitable for companies 
grouped under most industrial sectors with the exception of extractive and 
financial sectors. It was observed that the model is heavily oriented towards 
variables that denote liabilities of the company. Hence, companies with large 
borrowings tend to have PNB-Score biased towards ' problem ' status. 
The model has been tested on over 600 companies with known financial 
infonnation, in which data on the perfonnance had been stored in the computer 
database. The results predicted by the model were found to be consistent with the 
actual perfonnance of the companies in over 90 percent of the cases considered. 
In cases where the model failed to predict the perfonnance of the companies 
accurately, it was found that this happened only when the values of working capital 
or the earnings before interest and tax were very small. 
"" 
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3,2,1.2 CLASSIFYING 'TROUBLED COMPANIES' INTO 
SUCCESSFUL AND NON SUCCESSFUL 
TURNAROUND COMPANIES 
I. RETURN ON SHAREHOLDERS FUND AND COMMERCIAl. BANKS 
FIXED DEPOSITS RATES 
The confirmed ' troubled companies ' were further classified into Successful and 
Non Successful Turnaround companies by a comparative analysis of their Return 
On Shareholders Fund (ROSF) and the Commercial Banks Fixed Deposit Rates. 
Eventually, two major turnaround situations will prevail i.e. the ' Mere Survivals ' 
and the ' Sustainable Recoveries '. For the purpose of this research, the two major 
turnaround situations will be classified as: 
Sustainable Recoveries : Successrur Turnaround Companies (STC) 
Mere Survivors: Non Succe.urul Turnaround Companies (NSTC) 
The reason for coding the' Mere Survivors ' as Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies is due to the fragile conditions of these types oftumaround situations 
(details 11!1 explained earlier in its definition under topic ' Clll!lsifying Corporate 
Turnaround '). As mentioned earlier, their sustainability in recovery is doubtful and 
investors will question the time value of their money. 
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This type ofturnaround situation can also be categorised as ' Economic Failures ' 
or ' Economically Unsuccessful ', or companies whose realised rate of return on 
invested capital is significantly and continually lower than the prevailing rates on 
similar investments. 
And as cited by Hoffinan (1989) there must be a norm for co"llparison purposes as 
the company's prior perfonnance and industrial average may not be good 
comparative indicators since the latter is calculated from returns of not only 
perfonning companies within the industry but also of non perfonning ones. 
The other is based on the company's very own historical perfonnance, which is 
subjective and may well be below the industry's av~'rage. 
While riskless returns on government bonds are good comparative nonns, it may 
be advisable to compare with a commercial return as the nann for comparison and 
with this the" Fixed Deposit" rates offered by commercial banks will be used 
(since government bonds are difficult to obtain in the Malaysian 
financial market). 
Thus, for the purpose of this reseaich the' Economically Failed' companies or 
Non Successful Turnaround Companies will be those whose rate of returns 
(ROSF) are lower than that provided by an alternative investment- Bankers' 
' Fixed Deposit '. 
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Undertaking the above two stage filtration process for identifYing and classifying 
the population will eventually enable the research to close in on the actual 
candidates required for the survey. These will then be the population or ' troubled 
companies '. 
3.2.2 THE SAMPLE 
The ultimate sample was derived after the successful completion of both the 
Identification and Classification procedures. Two groupings were created, the 
Successful Turnaround Companies (STC) and the Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies (NSTC). The next step was to obtain information and data pertaining 
to the determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility via personal interviews with 
the respective Chief Executive Officers of the above groups of companies. 
3.3 ANALYSING THE DETERMINANTS OF 
CORPORATE TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY 
3.3.1 DATA COLLECTION THROUGH PERSONAL 
INTERVIEWS 
As mentioned earlier, data was collected through personal interviews with the 
respective current Chief Executive Officers of the' troubled companies '. The 
interviews were supported by a structured questionnaire (refer to Appendix U) 
aimed at examining the research hypotheses, always bearing in mind the research 
objectives. 
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As cited in the research hypotheses section, the determinants of corporate 
turnaround feasibility are categorised (for this research purposes) into Category A 
and Category B. Whereas in Category A, the research is interested in establishing 
their state of existence (favourable or non-favourable) towards turnaround 
feasibility; and in Category Bit is to their existence (exist or non existant). 
CATEGORY A 
The following are the factors considered in developing the questionnaire for testing 
the determinants under Category A. For the purpose of variable classification, 
they will be identified as D 1, D2, D3 .......... D9. 
Dl: CAUSES OF DECLINE 
Divided into Internal and External causes: 
Internal Causes 
Poor Management 
Inadequate Financial Control 
Financial Policy 
Marketing Problem 
High Cost Structure 
Mistaken Acquisitions 
Problem With Big Projects 
Overtrading 
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External Causes 
Decline of Market 
Competitive Pressure 
Product Life Cycle 
Other Environmental Factors 
There is a direct influence in terms of the generic strategies to be used for 
successful turnaround by the number of decline causes. Many causes of decline 
require the use of multiple generic strategies and the average number of generic 
strategies employed in successful turnarounds are considerably greater than the 
average number of factors causing decline (Slatter, 1984). 
However, we must bear in mind that not all ' troubled companies ' are in the 
position of simply applying combinations of generic strategies. Availability of 
generic strategies may well depend on the background of the company itself What 
can be implied from Slatter's statement is that if a company has fewer causes of 
decline, then it may need less application of generic strategies. The lower the cause 
of decline the better the chance of a feasible turnaround. 
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D2: SEVERITY OF THE CRISIS 
Possibly one oft he best definitions given relating to severity of crisis is by 
Bibeault (1982}. 
Severity of crisis can be divided into three levels of trouble; 
• Mild Level or declining business position, generally featured by perfonnance 
problems related to return on equity and sub-par industry perfonnance. 
• Moderate Level or continuing losses, generally featured by losses and potential 
liquidity problems. 
• Severe Level or survival, generally featured by viability problems and possible 
bankruptcy. 
The key characteristics of each of these levels will become the features to be 
captured in the questionnaire. Both mild and moderate levels are levels that have 
not yet reached to the point ofthreatening the existence and viability of the 
company whereas the severe level is an existence threatening level. If a' troubled 
company ' falls within the mild or moderate level, possibly, this would be more 
favourable for a feasible turnaround. 
·.~ 
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DJ: COMPANY'S HISTORICAl. STRATEGY 
Historical strategy is concerned with the company's product market scope and 
how assets were deployed, and how these influence the feasibility of the generic 
strategies to be considered. There is a difference between these when comparing a 
diversified company and a non diversified company. In a diversified company two 
levels of strategy exist i.e. the corporate level and the busin~;ss unit level. The 
corporate level generic strategy mix is limited to new management, strong central 
financial control, decentralisation and divisionalization, asset reduction, 
divestmen\, growth, acquisition and investment. 
Other strategies such as cost reduction, impmved marketing effort and product 
market reorientation are not feasible and these are strategies available only at the 
business unit level. 
Strategies such as divestment and acquisition whicl' are feasible at the corporate 
level may not be feasible options at the business unit level (Slatter, 1984). 
As such, strategies available to a non diversified company are similar to the 
strategies available to s business unit of a diversified company. The inference we 
can make from the point above is that the more diversified the company, the 
greater the generic strategies available for setting a feasible turnaround. A non 
diversified company's generic strategies are limited, 
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D4: INDUSTRYCIIARACfERJSTJCS 
Porter (1985) had cast 11 very high analytical insight on the issue of industry 
characteristics. He quotes that: 
The collective strength of the five competitive forces determines the 
ability of firms in industry to earn, on average, rates of return on 
investment in excess of the costs of capital. The strength ofthe five 
forces varies from industry to industry arxl can change as an 
industry evolves. the result is that all industries are not alike from 
the standpoint of inherent profitability. In industries where the five 
forces are favourable, such as pharmaceuticals, soft drinks and 
database publishing, many competitors earn attractive returns. Not 
in industries where pressure from one or more oftl•e forces is 
intense, as in rubber steel and video games, few finns command 
attractive returns, despite the best efforts of management. Industry 
profitability is not a function of what product looks like, or whether 
it embodies high or low technology, but of industry structure. Some 
very mund.ane industries such as postop meters and grain trading 
are eJCtremely profitable, while the more glamorous high technology 
industries such as personal computers and cable television are not 
profitable for many participants, (p. 4). 
However, for the purpose ofthe questionnaire design, the five forces in industry 
characteristics analysis are further elaborated and broken down according to 
Slatter's (1984) analogy of industry characteristics. 
~he breakdown is as follows: 
Nature 0£ Product 
The more differentiated anclless price-sensitive the product, the better will the 
product-market focusing be. Consumer bnsed products have shorter lead time to 
increase sales thlill industrial based products. 
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Market Segmentation 
Highly segmented market will enable the company to develop a focused and 
defensible product-market strategy for turnaround due to the varying customer 
preferences than lowly segmented market. 
Relative Size And Strength Of Competiton 
Fragmented industry will enable the company to develop successful recovery 
strategies than industry dominated by few powerful competitors or in an industry 
characterised by global competition based on technological and cost leadership 
strategies. 
Exit Barriery 
Low exit barriers pose favourable condition for implementing asset-reduction 
strategy itS against high exit barriers. An example of a high exit barrier are 
specialised assets that are not easily disposable. 
Entry Barrien 
High entry barriers pose a favourable condition to keep the intensity of 
competition intact as against low entry barriers. Examples of high entry barriers are 
high capital intensity, patented or licensed manufacturing or production process 
and government controlled and regulated industries. 
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Rats: OfTtchnological Change 
Slower rate of technological change favours the turnaround company. It gives the 
company feasibility of implementing viable product-market and investment 
strategies. High rate of change forces the company to acquire more financial 
resources to bring it to a competitive position. 
Threat of Retaliation 
Where powerful suppliers are present, the turnaround company has Jess bargaining 
power ar.d lesser chance of achieving substantial price reduction in raw material 
and component costs (vice- versa) and longer credit period. A powerful supplier 
situation exists when the number of suppliers is very few. 
Bargpining Power of Customen: 
Where powerful customers are absent, the turnaround company has more chance 
ofincreasing prices (vice· versa). Powerful customers are known to also affect 
the marketing mix of companies. Powerful customers just like powerful suppliers 
exist when their number is few and they hold the main bulk of the purchase. 
lgdustcy Growth Rats; 
The different stages ofinrlustry growth affect the usage of recovery strategies. The 
com~any's profit potential and hence its recovery potential, in part is a function of 
the industry it is in. 
116 
The chance of corporate recovery in an industry which _;s declining and with low 
profit potential must be lower than that in an industry growing with profit 
potential, as it may be easier to attract additional finance for investment and to 
implement an asset reduction strategy of divestment, because there are other 
companies willing to enter the growing industry. 
DS: COMPANY'S COSTwPRICE STRUCTURE 
Strategies to obtain short term profit improvement are dependent to a large degree 
on the company's cost-price structure at the time of crisis. This is only determined 
in part by the industry's characteristics and in part by the causes of decliile .. 
Cost-price structure of the finn is extremely important in determining whether 
management should focus short term attention on cost-reduction strategies, 
marketing improvement strategy, or both, to achieve a rapid improvement in profit 
margins. 
A company with high cost structure depicted by the high percentage of cost over 
sales (given the volume of sales is constant) as compared to the industry will face 
tougher times in trying to achieve a favourable turnaround (especially when the 
industry characteristics are not attractive) as compared with a company with lower 
cost structure. 
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D6: COMMITMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
Commitment by shareholders is the willingness of the shareholders to put proper 
authority in the hands ofthe rescue specialists, new leadership or new management 
and to support the plan to turnaround the company (Davis, 1988). In the absence 
of crisis, new management usually has fewer constraints determining the recovery 
strategy but this may not be the case in the pr~sence of crisi3, v1here management 
action may take place under the watchful eyes of the board and the principal 
shareholders (Slatter, 1984). However, if the rescuing concern (shareholders) is 
not willing to give proper authority and confidence to the new leadership and 
management, which in effect means handing over virtually absolute power, then it 
should not have started the exercise in the first place. 
Nothing destroys turnaround more effectively than an attempt to run them by a 
comrnlttee and having a board of directors worrying about every penny of its 
investment (Davis, 1988). 
What can be inferred from the above is that for a turnaround to be favourable, 
shareholders must give 'proper and absolute power and put confidence in the new 
leadership I management to implement the strategies deemed fit for the turnaround. 
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D7: COMMITMENT OF BANKERS 
The problem with bankers is significant in most turnaround cases especially when 
the troubled company is highly leveraged. It is critical to understand their attitude, 
expectations and commitments. Bankers will, most obviously, be concerned about 
the state of the company and the safety of their loan tc it. Or they may be getting 
nervous and ready to cut or ' pull the plug '. Bankers' commitment is very 
important for a turnaround process to be favourable. Their commitment may 
appear from supporting the rescue plan, rescheduling the loan, giving !eeway in 
tenns of time for interest and principal repayments to virtually helping 
management to decide which generic strategies should be given the most attention. 
DB: COMMITMENT OF CREDITORS 
While possibly the troubled company is able to obtain commitment from its 
bankers, it does not stop the creditors from taking harsh actions on the company 
such as foreclosure, petition for involuntary liquidation and suing for bankruptcy. 
Thus, this poses another challenge that the new leadership I management must 
attend to. Commitment from creditors in a favourable turnaround may include 
things like consensus towards fanning ofthe creditors committee, rescheduled 
payments or leeway in tenns oftime period and minimum amount for payments to 
continuing the provision of supplies. 
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D9: COMMITMENT OF EMPI.OYEES 
Getting support from the shareholders, bankers and creditors is simply not enough 
for a favourable turnaround. The company like any organisation is made up of 
workers. In most troubled companies the damage may have already occurred. 
Morale may already be at its lowest ebb. Unless the basic motivation ofthe 
people changes from a defeatist attitude to one of confidence, it is doubtful that the 
company can stabilise its base and return to growth (Bibeault, 1982). Motivating 
and getting their confidence back are steps to getting their commitment. 
Employees must not only believe in what the new management is trying to do but 
must also feel to a certain degree that they are participants in ensuring the success 
of the turnaround process. 
Their conunitment can he detected from the incidence of employee turnover, 
accepting more responsibility and probably longer working hours with the same or 
less pay to even pay cuts. 
CATEGORYB 
The following are the proposed considerations to be taken in account when 
developing the questionnaire for testing the determinants under Category B. For 
the purpose of variable classification, they will be identified as DIO ....... DI3. 
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DJO: NEW COMPETENT MANAGEMENT 
As Bibeault (1982) quotes: 
In more than seven out often cases, management has to be replaced 
because they either cannot cope with the problem or they 
themselves (or least the CEO) are the problem. Those managements 
that do hold on do so because the problems are recognised as 
external, they recognise the problems early enough, or in rare cases, 
they take bold action. Existing management is a problem because it 
lacks credibility and it cannot cope with the job at hand. It lacks 
credibility because it was the cause of the problem. it did not 
recognise the problems early enough, and it didn't want to do 
anything about them. It cannot cope with the difficult step of firing 
lots and lots of people, an action which is almost inevitable in a 
serious turnaround. It doesn't matter whether you use an axe or 
scalpel, the cutting back of unprofitable operations is very difficult 
for existing management for emotional reasons, (p. 94). 
In a company where the top person has a strong ownership position, top 
management change can take place but in the form ofthe change ofheart, new 
thrust, or an ability to make the tough decisions to save the business. The leader 
can also be an insider and does not necessarily have to be an outsider. However, as 
Robert Brown points out (1978, cited in Bibeault, 1982)" there is too much in-
house fellowship and you need a bloody bastard to go in and do it" (p. 95). 
How then can we detect the existence of a new competent management? Does 
having a new CEO or management team mean that a new competent management 
is in existence? 
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Both Bibt:'l.u\t (1982) and Davis (1988) have cited certain key characteristics of 
new competent management: 
• Able to identiry ' sore spotl ' I problems 
• Able to lire a lot or people 
• Not people oriented but people user 
• Makes decision h:t itselr 
• Achievement and objedive driven 
• Action oriented 
• Selr confident 
• Innovative and creative 
• Hands- on approach 
• Requires high shmdard or perf'onnance and evaluation 
• Makes bold, decisive moves 
• Making use or absolute power 
• Industry experienced person 
• Inrormatlon oriented 
• Exereilles tight controls 
• lnconsilltent 
• High level or stress tolerance 
' There are altogether 17 key characteristics that can be used to detect the existence 
of a new competent management. The higher the number of key characteristics 
scored, the more favourable it wiU be to prove the existence (actual score and cut-
off point will be discussed in the nelrt topic- measurement). 
D1 1: VlABI.E CORE BUSJNESS 
The existence of an economically viable core business to stabilise the company and 
possibly finance the turnaround is important. Frank Grisanti says that ( 1978, as 
cited in Bibeault, 1982)" you got to have a busineu that is worth perpetuating. 
Without a viable core, turnaround is very difficult, if not an impossible task. Some 
turnarounds are accomplished by stripping out the old core business, but very few 
succeed in this way" (p. 115). 
Bibeault (1982) adds that "the turnaround itself normally means shrinking to 
those segments ofthe business that can provide positive cashflow and a platform 
to stabilise the company" (p. 115). A similar fact was cited in this proposal on the 
technique of ' contraction ' and ' expansion ' used in corporate turnaround by 
Taylor (1982). 
Bibeault (1982) also cited five key characteristics to determine whether a viable 
core business exists in the first place or not. 
The core business must have: 
• Positive CasbOow 
• Sales Voh.•me 'Umbrella' 
• Competitive Equipment 
• Competitive Location 
• Awarencu Of Changes (recent, past or near future) 
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The core business must bear the five key characteristics to enable what is termed 
as ' the existence of a viable core business '. 
Dl2: BRIDGE CAPITAL 
Bridge capital depends on both erternal support available to the company and the 
internal ability to rai~e funds to weather and~ the turnaround process. 
Bridge capital can come from the following parties: 
• Shareholders through advances or new right issues 
• Management through sale of assets 
• Ban ken through • bridge credit 1 for working capital 
• Credilon through continuous support by supplying material at credit 
Availability of any of the above or combinations of them signals the existence of 
bridge capital. 
D13: REALISTIC TURNAROUND PLAN 
There is no way a turnaround process is to be exercised without s proper 
turnaround plan and certainly a turnaround leader will not take the risk by doing 
the contrary or o:lly by simply using his intuition. In Bibeault's survey (1982) 
(refer to Table 10), seven out of ten cases of turnaround moves are ' at first ' 
based on intuitive action with either no plan or a very informal plan. 
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However, at some point in eight out often cases, the formal plan was utilised and 
five often of these formal plans came after the emergency stage. Having a fonnal 
plan may not be what key stakeholders are seeking for especially the bankers, but a 
realistic and workable turnaround plan would be more appropriate. 
Table 10 
The Major Turnaround Moves Accomplished According to A Formal Plan 
Or Mostly By Intuilive Management Action 
Response % 
Intuitive action first 19.3 
Intuitive action followed by formal plan 50.6 
Formal plan followed by implementation 30.1 
ToW 100 
Source: Bibeault, D.B. ( 1978 ). Survey of eighty one turnaround company 
ChlefExecutives (p. 372). 
And like any other corporate or strategic plan, the turnaround plan must have the 
following key attributes: 
1. Objectivu or Targets 
2. Strategifll to be used 
3. Tactics or details on how atrategie~ w.i!J he implemented 
4. Review and controlay1tem 
Whether the plan is realistic and workable will depenq, ll,ot only on the factors 
above but also the evolution of these factors according to' the turnaround phases. 
As mentioned earlier, data collection for the detenninants of corporate turnaround 
feasibility are to be used for testing the determinants existence and state of 
existence in Successful and Non Successful Turnaround Companies. 
3.4 MEASUREMENTS 
To have precise measurement in the research it is important that the conceptual 
and operational definitions and system of consistent rules for assigning numbers or 
scores be established. 
3.4.1 CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
There will be two conceptual and operational definitions given the existence of2 
categories i.e. Category A and Categol)' B. 
CATEGORY A 
Conceptual definition for the variables will be " the state of their existence ". 
Operational definition for the variables will be whether the state oftheir existence 
is" favourable" or" pon~fayourable ". 
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CATEGORVR 
Conceptual definition for the variables will be the" existence". Operational 
definition for the variables will be whether they" exist " or " do not exist (non 
existantl ". 
3.4.2 SCALES OF MEASUREMENT 
The oominal.and interval scales will be used in the measurement of the variables. 
Application of the nominal scale in research measurement is generally for the 
purpose of coding questionnaire respol!ses in which the data collected place the 
respondent into a particular category. For example, 'io facilitate tabulation and 
computer I mathematical enalysis (Weiers, 1988). The nominal scale will be 
applied due to tl~e nature of certain variables whose measurements are categorical 
(dichotomous) in feature. 
The interval scale on the other hand will arrange the responses according to their 
magnitude and distinguish this ordered arrangements in units of equal interval. It 
will also allow the usage of a broad range of statistical methods for the description 
and analysis of information collected. 
3.4.3 TWO LEVELS OF MEASUREMENT 
At level I, the nominal (dichotomous) scale and the interval scale with magnitude 
will be used tu measure the variables. 
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Subsequently, variables will be classified into Favourable or Non Favourable state 
of existence and Exist or Do Not Exist at level2 using (where applicable) arbitrary 
cut~offpoints. There are nine variables in Category A and four variables in 
Category B. In order to smoothen the process of measuring and variable 
identification in the questionnaire, the nine variables in Category A are coded as 
Dl, D2, DJ ..... D9 and the four variables in Category Bare coded as DIO .... Dl3. 
NOMINAL SCALE VARIABLES 
Levell 
Categorising responses to questionnaires into dichotomous scale e.g. Diversified I 
Non Diversified, Higher I Lower, Yes I No .. etc. Variables under this 
measurement are D3, DS, D8. 
Level:! 
Classifying variables into Favourable or Non Favourable state of existence. 
Variables will be classified into Favourable or Non Favoumble state of existence 
by the group types they fall under. 
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INTERVAL SCALE VARIABLES 
Lenll 
Arranging responses to questionnaires according to their magnitude. Each variable 
will have its own scale of magnitude. Variables under this measurement are D I, 
D2, D4, 06, 07, 09, DIO, Dll, DJ2 and 013. 
Lovd2 
Classifying variables into Favourable or Non Favourable state of existence and 
Exists or Non Existant. All variables will ~ve arbitrary cut-off points to be used 
for classification purposes. 
3.4.4 MEASURING THE VARIABLES 
VARIABLE 01: CAUSES OF DECLINE 
As mentioned earlier, this variable will be measured using the frequency of 
occurrence and an arbitraJY cut-off point. And as implied by Slatter (1984) the 
fewer the causes of decline the better f .11: chances for a feasible turnaround. 
The arbitrary cut -off point will be 4 causes of decline. Meaning, occurences below 
or equal to 4 causes for decline fall under the category of Favourable and beyond 
which classifies them under Non-Favourable. 
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VARIABLE Dl: SEVERJ1Y OF CRISIS 
Falling under mild and moderate level of crisis or trouble will classifY it under 
Favourable. Falling under severe level of crisis or trouble will classify it under 
Non-Favourable. 
VARIABLE Dl: COMPANY'S HISTORICAL STRATEGY 
lfthe company is diversified then it will fall under the Favourable classification. If 
the company is not diversified then it will fall under the Non-Favourable 
classification. 
VARIABLE 04: INDUSTRY CBARACfERISTICS 
This variable deals with the frequency of occurrence ofFavourable and Non-
Favourable at each of the ten industry characteristics. Ultimately, whether the 
company is classified as Favour3ble or Non-Favourable will depend on the 
magnitude offrequency of occurrences ofthese factors. For example, ifthe 
compr.ny scores more than 5 occurrences (the arbitrary cut-offpoint) of 
Favourables, out often industry characteristics, say 6 or 7 Favourables, then the 
ultimate classification will be under Favourable. Otherwise it will fall under Non-
Favourable. 
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VARIABLE D5: COMPANY'S COST PRICE STRUCTURE 
Higher or equal cost structure(% of cost over sales) as compared to the industry 
wilt classify it under Non-Favourable. Lower or equal cost structure(% of cost 
over sales) as compared to industry will classify it under Favourable. 
VARIABLE D6: COMMITMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The variable deals with 3 types of commitment level. Scoring type no. 2 will 
classifY it under Favourable whilst scoring type no. I or 0 will classify it under 
Non-Favourable. 
VARIABLE D7: COMMITMENT OF BANKERS 
The variable deals with 4 types of commitment level. Scoring type no. 2 or 3 
classified it under Favourable, whilst scoring type no. 1 or 0 classifies it under 
Non-Favourable. 
VARIABLE D8: COMMITMENT OF CREDITORS 
Committed creditors (Yes) will classifY it under Favourable. Non commitment by 
creditors (No) will classifY it under Non-Favourable. 
VARIABLE D9: COMMITMENT OF EMPWYEES 
The variable deals with 4 features of employees commitment. Scoring <': 3 
(Yes/ N.A) wl!l. classify it under Favourable whilst scoring < 3 (Yes I N.A) will 
classifY it under Non-Favourable. 
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VARIABLE 010: NEW COMPETENT MANAGEMENT 
The higher the frequency score of the key characteristics, the more favourable the 
prove for existence will be. The arbitrary cut-offpoint will be at I 0. Anything 
equal or below 10 characteristics will classifY it under Non-Existant. Above 10 
characteristics will classifY it under Ex!sts. 
VARIABLE Dll: VIABLE CORE BUSINESS 
There are five key characteristics under this variable. The arbitrary cut-off point is 
4 key characteristics (since the element of location is not crucial in all businesses 
e.g. Plantations, Construction .. etc. Less than 4 key characteristics will classify it 
as Non-Exist ant whilst greater or equal to 4 key characteristics will classifY it as 
Exists). 
VARIABLE DlZ: BRIDGE CAPITAL 
There are 4 main sourc.:ls of' bridge capital '. The arbitrary cut-offpoint is 2, 
since having.more than one source will give an alternative source should the other 
fail. Less than 2 sources of' bridge capital' will classify it as Non-Existant whilst 
two or more sources will classifY it as Exists. 
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VARIABLE 013: REALISTIC TURNAROUND PLAN 
Occurrence ofthe 4 key characteristics for a realistic and workable turnaround 
plan and their evolution track will classifY it as Exists and non occurrence or 
insufficient occurrence of the 4 key characteristics and their evolution track will 
classifY it as Non-Existant. The arbitrary cut-off point is equal to 4 key 
characteristics for Exists whilst less than 4 key characteristics will classifY it as 
Non-Existence. 
3.5 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE 
Two types of data were used in the research: 
II 
PRIMARY DATA (/ 
To be collected from structured questionnaire interviews with the respective CEOs 
of the corporations concerned. 
SECONDARY DATA 
To be collected from the following sources: 
• Accounting Firms 
• Securities Firms 
• Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) 
• Ministry OfTrade 
• Government Publications 
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• Chambers Of Commerce 
• Malaysian Institute Of Economic Research 
• Federation Of Malaysian Manufacturers 
• Statistical Publications 
3.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data collected especially from the questionnaire interviews was analysed as 
follows: 
The analysis used the qualitative approach (cross tabulation and frequency 
observations) to detect the occurrence of, and identifY, the Existence and the Stale 
of Existence of each of the detcnninants in Successful Turnaround Companies and 
Non·SUOO".ssful Turnaround Companies. 
3.7 DEVELOPING THE CORPORATE 
TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY MODELS 
The objective of Chapter 6 of the research is the development of an empirical 
model consisting ofthe key success factors or detenninants of corporate 
turnaround to predict the feasibility of corporate turnaround 
The development of such a model will not only satisfY one of the main objectives 
of the re!ICIU'Ch but can abo contribute to a new approach and knowledge. 
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It can al~.o be used as one ofthe tools to facilitate the making oft he right decisions 
in predicting the feasibility of corporate turnaround so as to reduce costly errors in 
terms of money, man-hours, psychological turmoil, time and wasteful resources. 
The multivariate logistic regression model in which the dependent variable is 
associated with dichotomous (binary) qualitative choice will be used to develop the 
empirical model. The rationale for employing the multivariate logistic regression 
model will be dealt with later under' Model Basic Assumptions '. Dichotomous or 
binary qualitative choice models are not new and have been used by many 
researchers before on different ocasions. 
Examples of such aplication include the " Econometric Analysis Of The Market for 
General Obligation Municipal Bonds" by Rubinfeld (1972), "Probing The Bonds 
of Conventional Wisdom (Voting Behaviour)" by Aldrich and Cnudde (1975), 
" The Effects Of Registration Laws On Voters Turnout" by Rosenstone and 
Wolfinger (1978)," Shadow Prices, Market Wages And Labour Supply" by Fair 
and Jaffe (1974) and many others. 
The use of nominal dichotomous (binary) qualitative choice technique has been 
extended into the development of failure I bankruptcy predicting models using the 
multivariate technique. 
"' 
Edmister (1972) in his work" An Empirical Test Of Financial Ratio Analysis for 
Small Business Failure Prediction" analysed 19 financial ratios including most of 
those found to be important in previous failure prediction studies. He employed a 
zero -one regression technique with the intention of limiting the effect of 
multicollinearity in the regression. Rather than having the independent variables 
enter in their raw ratio form, he transformed each ratio into qualitative, zero - one 
variables based upon arbitrary cut-off points. 
For example, if the ratio of annual funds flow (defined as the Net Profit before 
taxes plus Depreciation) to Current Liabilities was less than 0.05, the ratio was 
assigned a value of one; otherwise it was assigned a value ofzero. The 
Classification results all have an overall accuracy of at least 90%. For example, 
using Z ~ 0.530 to determine non-failure and Z :5 0.530 for failure, all of the failed 
finns and 86% of the non failed firms were classified correctly for an overall 
accuracy rate of93%. 
The technique administered by Edmister above will be basically similar to the one 
the research is attempting to do using the Logit model. However, instead of 
transfonning each independent variable (in this case each key success factor or 
determinant of corporate turnaround feasibility) inti) nominal dichotomous (0, 1) 
qualitative variables, only two variables (one is the dependent and the other an 
independent variable) will be in this form and the rest will still be in their interval 
fonnat. 
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3.7.1 INITIAL VARIABLES FOR MODELLING I, 
There will be altogether 8 initial variables to be included for the modelling 
" purposes. 
,, 
,,II 
The details of the variables are listed as follows: 
D 1 ~ Causes Of Decline ~-
D2 ~Severity Of Crisis 
' D6 ' ~Commitment Of Stakeholders 
,, 
DlO- New Competent Management 
Dll -Viable Core Business 
D12- Bridge Capital 
D13- Realistic Turnaround Plan 
Dl4- Observed Feasible (Successful Turnarounds) I Non Feasible 
(Non Successful Turnarounds) 
It can be observed from the above that the 3 variables (03, 04 and 05) have been 
excluded from the modelling since it was found elirlier in Chapter 5 that there are 
no significant differences between the STC and the NSTC as far as these variables 
Ue con~med. Their presence is of no benefit and may affect the discri~nant 
power oft he ultimate model 
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The variable' 06' i.e. Commitment OfSiakeholders is a composite score of the 
determinants 06 (Commitment Of Shareholders), 07 (Commitment Of Bankers), 
08 (Commitment Of Creditors), and 09 (Commitment Of Employees). 
The transformation of06, 07, 08 and 09 into a composite score variable' 06' is 
,_. ·, 
inevitable in view ofthe total available observations I cases (which in this case is 
86 observations I cases) when the STC and the NSTC are paired for modelling 
purposes and the need to comply to the rules in terms of the number of required 
observations I cases for regression model building. 
Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman (1996) state that" it is important, 
however, that the model building data set be sufficiently large so that a reliable 
model can be developed. The number of cases should be at least 6 to 10 times the 
number of variables in the pool of predictor variables " (p. 437). 
In addition, the variable D 14 is included for the modelling purposes, since this 
variable contains the observed Feasible (Successful Turnarounds) and, Non 
Feasible (Non Successful Tumar~unds) for the corresponding cases in the 
independent variables. In fact 014 is the dependent variable for the model. 
Subsequently, the variables will be receded as the foLlowings (refer to Table II) 
for the ease of identification purposes in the computer modelling process. 
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Table II 
Receded Variables 
Former Codes 
0 I - Causes of Decline 
02- Severity of Crisis 
• 06 ' - Commitment of Stakeholders 
01 0 - New Competent Management 
011- Viable Core Business 
Dl2- Bridge Capital 
013- Realistic Turnaround Plan 
Dl4- Observed Feasible (Successful 
Turnarounds) I Non Feasible (Non 
Successful Turnarounds) 
New Codes 
COD 
soc 
COST 
NCOM 
VCB 
BCAP 
RTP 
FNF 
3.7.2 SCALES OF MEASUREMENT 
The types of measurement scales that will be deployed in Chapter 6 of the 
research are in tandem with the employment of the multivariate logistic regression 
model i.e. the nominal and the interval scales. 
NON.UNALSCALEVA~LES 
Variable1 that are in the nominal scale with dichotomous (0, I) qualitative choice 
will be 02ur S~erity Of Crisis. 02 was originally a cat_egorical determinant, 
transfOrmed into binary (0, 1) using the arbitrary cut-(·,ffpoint mentioned earlier. 
,, 
The other variable that i1 in nominal scale is 014 or the Observed Feasible 
(Successful Turnarounds) /Non Feasible (Non Successful Turnarounds). 
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INTERVAL SCALE VARIABLES 
Variables that are in the interval scales with numeric values will be Dl (Causes Of 
Decline), '06' (Commitment Of Stakeholders), DIO (New Competent 
Management), Dll (Viable Core Business), 012 (Bridge Capital) and 
013 (Realistic Turnaround Plan). 
3, 7.3 THE MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
MODEL 
Norusis (1994) explains that·. 
A variety of multivariate statistical techniques can be used to 
predict a binary dependent variable from a set of independent 
variables. Multiple regression analysis and discriminant anaJysis 
are examples of two related techniques. However, these techniques 
pose difficulties when the dependent variable can have only two 
va1ues M binary or dichotomous. When the dependent variable is 
binary or dichotomous, the assumptions necessary for hypothesis 
testing in regression analysis are necessarily viola• oo i.e. the 
distribution of the errors must be nonnal and the predicted values 
are not interpreted as discrete probabilities within a constrained 
interval ofO and I. No doubt that the linear discriminant analysis 
allows direct prediction of group category, but the assumption of 
multivariate normality of the independent variable~ and the equal 
variance-covariance matrices in the two groups is necessary for the 
prediction rule to be optimal (p.l). 
The logistic regression model requires fewer assumptions than the discriminant 
analysis; and even when the assumptions required for discriminant analysis are 
satisfied, logistic regression still performs well (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989). 
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However, the application of the multivariP!e logistic regression model, like any 
other non linear regression model must satisfy certain basic assumptions for the 
appropriateness ofits usage. 
3.7.4 APPLICATION ASSUMPTIONS 
Guidelines for the application assumptions ofthe multivariate logistic regression 
model as stated by authors like Aldrich and Nelson (1984} and Neter, Kutner, 
Nachtsheim and Wasserman (1996} .::an be summarised as follows: 
1. The dependent variable is usually a binary response or dichotomous response 
variable, taking on the values 0 and 1. 
2. Non normal error Ierma: For a binary 0, I response variaNe (dependent 
variable),eacherrortenn Ej= Y1- (Jlo+JltXI)cantake 
on only two values; 
•.WhooYj• I:&j= 1-Po-PtXl 
b.WheoY;= 0: &;=- Po-PlXl 
The assumption that E1 are nonnally distributed as in the nonnal error 
regression model is violated, 
141 
A test for non normal error terms will be the Histogram Plot of the errors 
(unstandardiz~ residuals) with a normal curve superimposed and the Normal 
Probability and Detrenc\ed Normal Probability Plot of the deviances. 
3. Constraints on response function: The response function represents 
probabilities when the outcome variable is a 0, I indicator variable. The mean 
responses should be constrained as follows; 
The above wiD be tested by plotting the Histogram (with the normal curve 
superimposed) of the logistic response function. Confinnation on its 
asymptotes at 0 and 1 will automatically satisfy the constraints above. 
4. Sigmoidal Response Function: The logistic response function must be 
curvilinear in the shape of either a titled S or a reverse titled S since its 
response variable (dependent variable) is binary. The above will be tested by 
plotting the logistic response function against the linear combination values to 
confirm its shape. 
3.7.5 MODEL BUILDING 
The parameters of the logistic regression model will be estimated using the 
Maximum- Likelihood method, where the coefficients that make the observed 
results most ' likely ' are selected. 
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Since the logistic regression model is non linear, an iterative algonthm (Gauss & 
Fisher Method) is necessary for parameter estimation and will be supplemented by 
' starting value So for the parameter vector ' and by a ' convergence criterion ' to 
stop the process. 
The multivariate: logistic regression can be written as: 
Prob (event)"" e• 
t+e1 
Prob ( event ) = 1 
1 + e--~ 
where Zis the lineareombi~~ation; Z =Po+ PIX 1 + P2X 2 + ........ ppxp 
Note: The SPSS 6.1 statistical software package for personal computers will be 
used for the logistic regression model building and statistical analysis. It is also 
important to note here that not all statistical tests as implied by numerous books on 
logistic regression are available in all statistical software. 
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The available statistical tests for multivariate logistic regression in SPSS 6.1 is 
reasonably good enough foi" the purpose of logistic regression model building and 
diagnostics. The following procedures and statistical tests are accordance 1.0 the 
SPSS 6.1 statistical software package for modelling and diagnosing multivariate 
logistic regression models. 
3.7.6 SELECTING PREDICTOR (INDEPENDENT) 
VARIABLES: ENTER, FORWARD AND BACKWARD 
CONDITIONAL STEPWISE PROCEDURE 
The Enter procedure, known also as the al/.possib/e.regressions procedure calls 
for considering all possible subsets ofthe pool of potential predictor variables and 
identifYing for detailed examination a few" good" subsets to eventually find 
the" right" model. It is a manual procedure where variables are entered into and 
removed from the model at will. 
Forward Conditional Stepwise proce<:ure variable selection techniques can be used 
by starting a model that contains only the constant and at each step the variable 
which is significant at 5% (the chosen cut·offvalue: 0.05) is entered into the 
model. The variables will be entered and examined to see if they meet the removal 
criteria. The process will continue until either no more variables meet entry or 
tY.moval criteria or the most ' likely ' model is encountered. 
144 
The Backward Conditional Stepwise procedure almost the opposite of the 
Forward Conditional Stepwise procedure can be used by starting a model that 
contains all of the variables, then at each step, variables are evaluated lbr entry and 
removal. The score stntistic will be used to determine whether variables should be 
added to the model and as in the Forward Conditional Stepwise procedure, the 
Wald, loglikelihood ratios or the conditional score statistic can be used to select 
variables for removal. 
Both Forward and Backward Conditional Stepwise procedure are automatic 
search procedures with the attempt to identifY a single regression model as the 
"best". These automatic procedures are not without their pitfalls. 
According to Neier, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman (1996): 
The identification of a single regression model as" best" by the 
automatic search procedures is a major weakness of these 
procedures. Experience has shown that each ofthe automatic 
search procedures can sometimes err by identifYing a poor 
regression model as" best". In addition, the identification of a 
single regression model may hide the fact that several other 
regression models may also be" good " (p. 348). 
In view of the above, the study proposed the usage of the Enter procedure as the 
base procedure for finding the" right" model and to reaffirm the results with the 
Forward and Backward Conditional Stepwise procedures. 
"' 
3.7.7 TEST STATISTICS 
CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
Used to assess how well the logistic regression model fits by comparing the 
predictions to the observed outcomes through a number of correctly classified and 
misclll5sified observations. 
HISTOGRAM OF ESTIMATED PROBABILITIES 
Used to assess how well the logistic regression model fits by observing how the 
number of cases are correctly designated to their respective groups.Ifthe logistic 
regression model successfully distinguishes the two groups, the cases for the STC 
should be to the right of0.5 and the cases for the NSTC should be to the left of 
0.5. The more the two groups cluster at their respective ends of the plot, the 
better. 
EXPONENTIAL BETA (EXP (B)) 
Used to test the influence in the amount of change in the dependent variable for a 
one unit change in the independent variable or the odds of an event occuning as in 
logistic regression. The EXP (B) will indicate the factor of increase due to the 
change of the ratio of the odds of an event occurring by the increase in the value of 
an independent variable from 0 to I. 
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WALDSTATISTIC 
Used for testing whether a variable coefficient is 0, using a chi-square distribution. 
It is the square of the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error; 
WALD 
5Ej 
An almost similar test to the Asymptotic I Ratios, the larger the Wald Statistics 
the more significant the coefficient is from 0 (using significance level of0.05). 
PARTIAL CORRELATION (R-STATISTiq 
Used for testing the contribution of individual variable in the logistic regression 
model. B can range from -1 to I. Positive values indicate that iftht! variable 
increases in value, so does the likelihood of the event occurring and ifR is 
negative, the opposite is the case. Small B values indicate that the variable has 
small partial contribution to the model. The equation for the B statistic is; 
R = :t ~ wald-2K I -2LLo 
GOODNESS OF FIT(- 2 U) 
Used to measure how well the estimated model fits the data. Models of good fit 
result in high likelihood of the observed results and translate to a small value 
for - ~LL. 
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MODEL CHI-SQUARE AND IMPROVEMENT CHI--SQUARE 
Two other tests that attach themselves with the- 2 LL test are the model chi-
square and the improvement chi-square tests. The model chi-square test is actually 
the difference between- 2 LL for the model with only the constant 
and- 2 LL for whatever the current model is. It tests the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for all the independent variables in the current model, except the 
constant, are 0. It is comparable to the overall E test for other regression models. 
The improvement chi-square test is the change in- 2 LL between successive steps 
of building the model. It tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the 
independent variables added at the last step are 0. It is comparable to theE change 
test in other regre;:•<un models. 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST (LR) 
An alternative to theW ALD statistic and used as a removal criteria by estimating 
the mlldel with each variable eliminated in tum in relation to the change in the 
loglikelihood when each variable is deleted. Based on the chi-square distribution, it 
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the terms removed are 0. 
SCORE STATISTIC 
It is an alternative to the Wald and the Likelihood Ratio test (LR) and test the 
hypothesis that a coefficient is 0, However, unlike the Wald statistic, it does not 
require the explicit computation of parameter estimates. 
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RESII)UAL CHI-SQUARE STATISTIC 
Used to ttst the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the variable~ not in the 
model are 0. It is calculated from the above Score statistic. It is comparable to the 
improvement chi-square test. 
3.7.8 MODEL DIAGNOSIS 
Model diagnosing is important once the model has been built to examine the 
adequacy of the resulting model. There are several comparable diagnostic tools in 
the logistic regression as in the linear regression, and they are as follows: 
RESIDUAL 
It is the difference between the observed probability ofthe event and the predicted 
probability of the event based on the model and is denoted by: 
The smaller the residuals the better the fit between the observed and the predicted 
probability of the event. 
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STANDARDISED RESIDUAL 
It is the residual divided by an estimate of its standard deviation and is denoted by: 
Z1 = 
The smaller the standardised residuals the better the fit between the observed and 
predicted probability of the event. 
DEVIANCE 
It is the square root of- 21og (Pi) and attaching a negative sign if the event did 
not occur for that case and is denoted by: 
DEV .. - .j -2tog (PI) 
Large values for deviance indicate that the model does not fit the case weU. 
STUDENTIZED RESIDUAL 
It is the change in the model deviance if the case is excluded. Discrepancies 
between the deviat1ce and the studentized residuals may identifY unusual cases and 
is denoted by: 
llO 
5 {eil 
LOGIT RESIDUALS 
It is the residual for the model ifit is predicted in the legit scale and is denoted by: 
Logit. ej = 
LEVERAGE 
Used for deteding observations that have a large impact on the predicted values. 
The leverage values are bonded by 0 and I, in fact they should not exceed I and 
their average value is PIn (where .r. is the number of parameters in the model 
including the constant and n is the sample size). 
The leverage is denoted by: 
h 
I hu= P 
I= 1 
"' 
The leverage value hu is considered large if it is more than twice as large as the 
mean leverage value. 
COOK'S DISTANCE 
It measures the influence of a case and indicates how much deleting that case 
affects not only the residual for that case but also the residuals of the remaining 
cases and is denoted by: 
Z2 1 * h 1 
n, 
DFBETA 
It measures the change in the logistic coefficient when a case is dele~ed from the 
modeJ and is denoted by: 
(II 
Dffieta (BI ) 
A case is considered influential if the absolute value ofDFBETAS exceeds I. 
'" 
3.7.9 MODEL VALIDATION 
The multivariate logistic regression model, like other regression models, must be 
checked in terms of the appropriateness of the variables selected, the magnitudes 
of its coefficients, accuracy and predictive ability through a model validation 
process. There are several available model valida(c;n· processes, as indicated below. 
However, the decision to use any one ofthe processes is dependent on several 
issues. 
NEW DATA SAMPLE 
The best and simpler approP.Ch of model validation is through the collection of new 
data for testing the applicability of the model on new data. However, this is not 
always easy to do because ofthe problems of limited number in new 
• troubled companies '. This difficulty is also found in observational studies and 
even in controlled experiments. 
SAME DATA SAMPLE 
The same data sample used in the construction ofthe logit model could be used for 
validation of the model. This technique was employed by Arkradejdachachai 
(1993) in his logistic bankruptcy model. However, the setback of this technique 
was that it suffered from an upward bias problem. 
'" 
DATA SPLITTING TECHNIQUE 
In the data splitting technique for model validation, the data sets sre split into two 
sets. The first set, called the model building set, is used to develop the model and 
the second data set called the validation or prediction set, is used to evaluate the 
reasonableness and predictive ability of the model. The validation set is used in the 
same way as when new data are collected. Ideally, the data sets are often split 
equally into model building and validation sets. However, if the entire data set is 
not enough to make an equal split, the validation set will need to be smaller than 
the model building data set. 
As mentioned earlier, the number of observations I cases for the model building 
data set should be at least 60 to 100 if 10 independent {predictor) variables are in 
the pool. In the case of7 independent (predictor) variables, the model building 
data set should hold between 42 and 70 observations/ cases. 
THE LACBENBRUCH (1968) METHOD 
In this method, validation samples are obtained by randomly selecting one or more 
observations I cases (at a time) from the original samples, re-estimating the models 
from the reduced samples, and then using the new coefficients to predict on the 
hold out samples. This process is rep~ted until all observations I cases are 
exhausted. 
"' 
It provides a nearly unbiased estimate of prediction accuracy and can be viewed as 
a generic test of the predictive ability of the models, since it is equivalent to 
commencing the research with reduced samples and then finding additional 
observations I cases to form holdout samples. The Lachenbruch method was used 
in other bankruptcy models for example by Altman (1971 ), Peel and Wilson {1988) 
and many others. 
In the case of the above research'::rs, the samples of observations I cases taken out 
each time were based on (n- 8). However, for the purpose of this research it will 
be based on (n- I) or a single obst~rvation I case to be taken out for validation test 
at every one time. 
It is common in mos1 bankruptcy and corporate tumaround studies, the cut-off 
point or criteria fer the; multivariate logistic regression model is chosen to be 0.5 
for classification purposes. If the estimated feasibility of a company is found less 
than or equal to 0.5, the firm is classified as a Non Feasible Corporate Turnaround; 
otherwise, it is classified as a Feasible Corporate Turnaround. 
Thus, the total correct classification rate is calculated as 
Total Percent Correct Classification = !!!+02 
N 
where: 
HI is the number of observations I cases correctly classified as Feasible 
Corporate Turnaround 
2. nz is the number of observations I cases correctly classified as Non 
n ~.;easible Corporate Turnaround 
3. ~is the sample size 
3.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the methodology used in this research. Specifically, share 
prices trend indicators (Financial Times Extel, C.D Rom), the earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) and earnings after interest and tax (EAIT) trends were 
observed in terms of their Downturn and Upturn phases for the purpose of 
identifYing ' troubled companies '. The PNB-Score (Malaysian Z-Score) was used 
to confirm the' troubled companies '. ClassifYing the ' troubled companies ' was 
carried out by comparing the Return on Shareholders Fund (ROSF) with the 
Commercial Banks Fixed Deposit Hates. ,, 
'I \I. 
" \, 
'-->,. 
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The determinants or ~ey success factors of corporate turnaround feasibility were 
analysed further in terms of their existence and state of existence in Successful and 
Non Successful Corporate Turnaround companies. 
Personal interviews with the respective Chief Executive Officers of the identified 
' troubled companies ' using a structured questionnaire were carried out. Data 
pertaining to each determil,;mt were analysed in order to help understand how each 
determinant and combinations of detenninants contributed to the feasibility of 
corporate turnaround. The State of Existence (Favourable I Non Favourable) of 
Category A detenninants I variables and the Existence (Exist I Non Existant) of 
Category B determinants I variables in Successful (STC) and Non Successful 
Turnaround companies (NSTC), were further classified usi11g measurements 
prescribed. 
The application assumptions for using the multivariate logistic regression model 
were tested to ensure that the usage of the model was appropriate for the study. 
Several multivariate logistic regression models were analysed in terms of their 
logic, appropriateness and suitability for predictive usage purposes using test and 
diagnosirJg statistics to find the" best" and final model. Subsequently, the model 
was tested for its validity and predictive power using the Data Splitting technique 
and the Lachenbruch method. 
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CHAPTER 4 
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IDENTIFYING TROUBLED COMPANIES 
Chapter 4 presents the findings and interpretation on the identification of the 
' troubled companies ' and their dassitiCIItion into Successful and Non Successful 
Turnaround Companies. 
In identifying the ' troubled companies ', the share prices trend indicator 
{Financial Times Extel, C.D Rom), the earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and 
earnings after interest and tax (EAIT) trends were observed interms of their 
Downturn and Upturn phases. The final confirmation on ' troubled companies ' 
was achieved by using the PNB-Score (Malaysian Z-Score), a composite failure 
identificatbn model. Subsequently, a comparative analysis of the Return on 
Shareholders Fund (ROSF} and the Commercial Banks Fixed Deposit Rates was 
carried.out in order to further classify the' troubled companies ' into Successful 
and Non Successful Turnaround Compa.'lies. 
4.1 FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
4.1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF TROUBLED COMPANIES 
4.1.1.1 RESULTS OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES EXTEL 
Share prices performance trends of300 public listed companies (excluding Finance 
and Extractive sectors) of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange were each carefully 
scanned. 
'" 
This was in order to observe patterns that may resemble a Downturn and Upturn 
phase of a' troubled company ' trying to turnaround. From the scanning exercise 
it was found that 211 companies exhibited such trends. Based on the argument 
setforth earlier by Brealey (1971) on share prices and company performances, 
these 211 companies suspected as the ' troubled companies ' were analysl.'d 
further to confirm their status. 
4.1.1.2 OBSERVATION ON EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAX 
(EBID AND EARNINGS AFTER INTEREST AND TAX CEAID 
The 211 suspected' troubled companies' were further observed in terms of their 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and earnings after interest and tax 
(EAIT). For the purpose of this exercise the analysis took a step further to observe 
earnings after minority interest and extraordinary items or earnings distributable to 
shareholders. Some interesting observations were made. The use ofEBIT and 
EAIT to confirm suspected ' troubled companies ' has its pros and cons. Careful 
thought shOldd be given when using their trends to confirm Downturn and Upturn 
phases of the ' troubled companies '. For instance, it was observed that in highly 
geared companies, the impact of interest on profit are not significant if only EDIT 
is taken into account. EBIT for most of the highly geared companies depicted 
reasonably healthy profit trends. 
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However, once the elements of interest and tax were deducted, profits or earnings 
after interest and tax were left in a thin layer of margin and in several cases in the 
negative (red). 
Earnings or profits distributable to shareholders [earnings (EAIT) after minority 
interest and extraordinary items] were also obseiVed, Certain interesting trends 
were exhibited and it is felt that these should be discussed specifically on their own 
under the topic of extraordin;ory items. 
As recommended earlier under the methodology for identification of' troubled 
companies ', there should not be a sole reliance on EBIT and EAIT for 
identification purposes and a more structured and composite financial model 
should be deployed to help identify the' troubled companies'- in th.is case the 
PNB Score or the Malaysian Z-Score. 
4.1.1.3 RESULTS OF THE PNB SCORE (MALAYSIAN Z-SCORE) 
Of the 211 companies suspected of being ' troubled companies ', th.e usage of the 
PNB Score or the Malaysian Z-Score failure detection model helped to further 
shortlist confirmed ' troubled companies '. According to (Bidin, 1988) th.e original 
results of the model wh.en they were first tested placed companies into two 
categories i.e. ' problem ' and • no problem '. 
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' Problem ' companies exhibited negative PNB Score whilst ' No Problem ' 
companies exhibited positive PNB Score. In the application ofthe PNB Score in 
this analysis to help confirm ' troubled companies ' it was found that this was not 
always the case i.e. where the results ofthe score must be negative to confirm 
whether the companies are in trouble or not 
The PNB Scores in majority of the cases are powerful enough to exhibit significant 
trends depicting the Downturn and Upturn phases, confirming that these 
companies are' troubled companies' who had undergone both the declining and 
turnaround period. 
Having identified 100 companies as the confirmed 'troubled companies' was 
simply not enough. There was a need to further demarcate and classifY them into 
Successful and Non Successful Turnaround companies. Based on the argument set 
forth earlier the suggested methodology used a comparative analysis between the 
Return On Shareholders Fund (ROSF) and the Commercial Banks Fixed Deposit 
Rates. 
However, it was pertinent that some issues and observations pertaining to 
Extraordinary Items be clarified and subsequently they would help further justifY 
the usage of the Return On Shareholders Funds (ROSF) as a basis of comparison 
with the Commercial Banks Fixed Deposits Rates for classification purposes. 
162 
4.1.1,4 EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS 
Extraordinary items in company accounts, although unusual and nonrecurring, 
are significant items to be taken into cognisance because of the effect they have 
towards the final earnings or profit distributable to the shareholders. 
Many financial statement users rely heavily on the income or earnings before 
extraordinary items when they make predictions and evaluate management's 
perfonnance, to indicate how profitable the company is without considering the 
effects of extraordinary items (Warren, Fess and Reeve, 1996). 
Meigs & Meigs (1983) defined extraordinary items as a gain or loss that is material 
in amount, unusual in nature and not expected to recur in the foreseeable future. 
By definition extreordinary items are extremely rare. Hence they seldom appear in 
financial statements. 
In" Accounting Trends and Techniques" the AICPA (1993, p. 377) states that 
" the tenn extraordinary items therefore has a technical meaning in accounting that 
ditfers from the everyday connotations of items that are simply unusual or peculiar. 
Furthermore, the criteria require the accountant to consider the speeilie 
charaeteristies of the company as weli as the environment in which it operates". 
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Examples of extraordinary items include the effects of unusual casualties 
(such as earthquakes or tornadoes) e,.;propriation of assets by a foreign 
government, and gains or losses that may result from a newly enacted law. 
From the list of the 100 'troubled companies' it was found that 75 companies or 
75% of the companies exhibited high occurrence of extraordinary items for more 
than one year. In most of the cases extraordinary items occurred continuously 
during the Downturn and Upturn phase. 
Details ofthe events ofthe extraordinary items for these 75 companies can be 
summarised as follows: 
I. Loss in disposal of shares 
2. Loss in disposal ofland I building I assets 
3. Loss in sale of subsidiary 
4. Loss in disposal ofinvestments 
5. Loss in sale of associated company 
6. Retrenchment Benefits 
7. Bad debts written·offs 
8, Diminution in investment value 
9. Write down on land /building I a~sets 
10. Loss from cessation ofbusiness 
II. Write uff on assets 
"' 
:,· 
12. Abortive acquisition expenses 
13. Provision for rationalisation 
14. Capital reduction 
15. Capital reserve write off's 
16. Financial restructuring of debts 
17. Loans written off's 
18. Gains on sale of shares 
19. Gains on disposal of investment 
20. Gains on disposal of subsidiary 
21. Gains on disposal of property I assets 
22. Gains on disposal of interest in associated company 
Based on the statement by the AICPA and the authors above, it can be concluded 
that the above, reported as extraordinary items, was justified since their occurrence 
concentrated in a non-usual business operating environment i.e. in the recession 
times, However one must carefully observe that extraordinary items in ' troubled 
companies ' did not just happen. 
They are the results of certain strategies undertaken by the management of these 
companies to eleviate their financial crisis; in other words they occurred 
deliberately. 
,, ,, 
"' 
They are part and parcel of possibly several generic turnaround strategies such as 
Organisational Changes strategies, Finance and Financial strategies, Cost 
Reduction strategies, Assets Reduction strategies and Revenue generating 
strategies undertaken by management to reduce the financial crisis and to 
turnaround the companies, which are reflected by gains, losses, write downs and 
write off's under extraordinary items. 
In instances where disposal ended up in losses, extraordinary items eroded the 
already thin profit margin layer, sometimes resulting in negative earnings. This 
consecutively affected Earnings per Share (EPS) and the Return on Shareholders 
Fund (ROSF). Yet within extraordinary items in a turnaround situation there could 
have been other hidden agendas. 
"For pubHc companies, write offs and reserves are also driven by the requirement 
to inform shareholders. That is why turnaround write off's are so high. The new 
managers want to inform the shareholders bow bad the old guys were, while 
setting the stage to make themselves look good" (Whitney, 1987, pJ32). 
On the other hand, troubled companies undergoing turnaround need to raise funds. 
Funds may not be easily available and careful disposal of investments and assets 
may be required to raise funds or working capital to further enable other generic 
turnaround strategies such as diversification or acquisitions to be deployed for the 
turnaround. 
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Given the observations and points set above, it can be argued that the earnings 
after extraordinary items ( earnings distributable to shareholders) in ' troubled 
companies' undergoing turnaround are reflective of required generic strategies 
and actions by top management to arrest the crisis situation and to try to improve 
the company's performance simultaneously. 
Subsequently, Meigs & Meigs (1983) also argued that gains or losses from such 
transactions as sales ofp\ani, assets strikes and settlements of litigation are 
recurring events in the environment and do not qualifY as extraordinary items. 
Based on the above arguments, it is felt that it would be appropriate to use the 
earnings after minority and extraordinary items and distributable to shareholders 
(ROSF) to be compared with the Commercial Banks Fixed Deposits Rates for 
classifYing the ' troubled companies ' into Succ.essful Turnaround Companies 
(STC)and Non Successful Turnaround Companies (NSTC). 
4.1.Z CLASSIFYING SUCCESSFUL TURNAROUND 
COMPANIES (STC) AND NON SUCCESSFUL 
TURNAROUND COMPANIES (NSTC) 
Comparative analysis of individual company's Return on Shareholders Fund 
(based on the last available financial year) with the Commercial Banks Fixed 
Deposit Rates was made. Using the Fixed Deposit Rates as demarcation points for 
classification purposes, 57 out of 100 ' troubled companies ' were classified as 
Successful Turnaround Companies, whereas 43 companies fell under the Non 
Successful Turnaround Companies, (refer to Appf'ndix A). 
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4.1.1.1 TROUGH PERIOI! 
The trough period consisted of the Downturn and Upturn period. On the average 
the trough period for both Successful Turnaround Companies (STC) and Non 
Successf..ll Tumart.und Companies (NSTC) was found to be between 6 and 7 
years:· This supports Hoffinan (1989) findings on the average turnaround cycle 
period. 
4.1.2.2 SOLVENCY AND LIQUIDITY CRISIS 
The companies were analysed in terms of their solvency and liquidity during the 
Downturn and Upturn period by observing the movements in their working capital. 
Basically, the movements or trends in their working capital depicted similar pattern 
as that of the trough period for both Successful Turnaround Companies (STC) and 
Non Succes.gful Turnaround Companies (NSTC). This is logical as these 
companies were facing further decline with the amount of working capital tovailable 
being depleted. Similarly, as the performance ofthese companies improved, 
working capital was oDserved to improve. Working capital in the fonn of cash was 
vital in any tumaround effort. 
However, this was not always easily available and In the worst case scenario many 
companies got themselves into the predicament of a' cash trap ' and became 
technically insolvent. "In turnarounds a cash crunch is almost always inescapable" 
(Whitney, 1987, p. 357). 
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Out of the 100 ' troubled companies ', 71 companies were seen to have faced 
negative wodting capital situation or technically insolvency. The period of 
technical insolvency differed from one company to the other. Some underwent a 
technical insolvency period of basically one to two years only, whilst others faced a 
continuous 8 year period. 
Forty insolvencies belonged to the companies who later achieved a successful 
turnaround (STC), whereas 31 belonged to the Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies (NSTC). Insolvency and liquidity crisis according to Bibeault 
(1982), are characteristics of companies facing the third level of trouble i.e. the 
Severe stage- facing viability problems and possible bankruptcy. 
4.1.2.3 FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 
Gearing of individual company was analysed. Trends in gearing were observed for 
the Downturn and Upturn period. Overall, 42% of' troubled companies ' ended 
up with higher gearing in the Upturn period while 34% exhibited lower gearing. 
For twenty four companies (24%), gearing did not change in either period. 
Table 12 depil .. 1s the breakdown for STC and NSTC : 
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Table 12 
Gearing Level ofSTC and NSTC 
Lower Higher Same 
Successful turnaround 
companies (STC) 37% 37% 26% 
Non successful turnaround 
companies (NSTC) 30"/o 49% 21% 
From the above table it can be deduced that the percentage ofNSTC who ended 
up with more financial leverage is higher than the STC. 
This could also be the contributing factor for their low Return on Shareholders 
Fund (ROSF) since the bulk of the earnings would have been used to repay those 
fixed financial commitment e.g. repayment of loan interests. 
Caution should be taken in analysing the gearing trends of the' troubled 
companies '. In most cases gearing was seen to increase as earnings declined. This 
is logical since decline in earnings reduced the Total Shareholders Fund which 
eventually increased gearing even when there is no actual increase in net 
borrowings. This phenomena is salient at the point where the trough pits. 
Thus, the analysis was done by comparing gearing.during the early Downturn 
period and the later part of the Upturn period. 
170 
4.1.2.4 LOAN CAPITAL 
When the ' troublerl companies ' were analysed in terms ofborrowings i.e. 
introduction ofloan capital, only 65% depicted significant increase in loan capital 
(specifically term loan). Out of which 45 companies were STC and 20 were 
NSTC. Introduction ofloan capitals were also significant towards the Upturn 
periods. 
The reasons for this could be that bankers must have felt more comfortable once 
companies showed potential to turnaround with higher returns. Overall, bankers 
were seen to have supported a large number of companies turning around 
(especially the STC ) by allowing for more borrowings, where appropriate, to 
finance the turnarounds. 
4.1.2.5 PAID UP CAPITAL 
Another significant trend observed was the increase in paid up capital in both STC 
and NSTC. Eighty two out of the' troubled companies' had their paid up capital 
increased of which 47 were STC and 35 were NSTC. The move in inr.reasing the 
paid up capital indicated strong shareholders' commitment to finance and support 
the turnaround exercises. 
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4,1.2.6 CORPORATE STRATEGIES 
Abrupt increase in certain financial indicators such as sales and profits and the 
volumetric increase in the paid up capital, gave suspicion that these comnanies may 
have deployed certain corporate strategies to help them achieve rapid turnaround. 
Further analysis on the ' troubled companies ' resulted in the following findings as 
depicted by Table 13. 
Table 13 
Corporate Strategies used by STC and NSTC 
Divest Diver Prod/mar 
STC 3 17 7 
NSTC 10 15 5 
keynote: 
STC- Successful Turnaround Companies 
NSTC- Non SucceBsful Turnaround Companies 
Diver- Diversification 
Prod/mar- Product I market strategies 
Ver.int- Vertical integration 
Aqc- Acquisitions 
Divest- Divestment's. 
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Ver.int Aqo 
4 27 
nil 20 
' Different corporate strategies were used either on their own or in combination for 
turnaround. For example e decision to diversify into a different business activity 
which is more profitable may have taken place via Internal growth or Acquisition. 
From the figures above, it is obvious that acquisition was more frequently used 
than other corporate strategies. 
Higgins & Vincze (1986) explained that an organisation can grow in four basic 
ways i.e. internally, by acquisition, by merger or by joint venture. 
However, Internal growth takes much longer to become larger than the other three 
external fonn of growth. 
A company undergoing turnaround is required to cut down on losses and to 
improve its earning within a crucial time frame and acquisition would be the 
answer to put the organisation into instant diversification resulting in instant 
increase in sales and profits. However, on the other hand, acquisition always 
involves a premium to be paid for acquiring the company. The acquirer must have 
the necessary financial support to undertake such an exercise. 
While there is no data available on the type of corporate strategy used by the other 
'troubled companies', one could not help but imagine that the turnaround 
exercise must have been supported by other turnaround generic strategies such as 
Cost-Reduction, Asset-Reduction, Organisational Changes ... etc. 
Subsequently, there was no detailed evidence to show that business level strategies 
such as the Offensive or Defensive strategies were used in the turnaround exercise 
above. 
4.1.2.7 CHANGES OF CORE BUSINESS 
It is also interesting to note that in the effort to turnaround these companies 
through the use of generic turnaround strategies or the deployment of corporate 
strategies or combination of both, a group of companies had simultaneously 
undergone the process of changing their core bu~inesses e.g. from Mining to 
Construction, Mining to Plantations, Plantations to Property Development, 
Property Development to Construction ...... etc. Twenty seven companies were no 
longer in their original industry afier their turnaround exercise, fitleen of which 
were companies of the STC. category and twelve were of the NSTC category. It 
was obvious that the corporate and generic strategies undertaken by these 
companies had led them to be completely out of their original core businesses and 
into new ones. 
4.2 SUMMARY 
One hundred ' troubled companies' were identified using the Financial Times 
Extel, EBIT, BAIT, earnings after minority interest and extraordinary items (or 
earnings distributable to shareholders) and the PNB Score. 
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They were further demarcated into Successful Turnaround Companies and Non 
Successful Turnaround Companies by a comparative analysis of their last financial 
year with the Commercial Banks deposit rates. The result identified 57 Successful 
·' 
Turnaround Companies {STC) and 43 Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies (NSTC). 
Extraordinary items were found to be part and parcel of possibly several generic 
turnaround strategies being implemented. The trough period was similar with those 
as described by Hoffinan (1989) and NSTC were found to end up with higher 
gearing (more financial leverage) than the STC in the Upturn period. The STC 
were also found to be able to obtain more borrowings than the NSTC. Strong 
shareholders commitment was also found in 47 STC and 35 NSTC in the form of 
an increase in paid capital to support the turnaround exercise. 
While different corporate strategies were found to be used on their own or in 
combination with others for turnaround by both STC and NSTC, acquisitions were 
fuund to be more frequently used than other corporate strategies in view of the 
crucial time frame in turnaround situations. It was also interesting to note that 15 
STC and 12 NSTC, through their efforts to tum around, ended up in the total 
change of their original core businesses to new ones. 
CHAPTER 5 
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DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY 
Chapter 5 pr.:sents the findings and interpretation on the analysis of the 
determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility in Successful and Non Successful 
Turnaround Companies. 
The determiuants of corporate turnaround f~asibility, mentioned in Chapter 2, need 
to be analysed further in terms of their existence and state of existence in 
Successful and Non Successful Corporate Turnaround companies. 
Personal interviews with the respective ChiefExecutive Officers of the identified 
' troubled companies ' using the structured questionnaire were carried out. Data 
pertaining to each determinant were analysed in order to help understand how each 
determinant and combination of detenninants contributed to the feasibility of 
corporate turnaround. 
Favourable I Non Favourable existence (Category A determinants) and Existence I 
Non Existence (Category B determinants) of the determinants in each Successful 
and Non Successful Turnaround companies were further classified using the 
measurements as setforth in Chapter 3. 
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5.1 FINDINGS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
5.1.1 D1 CAUSES OF DECLINE 
5.1.1.1 INTERNAL CAUSES 
A. POOR MANAGEMENT 
All problems often start at the top, and so poor management is the key to declining 
profitability. Those responsible for the operations ofthe company are making 
wrong decisions with respect to strategic decisions and implementation. Thus, the 
role and style of the ChiefExecutive Officers (CEOs) is critical. Poor management 
was observed in all 'troubled companies', out of which 57 were STC (100% of 
STC) and 43 were NSTC (100% ofNSTC) and they all suffered from poor 
management (refer to Appendix B). 
Previous authors and researchers such as Argenti (1976), Bibeault (1982), Slatter 
(1984), Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976), Sigololf(l981), Davis (1988) and 
many others stressed this factor 8ll one oft he main causes of corporate decline. 
Davis (1988) states that" it is insppropriate management that kills companies" 
(p. 5). 
"' 
As stated earlier, the features of poor management include one person rule 
(CEO with autocratic leadership style), chairperson or shareholder combined 
CEO, incompetent management, lack of management knowledge or depth, narrow 
vision, management change problems, inbred bureaucracy, unbalanced top 
management, ineffective board ofdi:-ectors, etc. 
The high occurrence of poor management in both STC and NSTC is not at all 
surprising. This finding is supported by Bibeault (1982), who stated that 85% of 
the time' bad management' is the cause for decline and, subsequently, also 
supports those of Argenti's findings (1976), who stressed that management should 
not blante external problems entirely for corporate decline but should first blame 
themselves. They could have suffered from ' functional blindness ' acquired 
through time that could have rendered them unable to see their own organisational 
problems (Whitney, 1987). However, the findings above and that ofBibeault's 
may differ slightly from those of Slatter's, where he found that the ' failed to 
recover companies ' were suffering more from poor management problems than 
the ' successfully recovered companbs '. 
Interesting observations pertaining to poor management are also made in both 
STC and NSTC. It was found that 38 STC (67% of STC) and 23 NSTC (53% of 
NSTC) did not cbar1ge their top mansgement (CEOs). Only 19 STC (33% of STC) 
and 20 NSTC (47% ofNSTC) had their top management changed. 
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There were 4 isolated cases in the STC where change in top management was due 
to new ownerships gained through acquisitions of these companies. 
Change in top management is cited as one of the key Sirategies in corporate 
turnaround as indicated by authors and researchers such as Slatter, Sche1iJe~ 
Patton and Riggs, Davis, Eisenberg, Silver, Bibeault and many others. 
Bibeault (1982) for instance, argued that a management change it> n pre-requisite 
for corporate turnaround and generally occurred at the top. His argument is 
supported by earlier findings by Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976), where they 
equally stressed that a most Sl.lccessful turnaround must involve general 
management changes. 
It is also interesting to note that out of the 38 STC, those with no change in top 
management (CEOs), 32 STC or 56% ofSTC CEOs are also shareholders and 
chairpersons of these companies. This is suspected to be one of the main reasons 
why no change in top management occurs in these companiC£. 
Slatter (1984) believes that" in thooo companies where the position of both 
chairperson and chief executive officer is held by the same individual, there will not 
be any effective' watchdog' -accountability of the activities of these CEOs" 
(p.28)' 
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However, this is contrary to the findings of the research above, where the majority 
or 67% of STC did not undertake any change in top management. The same 
owners cum chrJ'liersons I CEOs propelled the successful turnarounds of these 
companie:>. These owners cum chairpersons I CEO's may have been the very 
driving force behind the corporate turnarounds. And since they are affected in 
tenns oftheir investments and value ofinvestments in these companies, they could 
have possibly given their maximum commitment to battle to save these companies 
and enable their successful turnarounds. These findings also contradict those of 
Pant's (1986) where she found that externally owned and controlled firms are 
associated with successful turnarounds (the number of externally owned successful 
turnarounds is twice the number of non-successful turnarounds). 
B. FINANCIAL POLICIES AND INADEQUATE FINANCIAL CONTROL 
Finance is corporate function which has aspects such as acquisitions of funds, 
structure of funds (mix:), use of such funds for projects, provision of information to 
top management for strategic decisions, etc. Funding and investment decisions are 
fundamentel to corporate strategy. Corporate perfonnance can be seriously 
implicated due to the amount and mixture oflong term and short term debt when 
combined with the owner's capital (gearing ratio). Simultaneously, imperfections 
in financial control, the speed of preparing relevant financial information and the 
improper treatment of such information can result in poor strategic decision 
making, 
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Forty nine ofthe' troubled companies' (49%) reported having financial policies 
and inadequate financial control problems, out of which 33 were NSTC (77% of 
NSTC) and only 16 were STC (28"/o ofSTC). NSTC are thus found to have more 
financial policies and inadequate financial control problems than STC 
(refer to Appendix B). 
Slatter (1984), however, did not find any great differenc-e in the occurrence of both 
financial policies and lack of financial control problems in' failed to recover' and' 
successfully recovered companies '. 
In both NSTC and STC, financial policies and inadequate financiaJ control 
problems were due to the substantial level of gearing or leverage, accounting 
information that was not strategically designed and used and the common problem 
in most large companies- a structure that hinders effective controL 
The findings above support those of Slatter (1984) where he explains that : 
The management accounting system in declining companies is too 
complex, producing a lot of poorly presented information and 
subsequently giving the wrong information to top management, 
(p. 30). The financial infonnation may not be used as a guide to 
management action and the over centralisation structure oflarge 
companies seems to make financial control difficult , (p. 31 ). 
Moreover, for many firms, a high gearing ratlo is the result mther 
than the cause of corporate decline, especially when bank 
borrowings escalate as losses mount due to the price of 
competition, inefficient manufacturing ... etc., (p. 51). 
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The above finding also supported earlier findings on the same issue of leverage 
discussed in Chapter 4 of the research, where the percentage ofNSTC that ended 
up with more financial leverage was higher than STC. 
Similar findings are also reported by (Pant, 1986), where leverage variables were 
found to be significantly higher for ' non turnaround companies ' compared to 
' turnaround companies '. 
C MARKETING PROBLEMS 
Companies which. Hlil to understand and operationalize the concept of marketing 
will result inadequ"ate marketing functions. Marketing activities in a company are 
derived from a marketing plan. This plan subsequently acts ss a guide for the 
company I customer relationship and will be dependent on the market research 
information gathered and the ability to generate new products in the market. 
' Troubled companies ' with marketing problems, usually, have failed to embrace 
the marketing concepts in these terms. 
Only 30 of the' troubled companies ' (300/o) faced marketing problems. Out of this 
number 19 areNSTC (44% ofNSTC) and only 11 are STC (19% ofSTC) 
(refer to Appendix B), 
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The details on their marketing problems are in Table 14; 
Table 14 
Marketing Problems 
Problems __rn.;_ 
= 
Poorly motivated sales oil 2 
force 
Non aggressive sales 2 nil 
manager 
Efforts not targeted on 8 9 
key customers and 
products 
Poor after sales services nil nil 
Lack of market research I 2 nil 
knowledge 
Outdated /lack of II 19 
promotion 
Weak I non existent of II 12 
new product development 
The number ofSTC facing marketing problems is found to be lower in comparison 
' 
to NSTC. This supports Slatter's findings (1984) where be found the percentage 
of ' successfully recovered companies ' facing marketing problems to be lower 
(only 17%) compared to the' failed to recover 
companies' (40 %), 
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Among~i.-!he marketing problems STC and NSTC were facing included the high 
occurrence of outdated product development or lack of product promotion and 
the weak or non existence of new product development. 
There could be many reasons behind this. One of the reasons could have been that 
these companies have suffered from what is tenned as ' marketing myopia '. 
These companies may have strong beliefs that their products are superior and 
subsequently did not focus more attention to the ever changing requirements of 
their customers and needless to say their competitors. 
Kotler (1988) states that" sellers who concentrate on the product instead of 
customers' needs are said to suffer from ' marketing myopia ' " (p. 15). 
Slatter (1984) adds that" a fum that fails to respond to changing market needs or 
that responds too late to changing needs is likely to find itself heading towards 
extinction" (p. 32). 
Thus, if a company is to succeed it should not neglect the marketing concept and 
function. In a study by Hambrick and Sheeler (1983), in their attempt to find n 
conunon set of strategies for corporate turnaround, three fonns of clusters of 
strategies were found and one of these clusters is ' selective product I market 
pruning ', which is a marketing approach. This particular strategy cluster 
represents a product I market refocussing its strategy, concentrating on the most 
profitable sectors which have a quality rather thliJI cost advantage. 
"' 
This is manifested as increases in relative prices, direct costs and product quality. 
Whitney (1987) expresses that" when marketing solutions are successful, an 
unexpected bonus is received: improved productivity resulting from sales 
increases, improvement occurs in such key ratios as sales per labour hour, sales per 
square foot, distribution costs as percentage of sales and store labour as 
percentage of sales" (p. 34). 
D. HIGH COST STRUCTURE (COST DISADVANTAGE) 
High cost structure not only places a company in a cost disadvantage position but 
also to be in a competitive disadvantage position in relation to its competitors. It 
will not be able to compete in prices since its cost structure is high. 
Sixty nine' troubled companies' (69"/o) experienced a high cost structure 
(cost disadvantage situation). Out ofwhich 42 were NSTC (98%) and 27 were 
STC (47 %) (refer to Appendix B). Their details are in Table 15. 
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Table 15 
Causes OfHigh Cost Structure 
Causes STC NSTC 
Inability to achieve 20 28 
economy of scale 
Competitors controlling nil nfl 
strategic variables 
Diversification nil 
Management style and 4 6 
organisational structure 
Op~rational Inefficiencies 27 42 
~;nfavourable government nil 1 
policies 
Almost all ofthe NSTC were found to suffer from the high cost structure 
(cost disadvantage) syndrome. The most salient cause for high cost structure in the 
NSTC was operational inefficiencies followed by the inability to achieve economy 
of scale. But what could have caused operational inefficiencies? 
Slatter (1984) stated that operational inefficiencies are largely due to poor 
management. With the intensity of poor management in turnaround situations, 
operating inefficiencies affect all elements of the cost structure. 
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" Some of the areas in which ineflicit:ncies may directly or indirectly have caused 
higher costs", he added," are low labour productivity, poor production planning, 
lack of adequate maintenance, plant layout, allocation of sales force time, 
allocation of advertising and promotional expenditure, distribution and after sales 
service, terms oftrade that ' encourage ' a large volume of small orders and office 
procedures" (p. 39). 
Given the above, it is also highly probable that operational inefficiencies could 
have resulted in the ability to achieve economy of scale given the backdrop of 
intense competition and the probable decline in demand (resulting in a lower sales 
volume) due to the recession period. Thus, what is salient is that all these add up 
as a formula for a high cost structure. 
Maintaining a lower cost structure is not only vital for profitability but also for 
competitive reasons. Porter (1985, as cited in Kotler, 1988, p. 308) describes 
competitive advantage (i.e. the power that enables a company to be better off than 
its competitors) as follows: 
Competitive advantage grows out of a value a finn is able to create 
for its buyers that exceeds the finn's cost of creating it. Value is 
what buyers are willing to pay, and superior value stems from 
offering lower prices than competitors for equivalent benefits or 
providing unique benefits that more than offset a higher price. 
There are two basic types of competitive advantages: cost 
leadership and differentiation. 
"' 
The infurence that can be derived from the above explanation is that to acquire one 
of the features of competitive advantage, in specific cost leadership, 
a company must be able to have a lower cost structure than its competitors to 
enable it to manipulate pricing in the competition. However, this would mean that 
NSTC suffering from high cost structure, due mainly to operational inefficiencie~. 
and the inability to a~'ilieve economy of scale may not be able to acquire cost ,, 
"' leadership as a competitive advantage to compete. 
The findings above in terms of high cost structure in STC and NSTC are almost 
similar to those of Slatter's (1984) in his study of40 U.K finns, where' failed to 
recover companies ' were found to have faced more high cost structure problems 
than the ' successfully recovered companies '. 
However, with the exception of a minor difference, 70% o~·<' failed to recover 
companies' faced economy of scale problem as compared to 65% ofNSTC and 
17% of' successfully recovered companies' faced similar problems as compared 
to 35% ofSTC. In tenns of operating inefficiencies, only 400/o of 'failed to recover 
companies ' faced this problem as compared to 98% ofNSTC. On the side ofthe ' 
successfully recovered companies ' 36% faced similar problems as compared to 
47% ofSTC. 
"' 
E. MISTAKEN ACQUISITIONS 
Acquisition is an alternative corporate strategy to internal development used as an 
entry tactic into an industry or market through the purchase of a firm in that 
business, instantly acquiring the requisite skills and resources although in some 
instances they may not be operating to satisfactory performance standards. For 
some companies, an acquisition which failed to generate the expected returns 
becomes a major cause of corporate decline. 
Mistaken acquisition is not found to be a major cause of corporate decline in the 
' troubled companies'. Only 3 ' troubled companies ' (3%) recorded mistaken 
acquisitions as one of the causes for their decline. None of the STC faced this 
problem. However, 3 NSTC (7% ofNSTC) recorded having this problem 
(refer to AppendiK B). 
The mistaken acquisitions problem in these NSTC are divided basically into two 
typical problems i.e. acquisition of losers (acquiring companies with weak 
competitive positions in their own markets) in 3 cases, and poor post acquisition 
management (inadequate managerial control, financial control or I and 
organisational resistance to change) in one particular case. 
The findings above support some of those of Slatter (1984) where he found that 
200/o ofthe 'failed to recover companies ' in the U.K facing mistaken acquisition 
problems. 
190 
The difference is that he also found about 13% of the' successfully recovered 
companies' facing the same problem, whlch the finding of this research did not in 
the STC. While mistaken acquisitions is one ofthe causes of corporate decline, 
properly planned acquisitions, pursued with caution can, instead, can be rewarding. 
Luffinan, Sanderson, Lea and Kenny (1988) explained that acquisition should be 
pursued when: 
• The product is in the maturity or decline stage of the PLC 
• The company has little knowledge of the products or markets it wishes to 
develop 
• Earliest entry is desirable 
• There are few internal development skills within the company 
• There is no production r-apacity 
• Costs do not need to be spread over time 
Acquisitions were also found to be more frequently used as one of the corporate 
strategies to tum around the companies in Chapter 4 as compared to other 
available corporate strategies. Twenty seven STC and 20 NSTC adopted this 
strategy in their effort to turnaround their companies. 
Subsequently, Schendel and Patton (1975) found similar results in their turnaround 
study, where they conc~uded that turnaround firms are able to generate new 
businesses whether inte.mally or through acquisitions and are able to operate these 
businesses more efficiently. 
' 
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(·, Slatter (1984} who earlier found mistaken acquisitions as one of the causes for 
corporate decline also supported this viewpoint and quoted that" a somewhat 
surprising but quite common recovery strategy is growth via acquisition " 
(p. 96). 
F. PROBLEMS WITH' BIG PROJECTS' 
' Big Projects ', sometimes called ' Mega Projects ', can be a large acquisition, a 
major capital investment, a major marketing campaign or substantial research and 
development expenditure which are large in tenns of company resources and have 
significant effect on profitability. Thus, when a' big project ' goes wrong, 
profitability is badly affected and the company faces decline and failure. 
Only 13 'troubled companies' (13%} faced this problem. The number ofSTC 
with ' Big Project ' problems is only I or 2% of STC. NSTC have 12 or 300/o of 
NSTC affected by this problem (refer to Appendix B). Details of the ' Problems 
With Big Projects' are in Table 16. 
The three major problems in ' Big projects ' for the NSTC are start.up difficulties 
(i.e. technical difficulties, poor project planning, lack oftrained employees, etc), 
capacity expansion (i.e. wrong timing and feasibility error} and market entry costs 
(i.e. product development and market development costs wrongly anticipated). 
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Table 16 I 
II Problems With Big Projects 
Problem .siT_ 
= 
Underestimating capital 
"'' 
2 
requirements 
Start-up difficulties 
"'' 
9 
Capacity expansion I 7 
Market entry costs 
"'' 
s 
Major contracts 
"'' 
The findings above are similar to that of Slatter (1984) with the exception that he 
found the ' successfully recovered companies ' to be affected by ' Big Projects ' 
\~ problem more than the ' failed to recover companies', and this of course is the 
/1 
opposite of the finding above. 
G. OVERTRADING 
Growing at the rate faster than the company's own abmty to finance from 
i' d 
internally generated cashflows and external borrowings !OiiYCimse overtrading. 
Increaae in turnover by increasing volume and unprofitable customers is pursued at 
the expense of profitability, 
Thirty six • troubled companies ' (36%) suffered from overtrading, Given this 
number, only II are STC (!goA, ofSTC) and 25 are NSTC (58% ofNSTC). 
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The percentage ofSTC suffering from overtrading is significantly less than that of 
NSTC (refer to Appendix B). 
Details of overtrading causes in STC and NSTC are in Table 17; 
Table 17 
Causes Of Overtrading 
Causes STC NSTC 
Going for sales growth II 25 
regardless of profitability 
Going for sales growth "n 1 
despite small capital base 
From the above the main cause for overtrading for both STC and NSTC is that 
these companies went after sales growth regardless of whether or not it was (_ .. -1 
._i 
profitable. One obvious reason for embarking on the above strategy may be linked 
to the economic recession period of the mid 80s. Intensity of competition may be 
higher in the economic recession period as the number of recession sensitive 
markets start to shrink. In many cases, companies will have to compete not only in 
tenns of product features but also in terms of prices. 
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Thus, the practise of price undercutting to capture sales volume is inevitable 
irrespective ofwhether sufficient profits are made or in certain circumstances L?, 
cover operating costs in order to survive. 
Kotler (1988) mentions that" the finn needs additional business and ca11~~t 
generate it through increased sales efforts, product improvement or oi~ier 
alternative measures, which led to price cutting. Companies will consider cutting 
prices in a period of economic recession" (p. 517). 
(Slatter, 1984) did not find the problem of overtrading in his study, but he did 
mention that overtrading is a characteristic of growth firms. 
While it is not the objective of this research to include the study of the 
characteristics of growth firms, its findings obviously pointerl out that overtrading 
is a strategy that has resulted in companies declining when faced with harsh 
competition, especially during an economic recession period. 
5.1.1.2 EXTERNAL CAUSES 
A. DECLINE OF MARKET 
One of the significant external causes for corporate failure is falling demand of the 
product or service provided by the company ~ declining market sales. These 
declining sales could be temporary but could also be associated with long tenn 
declining trend or an economic recession. 
"' 
Decline of the market seems to affect a large portion of ' troubled companies ' 
where 89% or 89 of these companies are affected. Those affected are strong 
majorities of both NSTC and STC. It was found that 51 STC (89% of STC) 
and 38 NSTC (88% ofNSTC) were affected by this problem (refer to 
Appendix B). 
Their details are in Table 18; 
Table 18 
Causes Of Market Decline 
Causes STC NSTC 
Secular decline in demand nil nil 
Cyclical market decline 48 37 
Changing pattern of 3 2 
demand 
None of the STC and NSTC suffered from secular decline in demand (i.e. when a 
product becomes obsolete due to the introduction of new or improved products). 
The bulk of the STC and NSTC suffered from cyclical market decline (i.e. when 
decline is due to economic or business cycles). 
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When cyclical market decline is analysed further, it is found that 39 STC and 33 
NSTC faced this problem due to the economic recession in the mid 80s. About 9 
STC and 4 NSTC suffered cyclical market decline due to erratic commodity prices. 
While most top management blamed recession as the prime cause for decline, 
recession by itself realistically and rarely causes a company to decline. 
Slatter (1984) supports Argenti's (1976) argument on this issue (as explained 
earlier). Slatter stressed that recession must have coupled with other factors, such 
as lack of financial control, weak competitive position and possibly a financial 
policy of high gearing, to spell disaster in an economic recession period. He also 
added that recession tends to expose a company's competitive weaknesses, 
although the source of these weaknesses is often the result of management 
decisions or acts of omission during the previous economic boom period. 
However, in his study, Slatter did not find similar details as that of the above 
findings. He found that only 30% of the' failed to recover companies' and 40% of 
the ' successfully recovered companies ' faced cyclical market decline due to 
economic recession. 
Recession is part and parcel of the economic trends. As stated earlier, recession 
alone may not cause a company to decline. Changes in commodity prices , another 
factor in cyclical market decline, can have a significant impact on heavy users of 
certain types of commodities. 
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For example when the price for latex increases, producers of rubber items will have 
no choice but to increase the selling prices of their products. This has led 
customers to seek for an alternative to rubber based products, consequently, 
causing a decline in the demand for rubber products. Similarly, changes in fashion 
or technology can result in the changing pattern of demand resulting in and the 
former product being made obsolete. 
B. COMPETITIVE PRESSURE 
Competition is inevitable. Like variables in an ecosystem, companies compete with 
one another not only for sales and profits but also for growth and market share. It 
will not be long when a company enjoying success in a market faces competitive 
pressure from existing players and new entrants, all aimed at harvesting the same 
success as the former. 
Competitive pressure is another significant external cause for corporate decline 
among the ' troubled companies '. Eighty one ' troubled companies ' (81%) 
encountered competitive pressure problems. Almost all ofthe NSTC 
(42 companies or 98% ofNSTC) faced competitive pressure compared to 39 STC 
(68% of STC) (refer to Appendix B). The details for competitive pressure are in 
Table 19. 
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Table 19 
Competitive Pressure 
Causes 
Product competition 
Price competition 
STC 
35 
38 
NSTC 
34 
42 
In terms of percentage, the NSTC (79%) were found to have faced more product 
competition than the STC (61 %). However, 98% or almost all of the NSTC faced 
competition in terms of price as compared to the STC (67%). Thus, STC faced 
significantly less price competition. 
The findings above support that of Slatter (1984), where, in his study, he found 
more ' failed to recover companies ' facing both price and product competition 
compared to the ' successfully recovered companies '. Product and price 
competition from overseas producers have been known to have made many sectors 
of industries in developed countries such as United States of America, Britain and 
other European countries to decline. 
In times of economic recession (as cited earlier), the market for certain products 
may shrink. Here intense competition in terms of product and price will prevail 
forcing those companies without significant product differentiation and with a 
lower price tag to be out of the game. In order to survive in this harsh environment 
some companies may go for sales volume with ridiculous low prices, irrespective 
of profitability, or to overtrade (as cited earlier). 
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While it is believed that product and price competition increases as an industry 
matures, the above findings have made it clear that this may not necessarily be the 
case. An industry may be in its growth stage but economic recession is equally 
capable of triggering product and price competition. 
C PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 
An extension related to the issue of competition is the product life cycle. The 
product life cycle provides insights into a product's competitive dynamics. 
Companies need to plan for successive strategies appropriate to each stage of the 
product's life cycle. 
Only 18 of the' troubled companies' (18%) were observed to have had problems 
related to the product life cycle, out of which 8 were STC (14% of STC) and 10 
were ofNSTC (23% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix B).The problems relating to the 
product life cycle are: having the same product too long in the market and having 
saturated sales which are declining. 
The bulk of STC and NSTC above faced the problem of having the same products 
too long in the same market (8 STC and 10 NSTC). Only 1 NSTC company 
reported facing saturated sales which were declining. 
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Whitney (1987) exj,lained that life cycle studies have proven companies like to 
hold on too long to their products in the market. The reasons behind this could be 
due to ' marketing myopia ' as cited earlier. A firm that fails to respond to 
changing market needs or that responds too late to changing needs is likely to find 
itself heading towards extinction (Slatter, 1984). 
Hofer (1980) produced a product I market matrix which can help companies to 
assess the appropriate strategic responses given the competitive position and the 
current stage it is in the product"life cycle. The matrix utilised the product life cycle 
and market share to translate into competitive position. 
D. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
There are other environmental factors that can cause corporate decline or, in some 
instances, failure. These factors can range from economic, social, political and 
technological environments that can have influence company performance such as 
the GNP growth, Monetary policy, Material sciences, Mechanisation and 
Robotization, Nationalised industries, etc. 
Only one particular company (an NSTC) was reported to have declined due an 
environmental factor. The particular circumstances was due to the move by the 
government to initiate a nationalised car industry, which in fact was a political 
decision and subsequently was followed by the increase in the excise duty for 
importers of ' completely knocked down units ' (CKD) motorcars. 
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This move by the government affected the particular company's internal cost 
structure and efficiency, which resulted in the increase in the cost of production, 
forcing the importer to increase the ultimate selling prices and eventually eroding 
the profit margin away due to the competitor pricing. 
In summary, there is a direct influence in terms of the generic strategies applicable 
for a successful turnaround by the causes of decline. The higher the number of 
decline causes, the more the generic strategies that will be required to turnaround 
the company. 
With reference to Appendix I, it was found that the majority ( 46%) of 
' troubled companies ' faced 4 causes of decline. Ten percent faced 3 causes of 
decline, another 10% 5 causes of decline, 19% 6 causes, 12% 7 causes and the 
remaining 2% and 1% faced 8 causes and 10 causes of decline respectively. 
Comparative analysis was also made between the STC and the NSTC. It was 
found that a group of 10 STC (17% ofSTC) faced 3 causes of decline. It was also 
observed that the majority of ' troubled companies ' facing 4 causes of decline 
belonged to the STC. None of the NSTC was observed in the above range of 
decline causes. Ten NSTC (23% ofNSTC) faced 5 causes of decline while the 
majority ofNSTC (18 companies or 42% ofNSTC) faced 6 causes of decline. 
There was also one STC observed in this range. 
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Another 12 NSTC (28% ofNSTC) were found with 7 causes of decline while the 
remainder 2 (5% ofNSTC) and 1 (2% ofNSTC) faced 8 and 10 causes of decline 
respectively. 
What can be observed further from the above is that the statistical mode for the 
number of causes of decline for the STC and the NSTC is 4 and 6 causes of 
decline respectively, meaning, that the STC are facing less causes of decline than 
the NSTC. When the range of the causes of decline was further analysed in terms 
of internally and externally generated causes, the followings were observed (refer 
to Table 20); 
Table 20 
Range Of The Causes Of Decline 
Internal causes (No.s) Eternal causes (No.s) 
Min Max Min Max 
STC 1 4 nil 2 
NSTC 3 7 nil 3 
For both internal and external causes of decline, NSTC are found facing higher 
I 
number in terms of both types of causes of decline than STC. 
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However, it is also fascinating to observe that both STC and NSTC faced more 
internally generated causes of decline than externally generated ones. The findings 
above also supports the statement made by Robert Di Giorgo, chairman ofDi 
Giorgo Corporation (as cited earlier) that problems come from an internal problem 
aggravated or triggered by external changes. 
Slatter (1984) as cited earlier, stated that if a company has fewer causes of decline 
then it may need less application of generic strategies to turnaround. This is in 
view of the position of ' troubled companies ', where not all them will be at the 
liberty, of simply applying every available combinations of generic strategies to 
tum around, and therefore the fewer the causes of decline the better would be the 
chances for them to have a feasible turnaround. Slatter also found that the number 
of generic strategies employed in successful turnarounds are considerably greater 
than the average number of factors causing decline (also cited earlier). 
The inference that can be made from Slatter's statement and findings above is that 
since STC faced fewer causes of decline, this would have placed them in a better 
position to tum around their companies successfully and STC would probably have 
been in a better position to use more combinations of generic strategies for 
corporate turnaround than the NSTC. 
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While it is better to have fewer causes of decline so that fewer generic strategies 
are needed to turn around the companies, it does not stop these companies (STC) 
with fewer causes of to apply higher number or combinations of generic strategies 
to turn around their companies. This creates greater higher chances for successful 
corporate turnarounds, but it may not have been the case with the NSTC. 
5.1.2 D2. SEVERITY OF CRISIS 
Threatening events and defects in a company's environment can generate crisis. 
Crisis promotes anxiety and stress, bringing about a negative impact on 
managerial emotions and behaviours and has the ability to deteriorate the whole 
organisation. 
Slatter (1984) commented that crisis tends to accentuate the internal affairs 
causing decline, reinforcing and accelerating the down tum trend and if no action is 
taken to effect a turnaround, the end result is insolvency and failure. 
Only 23 of the' troubled companies ' (23%) suffered from mild crisis, out of 
which 17 were STC (30% of STC) and 6 were NSTC (14% ofNSTC). 
Subsequently, 34 of the' troubled companies' (34%) suffered from moderate 
crisis, where 21 were STC (37% ofSTC) and 13 were NSTC (30% ofNSTC). 
The bulk of the' troubled companies' (43 companies or 43 %) suffered from 
severe or survival crisis situation. 
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Out ofthese, the majority were NSTC (24 companies or 56% ofNSTC) and only 
19 were of STC (33% of STC). Thus, the NSTC suffered more severe crisis than 
the STC (refer to Table 21). 
Table 21 
Severity OF Crisis 
Troubled Companies STC NSTC 
No. % No. % No. % 
Mild 23 23 17 30 6 14 
Moderate 34 34 21 37 13 30 
Severe or Survival 43 43 19 33 24 56 
Crisis and its severity may have direct or indirect links with other determinants and 
factors. The problems with inadequate financial control and financial policy for 
instance, can lead a company into crisis. High internal cost structure, in another 
instance, coupled with overtrading can together cause negative profitability and 
cashflows. 
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Subsequently, intense competition can erode away profit margins or even put a 
company into losses. A formula for disaster can arise if these and other negative 
factors acted upon the company all at once. 
With reference to the issue of ' solvency and liquidity crisis ' in Chapter 4 of the 
research, Bibeault (1982), Slatter (1984) and the other researchers found that 
insolvency and liquidity crisis are characteristics of companies facing a severe stage 
of crisis - those facing viability problems and possible bankruptcy. 
The findings above do not support those ofBibeault's (1982), Slatter's 
(1984)and the others. In phase one, it was found that 40 insolvencies which 
belonged to companies, who later successfully turned around were STC and 31 
belonged to the NSTC. Out of the 40 technically insolvent STC only 19 
companies were found to be in the severe or survival crisis stage while 21 
companies suffered moderate crisis. 
Consequently, it is not necessary that companies facing technical insolvencies are 
also companies who are in their severe stage of crisis. There are also STC at the 
moderate crisis stage with 1 or 2 years of technical insolvency. Thus, the argument 
that arises at this point is that it may be necessary to determine the length of time a 
company has faced technical insolvency before categorising it into the severe crisis 
stage. As a suggestion, a company that is facing more than 2 years of technical 
insolvencies may be categorised as being in the severe crisis stage. 
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However, it important to note from the above that 19 STC (33% of STC) who 
were in the severe crisis stage did manage to turn around successfully. This has led 
the research to believe that it may not be necessary that a company facing severe 
or survival crisis stage will eventually go into bankruptcy. 
Positive contributions from other factors such as industry characteristics, 
shareholders' commitment, bankers' commitment, creditors' commitment and 
others (it is not the intention to discuss them in detail at this stage) may have the 
role to play for enforcing the sui:cess of the turnaround. 
5.1.3 D3. COMPANY'S IDSTORICAL STRATEGY 
Diversification can be a good growth strategy given the existence of strategic 
opportunities, when the industry is very attractive and the company has the right 
capabilities to be successful in such an industry. As mentioned in the earlier part of 
the research (specifically under the research methodology), diversified companies 
have better opportunities in terms of the number of generic strategies available for 
corporate turnaround than non diversified ones due to the existence of two levels 
of strategies, that is, the corporate and the strategic business unit levels. 
Sixty of the ' troubled companies ' ( 60%) were found to be non diversified 
companies, out of which 30 belonged to the STC (53% of STC) and 30 to the 
NSTC (70% ofNSTC). 
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The number of div>ersified' troubled companies' was 40, out of which 27 were of 
the STC (47 % of STC) and 13 were of the NSTC (30% ofNSTC) (refer to Table 
22). 
Table 22 
Company's Historical Strategy 
Troubled Companies STC NSTC 
No. % No. % No. % 
Diversified 40 40 27 47 13 30 
Non diversified 
60 60 30 53 30 70 
For the STC, the ratio between diversified and non diversified companies was 
almost negligible. However, the fact remained, that the majority of the STC were 
non diversified companies. As for the NSTC, the ratio between diversified and non 
diversified companies was obvious and a strong majority (70%) ofNSTC were 
non diversified companies. 
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No doubt the NSTC have more non diversified companies than the STC but both 
types of companies have their majority of companies falling under the non 
diversified category. 
The argument at this point is whether there are real differences in terms of 
achieving a successful turnaround between diversified and non diversified 
companies. 
Slatter (1984) believes that the availability and the liberty to use more generic 
strategies to turnaround rompanies exis~ better in diversified companies (as cited 
earlier). Subsequently, Luffman, Sanderson, Lea and Kenny (1988) comment that 
" tlte further a company moves from its existing product market portfolio 
(diversify) and the resultant core skills and key resources, the greater the 
possibility of failure" (p. 88). 
The findings above do not seem to support previous. While 70% of the NSTC 
were found to be non diversified, the majority of the STC were also non 
diversified, but yet they have managed to achieve successful turnarounds. EquaJly 
by having 70% non diversified companies in the NSTC, it did not guarantee them 
from failing to achieve successful turnarounds. 
210 
Thus, the research found no differences in tenns of a company's historical strategy 
(diversification) between the SIC and the NSTC. But it did not deny the fact that 
further diversification can be employed as one orthe strategies for turning around 
companies as found in phase one under the issue of ' corporate strategies '. 
5.1.4 D4. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
The dynamics of an industry starts with the basic condition underlying demand and 
supply. These conditions influence the industry structure or characteristics. The 
industry structure or characteristics in tum influences the industry conduct such as 
product strategy, pricing, investment, etc. And, subsequently the industry conduct 
which in tum shapes the way the industry performs, that is its efficiency, growth 
and employment. The way the industry conducts itself may have a substantial 
intluence on the way the companies within the ind·1stry perfonn. 
This is because the characteristics of an industry influence the way companies 
fonn11late their strategies. Thus, as part of the industry dynamics, the industry 
structure or characteristics must be taken seriously to further understand its impact 
on companies intending to tum around. 
A. NATURE OF PRODUCT 
The understanding of the nature of a product is important. As part ofth~ 
marketing mix, product strategies \\ill be fonnulated in accorda11ce with the nature 
of the product, which subsequently influences the other marketing mix components 
such as pricing, promotion and distribution. 
Eleven ofthe ' troubled companies ' ( 11%) were involved with consumer 
products, out of which 4 were STC (7% of STC) and 7 were NSTC (16 o/o of 
NSTC). Those involved with industrial products consisted of SO' troubled 
companies' (50"/o) of which 30 were STC (53% ofSTC) and 20 were NSTC 
(47% ofNSTC). 
'Troubled companies' dealing with both types of products con,isted of39 
companies ofwhich 23 were STC (40% ofSTC) and 16 wereNSTC (37% of 
NSTC) (refer to Appendix C). 
When product differentiation was analysed, 84 'troubled companies ' {84%) w~re 
found not to be highly differentiated and only 16 companies (16%) were highly 
differentiated. Forty STC (81% ofSTC) and 38 NSTC (88% ofNSTC) did not 
have highly differentiated products and only 11 STC (19% ofSTC) and 5 NSTC 
(12% ofNSTC) had highly c!ifferentiated products. 
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Subsequently when price sensitivity was viewed, 92 ' troubled companies ' 
(92%) reported having products that were more price sensitive. Out of this figure, 
57 were ofthe STC (100% of STC) and 35 were of the NSTC (81% of 
NSTC). Only 8% of the' troubled companies' reported having products that 
were Jess price sensitive and all 8 belonged to the NSTC. 
The findings above showed that a majority ofboth STC and NSTC were involved 
with industrial products. They !!so showed that a majority ofSTC and NSTC were 
having products that were not highly differentiated. Subsequently, the majority of 
STC and NSTC were also having prod!.lcts that were more price sensitive. 
Contrary to the beliefs of previous researchers such as Porter (1980) and Slatter 
(1984) where companies dealing with consumer products that are highly 
differentiated and less price sensitive are likely to be in a better position to 
compete and subsequently turn around, the findings above found otherwise. The 
majority ofSTC were found to be dealing in industrial products, which were more 
price sensitive and less differentiated. Furthennore, as far as these were concerned 
it was found that there were no apparent differences between the STC and the 
NSTC. 
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B. MARKET SEGMENTATION 
... , Target marketing is the decision to distinguish the different groups that make up 
a market and to develop corresponding products and marketing mixes for each 
target market" (Kotler, 1988, p. 280). However, the number of target markets will 
depend on the number of potential market segments. The greater the number of 
potential market segments, the greater are the target markets. Thus, the marketeer 
will be able to develop more products and marketing mixe!. for the different ranges 
of target marketing in these segments. Existence of multiple segments also gives 
the marketeer the freedom of choice to choose which segment the marketeer 
prefers to concentrate upon. 
Eighty nine ofthe 'troubleU companiP.s '(8!)0A.) repoil:fd having highly segmented 
markets. Fifty six of them belonged to the STC (98% ofSTC) and 33 to the NSTC 
(78% ofNSTC). Only 11 ofthe' troubled companies' (11%) reported not having 
highly segmented markets, out of which I was an STC (2% ofSTC) and 10 were 
of the NSTC (23% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix C). 
From the above, it is found that there is no apparent difference between the STC 
and the NSTC as far as market segmentation is concerned. The majority ofSTC 
and NSTC companies depended their b.J.sinesses from the multiple market 
segments. One reason may be connected to the issue of differentiation under 
'nature of product' as cited earlier. 
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Whitney (1987, p. 148) stated that" much nonsense ha8 been written about market 
segmentation without concomitant consideration of product differentiation or, 
worse still, about product differentiation without a sharp eye on market 
segmentation". 
Levitt (1981, as cited in Whitney, 1987, p. 149) says that" to differentiate an 
offering effectively requirru. knowing what drives and attracts customers. It 
requires knowing how custo:>:r~ers differ from one another and how those 
differences can be clustered into commercially meaningful segments ". 
From the citations above, what can be inferred is that it is simply not enough just 
to have multiple segments but what is more important is how differentiation can 
be effectively captured into these market segments. Thus, a possible reason as to 
why NSTC found having high market segmentations did not succeed in their 
turnarounds may be due to the lack of product differentiation. However, the STC 
were also found to be in a similar position as the NSTC. Thus, this has further led 
the research to believe that there are other interacting factors in play to affect a 
successful turnaround other than merely having highly segmented markets. 
C RELATIVE SIZE AND STRENGTH OF COMPETITORS 
The fragmentation of the industry a company is in has an influence over the 
number of approaches the cc;mpany is able to achieve in terms of competitive 
advantages and the size ofthe competitive advantages. 
"' 
Thus, the more fragmented the industry, the greater the opportunities for 
differentiation although the size of the differentiations may be smaller. The 
fragmentation of the industry is also related to the concentration of the players in 
the industry. A less fragmented industry is depicted by a small number of 
competing companies, thus, increasing ' player' concentration. 
George and Joll (1988) gave an example of what is meant by a small number of 
firms in an industry. They explain that" each with a subst .. ntia! share of a market 
that is not showing any growth will mean that a substantial increase in the sales of 
one firm results in a noticeable loss to the others. The £inns will quickly learn why 
they have lost sales and are likely to respond in an attempt to regain their market 
share" (p. 109). 
Only 36 ofthe' troubled companies' (36%) reported being in industries which 
were fragmented, out ofwhich 19 were STC (33% ofSTC) and 17 were NSTC 
(4QG/o ofNSTC). The majority of the' troubled companies' {64 %) were in 
industries which were not fragmented out of which 38 were STC (67% of STC) 
and 26 were ofNSTC (60% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix C). 
From the above it is observed that there are no apparent differences and the 
majority ofSTC and NSTC are both in industries which are not fragmented. 
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As explained earlier, the concentration of the' players' in non fragmented 
industries is higher and each ' player ' may be fighting to increase or maintain its 
existing market share. Thus it was not surprising when the majority of the STC and 
NSTC reported that they were facing intense competition pressure in the earlier 
findings, given that both types of company were equally suffering from external 
pressure due to the recession and subsequently, aggravated by the non fragmented 
industry characteristics their are in. 
D. ENTRY BARRIERS 
Given the already intense competitive pressure from the existing ' players ' in the 
industry, a low entry barrier means that new entrants can add to the existing 
competitive pressure and worsen the conditions for the existing ' players '. 
High entry barriers would be of help to deter newcomers especially in a turnaround 
situation. 
Forty three ' troubled companies ' (43%) were in industries with low entry 
barriers. Out of these 22 were STC (39% ofSTC) and 21 were NSTC (49% of 
NSTC). The majority of the 'troubled companies' (57%) were in industries with 
high entry barriers of which 35 were STC (61% ofSTC) and 22 were ofNSTC 
(51 % ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix C). 
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It can be observed from the above that there are more STC who are in industries 
with high entry barriers than there are NSTC. In tact, a strong minority ofNSTC 
(49 %) are in industries with low barriers of entry. 
Given the scenario above, one cannot help imagine that the strong minority of 
NSTC are facing possible intense competition not only from the existing rivals but 
also from new entrants. Entry barriers may also be linked to several other factors 
such as economies of scale and differentiation. 
Porter (1980) stated six major sources ofbarriers to entry, out of which two are 
economies of scale and product differentiation (both are factors cited in the earlier 
findings of the research). While it is pointless to detail Porter's comments on 
product differentiation since the majority ofboi!t STC and NSTC do not have 
highly differentiated products, his explanation on the relationship between barriers 
of entry and economies of scale is worth mentioning. Porter aays that" economies 
of scale alter entry by forcing the entrants to come in at large scale and risk strong 
reaction from existing firms or to come in at a small scale and accept a cost 
disadvantage" (1985, p. 7). 
In the case of the STC it was found that only27 companies or 47% of the STC 
suffered from cost disadvantage in terms .of not having economies of scale and 
faced operational inefficiencies compared to 42 NSTC (98% ofNSTC). 
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This number ofSTC suffering from cost disadvantage may be linked to the high 
minority (39%) of STC in the low entry barrier industries. The features of low 
entry barrier industries would have placed them in worse off positions in terms of 
economies of scale and operational efficiencies. 
The majority of NSTC who did not achieve economies of scale and operational 
efficiencies but are enjoying the protection from the high entry barrier features may 
also be deriving benefits from other high entry barrier features such as high capital 
intensities, high switching costs, costs disadvantages independent of scale, etc. 
E. EXIT BARRIERS 
Companies may want to exit from 1111 existing industry since they may no longer 
consider that they can make returns on invl!!."tments that exceed the opportunity 
costs of capital. By the reduction in the number of companies through the exit 
process the industry structure changt'..s and subsequently leaves the leading ones to 
dominate. This strategy is also recognised as an ' Asset Reduction Strategy' in 
corporate turnarounds and may be chosen by a declining company as one of the 
strategies to turnaround. However, there are barriers to the application of this 
strategy. 
Fifty two of the ' troubled companies • (52%} were in industries with low exit, out 
of which 29 were STC (51% ofSTC) and 23 were NSTC (53% of the NSTC). 
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The number of companies found in high exit barrier industries were 48 ' troubled 
companies' (48%), out of which 211 were STC (4IJO/o ofSTC) and 20 were NSTC 
(47% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix C). 
It can be observed from the above findings that there are no significant differences 
between the number ofSTC and NSTC in high exit barrier industries and those in 
low exit barrier industries. For those in the high exit barrier industries the reasons 
could be due to high investments (capital intensity) in non transferable assets 
(e.g. specialist plant), the high cost of redundancy, the reliance on one product to 
be credible within a market sector, even ifthe product itself is making heavy 
losses, and the possibility of political intervention. It is also possible that the exit 
harriers faced by the companies above may be linked to factors found earlier in the 
research such as poor management, non diversified structure, non fragmented 
industries with high entry barriers and ' tied down assets '. 
Poor management feature of a declining company coupled with ' sentimental ' 
emotions for a company's asset or subsidiary may be the cause for the reluctance 
to sell off the asset or subsidiary in order to raise the extra cash required. In 
addition, in a non diversified company where there are no spare or excess assets 
available, all there is left is the company itself with nothing else to be sold except 
the company. 
(( 
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As observed earlier, the majority of the STC and the NSTC are in non fragmented 
and high entry barrier industries. Non fragn1ented industries, featured by several 
powerful ' players ' with high entry barriers may not be attractive to a new comer 
or potential buyer oft he company on sale. Subsequently, given the significant 
number ofNSTC with high borrowings and the STC who are able to raise bridge 
capital from their bankers (to be discussed later), the assets available would 
probably have been pledged as collateral for the loans given~ meaning they are 
'tied up'. 
F. RATE OF TEOINOLOGICAL CHANGE 
It is recognised that technology, even in its simplest fonn exists in almost all value 
activities in a company. Technology development may exist in the inbound 
logistics, main operation I production, outbound logistics, marketing and sales and 
service sections of a company. Subsequently, the same or even different 
technology may be used by other competitors in the same industry. In some 
industries technology improvements occur at a fast pace while in others it may not 
be so. 
Only 7 of the' troubled companies' {7%) reported being in industries with 
frequent technological changes. Out of these 4 were STC (7% ofSTC) and 3 
were NSTC (7% ofNSTq The majority of the' troubled companies' (93%) 
admitted that they were in industries where technology does not change too 
frequently, 
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And out of these 53 were STC (93% of STC) and 40 were NSTC 
(93% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendi~t C). 
While the minority of both STC and NSTC (reported being in industries with 
frequent technological changes) may be in ' technology- based ' industries such as 
electronic engineering, robotics and information technology (I.T), it is arguable 
whether the majority of the STC and NSTC are in industries without frequent 
technological changes, since it is accepted in this era that the pace of technological 
change in many industries is so rapid that product and process life cycles have 
become even much shorter. 
What can be inferred from the above is that there is the possibility of a link 
between the situation above and that of poor management problems. As stated 
earlier, one of the characteristics of poor management is the lack of awareness and 
the inability to react to external changes due to their' functional blindness ' and 
being ' myopic '. 
Luffinan, Sanderson, Lea and Kenny (1988) warn that" whilst some industries 
may feel somewhat immune from such changes, technological development in 
related industries can have a large effect" (p. 29). 
Thus, it may not be true that the industries the majority of the STC and NSTC are 
in arc not the ones facing frequent technological changes. 
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Frequent changes in technology may not be the only problem. The other reason 
could be the management of these companies, who are not sensitive enough to 
capture the changes due to their poor management characteristics. 
G. THREAT OF P...I.?TAL/ATION 
A company contemplating any change in terms of its marketing mix must take 
into account the reaction of its competitors or their threat of retaliation. Some 
competitors react instantaneously while others may take a longer period of time to 
react. 
Seventy two of the' troubled companies ' (72%) reported having a slower rate of 
reaction by their competitors. Out of which 38 were STC (67% of SIC) and 34 
were NSTC (79% ofNSTC). Only 28 ' troubled companies ' (28%) admitted that 
their competitors were quick to react or retaliate. Out ofthese 19 were STC 
(33% of the STC) and only 9 were NSTC (21% of the NSTC) (refer to 
·Appendix C). 
The majority of the STC and the NSTC were found to have experienced slower 
competitors' rate of reaction. These findings are :;omewhat contradictory to 
comments made by authorB such as Kotler (1988) and Johnson and 
Scholes (1988). 
"' 
Johnson and Scholes (1988) for instance, stated several facJO'rs that they believe 
' 
contributed to the degree of rivalry e.g. market growth, competitors size, fixed 
costs, capacity, differentiation and exit barriers. They added that intense 
competition and quick reaction by competitors arc likely to be found in an industry 
where the market growth is slow, the competitors are almost equal in size, with 
high fixed costs, extra capacity in large increments, where products are not 
differentiated and where the exit barriers are high. 
Contradictory to the above, the competltors' rate of reaction for retaliation is 
found to be slower despite the fact that the majority of the STC and NSTC arc in 
markets with slow growth (due to the recession}, in non fragmented industries 
without product differentiation and with excess capacity and high exit barriers. 
The reasons for this could be explained in Porter ( 1980) tenns as 
' factors for quick response capability ' or reasons behind a competitor's quick 
rate of reaction or retaliation. These factors are as follows; 
• Uncommitted cash resetves 
• Reserve borrowing power 
• Excess capacity 
• Unintroduced but on-the-shelf new products 
224 
However, by observing the factors given by Porter, it may be difficult to believe 
that most companies during an economic recession may have the luxury of 
experiencing all of the factors above, except possibly, having to had excess plant 
capacity, which in this case is true due to the downturn of the market, which may 
have affe<:ted their sales and subsequently forcing these companies to produce less, 
with higher costs, without the economies of scale and at lower margins. On the 
other side ofthe argument, it may also be due to not having these factors as stated 
by Porter to enable them to have ' quick response capability ' as in the case above, 
that have resulted in the competitors to react slower? I 
H. BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
Suppliers tend to~~ powerful when their concentration is high (i.e. when their 
numbers are few), when there a few substitutes and the supplied product is an 
important input and where switching costs are high. It is thus necessary in this case 
to have multiple supply sources. However, not all companies are in the position to 
do so and are basically' locked in ' with their suppliers. 
" Suppflers can exert a bargaining power over participants in an industry by 
threatening to raise prices or reduce the quality of purchased goods and services" 
(Porter, 1980, p. 21). Powerful suppliers can squeeze profitability out of a 
company wh<;> is unable to recover cost increases and further dampen the hope of a 
successful turnaround. 
Ninety six ofthe' troubled companies' (96%) reported having depended on more 
than 5 suppliers (the arbitrary cut of point rate), meaning that their number of 
suppliers were many and the suppliers were not able to exert much bargaining 
power due to their low concentration level. 
Out of these 56 were STC (98% of the STC) &nd40 were NSTC (93% of the 
NSTC). Only l STC and 3 NSTC reported havin£)' to depend on less than 5 
suppliers (refer to Appendix C). 
From the above it can be observed that the majority of the STC and the NSTC did 
not have to depend on a few suppliers. As such they were not' locked in 'by the 
suppliers and dictated on the purchasing tenns and conditions. 
Whilst, the majority of both STC and NSTC enjoyed this freedom of having 
suppliers without strong bargaining powers, it did not make any difference in tenns 
of trying to achieve successful turnarounds for the NSTC. They still did not 
manage to achieve successful turnarounds. Thus it is believed that there are other 
factors in play that may have compounded negative impacts on the NsTC from 
achieving successful turnarounds. 
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L BARGAINING POWER OF CUSTOMERS 
Customers bargaining power grows when they are a few and become more 
concentrated., They will try to force down prices, demand better quality products 
or services, longer credit periods and in some cases set competitors ag1iin5t each 
' 
other. For example, a seller who deals with a few large retail outlets may have to 
' 
offer special discounts, longer credit periods and may even have to pay for the 
sales space of his products in these outlets. As stated by (Luffman, Sanderson, Lea 
and KeMy, 1988)" supplying firms can become heavily dependent on one or two 
retailers which gives great power in such aspects as price negotiation and product 
quality and quantity" (p. 40). 
The majority oft he ' troubled companies ' (81JOAI) reported having more than 5 
customers (the arbitrary cut off point), out of which 47 were STC 
(82% ofSTC) and 42 were NSTC (98% ofNSTC). Only II of the' troubled 
companies ' (II%} :·o~ere found to be servicing less than 5 customers and out of 
these 10 were STC (18% ofSTC) and I was NSTC (2% ofNSTC) 
(refer to Appendix C). 
From the above, it can be observed that a strong majority ofboth STC and NSTC 
are not relying on a few customers for their revenue and as such they would not 
probably have to face the problem of strong customers' bargaining power. They 
are in a better position to decide which customer they find comfor.able and more 
profitable to do business with. 
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However, it is questionable as to why NSTC who are in similar position as the 
STC did not achieved successful turnarounds. As reasoned out earlier under 
' bargaining power of suppliers ' this particular factor alone may not be able to 
substantiate the ability ofthe NSTC to tum around. There may be other factors in 
play that can determine the ability ofthe NSTC to tum around. 
J. INDUSTRY GROWTH RATE 
An attempt to tum around a company in a mature or declining industry can be 
harder or even futile compared to when the industry is in its introduction or 
growth stage. 
"It is simply because the life cycle has an influence, not only on the functional 
activities of a company but also on its corporate strategy" (Luffinan, Sanderson, 
Lea and Kenny, 1988, p. 130). 
For instance, the industry characteristics in a mature industry are not as attractive 
as when it is in the growth stage. In the mature stage it is plagued by reducing 
market growth, oligopolistic structure, significant reduction in product variety and 
differentiation and depending on the rate ofinvestment ofthe company, it can be 
be either a' cashcow' or a' cash drainer'. The characteristics in the growth stage 
are somehow more positive than those described in the mature stage. 
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Eighty one' troubled companies ' (81 %) were reported to be in industries which 
are growing. Out of these 46 were STC (81% of the STC) and 35 were NSTC 
(81% of the NSTC). Only 19 of the' troubled companies' (19%) were in mature 
industries and out of which II were STC (19% ofSTC) and 8 were NSTC (19% 
of the NSTC) (refer to Appendix C). 
From the above findings, a strong majority ofboth STC and NSTC are in 
industries which are growing. There could have been multiple attractive 
characteristics apparent in these industries such as rapid market growth, fewer 
competitors, more profitability to ' plough back' for reinvestment or expansion 
and with reduced costs due to the rapid move along the experience curve. While 
these may have been beneficial to the STC, they did not make any difference to 
theNSTC. 
A!; stated clearly by Slatter (1984) "a firm's profit potential and hence its 
recovery, in.wlrt is a function ofthe industry it is in " (p. II). It is also believed 
that there could be other factors or combination of factors that have resulted in the 
NSTC experiencing non successful corporate turnarounds. 
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Overall, when the industry characteristics were analysed, it was found that 
6' troubled companies' (6%) had 3 occurrences of favourable industry 
characteristics, out of which only I was STC (2% ofSTC) and 5 were NSTC 
(II% ofNSTC). Ten STC (17% ofSTC) and 4 NSTC (9"/o ofNSTC) were 
observed to have had 4 occurrences and 9 STC (16% ofSTC) and 8 NSTC 
(19% ofNSTC) had 5 occurrences of favourable industry characteristics. 
The number ofSTC and NSTC having 6 occurrences were 12 STC {22% of 
STC) and 7 NSTC (17% ofNSTC). Seven STC (12% ofSTC) and 5 NSTC 
(11% ofNSTC) had 7 number of occurrences. The majority of the NSTC 
(10 NSTC or 23% ofNSTC) had 8 occurrences offavourable industry 
characteristics. Only 8 STC (14% of STC) were observed for this number of 
occurrences. Another lO SIC (17% ofSTC) were observed to have 9 
occurrences. Lastly, only 2 NSTC (5% ofNSTC) were observed to have 10 
occurrences offavourable industry characteristics while none of the STC were 
observed here (refer to Appendix G). 
From the findings above, the bulk of the the STC and NSTC have both higher 
number of occurrences of favourable industry characteristics. But the fact remains 
that NSTC did not benefit from the favourable characteristics of the growing 
industries they are in. Being in growing industries did not guarantee them to have 
successful turnarounds. 
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And as mentioned in the earlier observations, there may be other factors or 
combinations of factors that have the influence over the success of the NSTC 
turnarounds. 
To substantiate the comments above, Porter (1980) stated that" forces outside the 
industry are significant primarily in a relative sense; since outside forces usually 
affect all finns in the industry, the key is found in the differing abilities offinns to 
deal with them" (p. 3). 
Thus, possessing an attractive industry characteristic may not be enough to 
detennine a successful turnaround. What is equally important are other influential 
factors such as the firm's own internal abi·i!,ties. This is logical and it is also the 
very reason for this research which is trying to identify and understand the other 
detenninants of turnaround feasibility such as commitment of shareholders, 
bankers, creditors, availability of bridge capitals, viable core business, new 
competent management, etc. 
5.1.5 D5. COMPANY COST PRICE STRUCTURE 
In the ' emergency phase ' of a corporate turnaround, generic strategy such as cost 
reduction is usually applied as a short tenn measure in an attempt to ' stop the 
bleeding' or further erosion ofthe company's going concern. However, the cost 
reduction strategy is dependent on the company's existing cost price structure. 
In some companies, management could take full advantage of cutting costs in 
every possible costing variable to reduce losses and improve profitability. In 
others, however, once certain cost variables are reduced to a point, further cost 
reduction may not be possible. A compa'ny undergoing a corporate turnaround 
situation may still need to compete intensively in the market. 
Thus, the company with the lower cost price structure may be able to compete 
more effectively than others, with higher or equivalent cost price structure in the 
industry. 
Twenty five of the' troubled companies' (25%) were found to have lower cost 
price structures than their industry standards. While 25 STC (44% ofSTC) 
reported having lower cost price structure, none of the NSTC reported this. 
The bulk of the' troubled companies' (75%) reported having cost price structures 
thRt were equivalent to that of their industry, out ofwhich 32 were STC 
(56% ofSTC) and 43 were NSTC (100% ofNSTC) (refer to Table 23). 
Porter (1985) stresses that" cost advantage is one of the two types of competitive 
advantages a finn may possess. Cost is also of vital importance to differentiation 
strategies" (p. 62). 
Table 23 
Qmjp1my's Cost- Price Structure 
Troubled Com anies STC NSTC 
No. % No. % No. % 
Lower than industry 
" " " 
.. 0 0 
Equal or higher than 
industry 
7l 7l J2 
" 
4l 100 
Slatter (1984) gave a comparative example of two companies (both were making 
losses) in terms of cost price structure and the impact on profits by a 10% change 
in pricing, volume generation and cost reduction strategies. The company with. the 
lower variable costs was found to have more impact on profits when the sales 
volume wns increased. On the other hand, the company with higher variable costs 
and smaller contribution margin, had little impact on profit improvement even 
when the sales voklme was increased. 
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Hofer (1980) found that turnaround companies increased sales and market share to 
the level of non turnaround companies and that turnaround companies appeared to 
have been more effective in their efforts to manage costs and assets. He also found 
that turnaround companies have been able to generate increases in sales without 
corresponding increases in costs, fixed assets and debts. His findings are consistent 
with those of Schendel and Patton (1975) and Ramanujam ( 1984). 
The inference that can be made from the findings ofHofer and other researchers 
above is that turnaround companies, through effective management of costs and 
the other variables mentioned, may have increased their sales volume while 
achieving lower costs levels. 
However, in contrast to the above researchers' findings, the research did not 
observe any apparent differences in terms of cost price structure between the STC 
and the NSTC. Majority ofthe STC and the NSTC had cost price structures 
which were equivalent to their industry. 
This is supported by the research findings earlier in terms of cost disadvantage 
(discussed under' Causes of Decline'), where, even though the figures reported 
then were not exactly the same as the ones reported here, they are close enough to 
indicate the existence of a possible relationship or link with each other. 
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In the findings of detenninant Dl (Causes of Decline), it was observed that 27 
STC (47% ofSTC) and 42 NSTC (98% of NSTC) suffered from being in a cost 
disadvantage position or having higher cost structure due to operational 
inefficiencies and the inability to achieve economies of scale. Researchers such as 
Si::!Joeller (1977), Buzzell and Heaney (1971), Schendel and Patton (1975) and 
Hmbrick and Schecter (1983) had observed the reduction in costs due to 
economies of scale workings. 
Subsequently, both high cost price structure and cost disadvantage may not only 
be due to internal weaknesses of these companies but also may be caused by 
external factors such the recession reported earlier. Recession as explained before, 
affected 39 STC and 33 NSTC. Intense competition and shrinking markets in 
recessionary periods could have forced down sales, lowering production volume. 
Coupled with operational inefficiencies non economies of scale and higher costs 
resulted. 
It is also interesting to note that given the high number of companies affected by 
the recession, another inference that can be derived from this is that, comparing a 
company's cost price structure with its respective industry may not be the right 
form ofperfonnance control since other companies and competitors are equally 
affected by the recession. 
And high cost price structure and cost disadvantage may also incur in companies 
with inappropriate organisational structure and management style which 
sub~equently hinders effective cost control (inadequate financial control). 
5.1.6 D6. COMMITMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
The shareholders are the legal owners ofthe company. Their interest in the: \ 
company is reflected by the amount oftheir investments in tenns of paid up capital 
in the shareholders fund ofthe company's balance sheet. 
The reason for their investments is not soley to own the business but to ensure 
their investments are protected and further enchanced in terms of growth in the 
shareholders fund and prudent dividend payments. Equally, in a decline situation, 
shareholders are the most worried due to their depleting investment values and the 
possibility of greater losses leading to bankruptcy and demise of the business. 
Fifty nine of the' troubled companies' (590/o) reported that they had always 
received the conunitment of their shareholders, out of which 57 were STC 
(100% ofSTC) and 2 were NSTC (5% of the NSTC). 
In addition, 41 'troubled companies' (41%) admitted that they did not always 
receive the commitment of their shareholders. All41 belonged to the NSTC 
(95% ofthe NSTC). None of the companies receiving absolutely no form of 
conunitment from their shereholders (refer to Table 24). 
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Table 24 
Commitmer,.j Of Shar~ 
Troubled Comnanies STC NSTC 
Level of No. % No. % No. % 
commitment 
Always 
" " " 
100 2 s 
Not always 
41 41 0 0 41 95 
Never 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
From the above, it can be observed that the majority of the NSTC did not always 
,, 
receive the full commitment of their shareholders in tenns ofthe full authority and 
absolute power to initiate and implement a corporate turnaround. Their actions 
were usually highly scrutinised and monitored closely by their shareholders. 
Thll reasons for the above could be due to the NSTC shareholders who may be 
overly concerned and deeply worried over the security of their investments in the 
NSTC, given that the majority of the NSTC were in the severe crisis stage. 
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Thus, shareholders may be scrutinising actions by the top management closely to 
ensure that things do not go wrong at every step of the turnaround process. 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) found that eKtemally controlled firms are likely to have 
management performance closely reviewed and evaluated by eKternal shareholders 
who will intervene when performance is judged to be unsatisfactory. 
T~e research findings supports those of Sohncik and Pfeffer since it was found 
]) 
th,~.1t 34 of the NSTC (79% ofNSTC) were actually externally owned. Most of the 
CEOs were employed and only a handful of the NSTC (9 NSTC or 21% ofNSTC) 
were owner cum chairperson I CEO. This may have explained the reasons for the 
tight decisions and actions of the majority of the NSTC shareholders. 
In contrast to the NSTC, the STC have always received the full commitment of 
their shareholders. The compelling reason behind this could be due to the high 
number of owner cum chairperson I CEO who are also the shareholders of these 
companies (and in most cases they are the main shareholders) and as such they 
may not require higher authorisation or sanctions to initiate or implement recovery 
strategies which they feel are deemed fit for turning around the companies. In 
addition. they themselves are the dominating powers within their compru1y boards. 
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The findings above for the STC are also in contrllllt with of Slatter (1984) where 
he commented that only a few turnaround managers would have the freedom in 
terms of determining the recovery strategy to take and to implement them, unless 
the finn has just been acquired. 
These CEOs as described by Slatter would have to obtain the blessings and 
sanctions from the main shareholders through their board of directors for every 
action that they may want to embark on. This is, however, similar in the case of the 
NSTC above. 
5.1.7 D7. COMMITMENT OF BANKERS 
A company undergoing the process of turnaround must establish and communicate 
credibility with the influential stakeholder group. This group has the power to 
appoint or not appoint a receiver, to restructure the debt and I or to offer 
additional financing. This particular group in discussion is the bankers. 
The turnaround CEO must convince the banks with their strategic turnaround plan 
and must also persuade the banks not to put the company into receivership. 
Conununication is vital with the bankers. The turnaround CEO may also seek the 
commitment of the bankers in various fonns such as an agreement to restructure 
the debt, defer principal payments, waive the interest charges and may also request 
for additional financing to weather the turnaround period. 
"' 
None of the' troubled companies' found their bankers to be not all supportive in 
terms oftheir commitment level. However, 29 of the' troubled compa11ics' 
(290/o) found their bankers not so supportive and all 29 belongt.d to the NSTC 
(67% ofNSTC). However, 27 of the 'troubled companies' (27%) obtained the 
supportive level of commitment from their bankers. 
Within this group 21 were STC {37% ofSTC) and only 6 were of the NSTC 
(14% ofNSTC). The major group of 44 'troubled companies' (44%) received 
the very supportive commitment level from their hankers, out of which 36 were 
STC (63% ofSTC) and only 8 were NSTC (19"/o ofNSTC) (refer to Table 25). 
It can be observed from Table 25 that the STC received either the supportive or 
the very supportive levels of commitment. The number of NSTC experiencing 
these levels of commitment were only 14 or 33% ofNSTC. The bulk of the 
NSTC fell within the not supportive level ofbankers commitment. 
The reasons the STC received the supportive and the very supportive levels of 
commitment from the bankers compared to the NSTC, could be due to certain 
factors of ' comfort ' that bankers may have found in them snd which may be 
linked to determinants such as the number of decline causes, severity of crisis, 
industry characteristics (as discussed earlier) and viable core business, realistic 
turnaround plan or recovery plan and new competent mansgement (to be discussed 
later), 
'"" 
Table 25 
Commitment Of Bankers 
Troubled Companies STC NSTC 
Level of No. % No. % No. % 
commitment 
Very supportive 44 44 36 63 
' 
19 
Supportive 
21 21 21 37 6 14 
Not so supportive 
29 29 0 0 29 67 
Not supportive at all 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
It is worth recalling the earlier findings on some of these determinants where the 
STC were found to have positive attnbutes of these determinants compared to the 
NSTC. For instance, it was found that STC suffered fewer causes of decline, and 
had always received the commitment oftheir shareholders, etc. more than the 
NSTC had received. 
At this point it may also be worth citing a contriL'Iting observation. Several authors 
and researchers such as Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976), Davis 
(1988), Eisenberg ( 1972), Pant (1982), Taylor (1982), Slatter (1984), Bibeault 
(1982) and others, have stressed the importance in the change in top management. 
In fact Bibeault emphasised that the recovery phase should begin only when a new 
CEO is appointed. 
Bibeault is supported by Slatter, who also recommended the removal of the fanner 
CEO to show tangible evidence to interested parties such as investors, employees 
and, specifically the bankers, to prove to them that something positive is being 
done to improve the firm's performance. 
The emphasis and recommendations of the researchers contrast with those findings 
above. It must be re-emphasised that out of the 57 SIC, 38 SIC did not have any 
change in their top management and 32 SIC were literally managed by owner cum 
chairperson I CEO. It was also emphasised earlier under ' commitment of 
shareholders ' that one oft he reasons SIC received a greater level of commitment 
from their shareholders was due to the fact that the majority of SIC were 
managed by owner cum chairperson I CEO. 
Subsequently, it is also felt that this could be one of the compelling reasons 
bankers are found to be giving greater levels of conunitment to the SIC. 
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Bankers, similar to those shareholders, are equally worried about the value and 
fate oftheir monies loaned to these companies. Bankers are more assured when 
they know that these owners cum chairpersons I CEOs are also striving hard, 
giving their best and their part oft he commitment to ensure that these companies 
do not decline further and are seen to be taking steps toward successful 
turnarounds. 
What can be derived from the above argument is that bankers may not be looking 
for assurances such as a strong chance for a successful corporate turnaround. 
They are also looking for the type and level of commitment that can be given by 
the leadership of the company wanting to turnaround. It is not necessary that only 
new top management possess this level of commitment. Instead greater levels of 
commitments are also found in companies with the owner cum chairperson I CEO 
type, those who sre equally concerned with the fate of their investments. 
5.1.8 DS. COMMITMENT OF CREDITORS 
Another party with which a turnaround leadership must establish and communicate 
credibility are the creditors. Creditors or suppliers must be persuaded not to apply 
for a creditor-winding-up-order and wherever possible should be persuaded to 
ensure the continuity of supplies during the process of turning around the 
company. 
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In most cases creditors usually realise that they have a greater chance to get back 
monies due to them by co-operating closely with the turnaround leadership rather 
than pushing the company into receivership or liquidation. They also realise that by 
resorting to harsh decisions, as mentioned above, they may be at the losing end 
because the proceeds to be derived from a winding up exercise will first benefit the 
secured creditors such as the banks, government taxes, employee salaries, etc since 
most creditors are unsecured. 
Out ofthe 66' troubled companies' (66%) reported to have received strong 
commitments from their creditors in tenns of their creditors agreeing to the 
rescheduling I deferring of payments, continuation of supplies and the formation 
of creditors committee, 57 were STC (100% ofSTC) and only 9 were NSTC 
(21% ofNSTC). Thirty four NSTC (79"/o ofNSTC) who did not receive the 
commitment of their creditors were also the 34' troubled companies' (34%) who 
were facing similar problems (refer to Table 26). 
From Table 26, the STC were found to be in a better position as far as getting the 
commitment of their creditors was concemed compared to the NSTC. The lather 
group found it more difficult to defer payments, that is, the creditors were insisting 
that payments be made immediately and were also deciding not to continue their 
supply, far from agreeing to the formation of the creditors committee. 
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Table 26 
Commitment Of Creditors 
Troubled Companies STC NSTC 
Agreement on No. % No. % No. % 
rescheduled I 
deferred payment, 
continuation of 
supply and creditors 
committee 
y,. 
" " 
57 100 9 21 
No 
34 34 0 0 34 79 
As Slatter (1984) states" the suppliers greatest leverage comes from threatening 
to stop supplies, but in situations where there are no alternative sources of supply, 
cutting off supplies may mean that management has no alternative but to ask the 
bank or court to appoint a receiver" (p, 136). 
In practice, usually creditors insist that any further supply to the company be made 
on a ' c.o.d ' or cash on delivery basis. This will not help a eompany already in 
a ' cash trapped ' position. 
The reasons creditors gave their commitment to the STC may be similar to the 
reasons set forth as to why bankers are giving their commitment to this group of 
companies. 
The findings above con1radict those of the researchers such as 
Slatter (1984), Whitney (1987) and others mentioned before. 
Whitney (1987) for instance states that" a skilful negotiator will sustain the 
suppliers' fear at the subliminal level while providing a modicum of wholesome 
greed. After all, dynamic new management is now in place, old and festering 
problems are being recognised, new financing facilities are being negotiated and 
new marketing programs are being developed" (p. 56). 
As pointed out earlier under' commitment ofbankers' a strong majority ofSTC 
did not have their top management changed and most of them were managed by 
owner cum chairperson I CEO. It may be worth reiterating the same argument put 
forward earlier, but this time in the context of creditors. 
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One of the compelling reasons why creditors gave their commitment to the STC 
may have been due to the eKistence of the strong commitment by the owner cum 
chairperson I CEO, who is also a shareholder and life equally concerned about the 
fate of his or hr.r investments in these companies. They will take all appropriate 
actions to ensure a successful turnaround of their company. The reasons for the 
commitment of the bankers toward to the STC may also help to reinforce the 
above llfguement. 
5.1.9 D9. COMMITMENT OF EMPLOYEES 
No turnaround leadership works on their own. They need not only the 
commitment of other stakeholders such as the shareholders, bankers and creditors 
but, in every of their attempts to further arrest the crisis situation and to later 
implement changes to turnaround the company, they will need the commitment of 
the employees. 
In a crisis situation, employees would have already taken the blow from 
demotivation,low morale and would have shown resistance to change. An easy 
answer out of this would be to execute a redundancy program or even fire the 
' hard core ' personnel. However, as easy as it may sound, what the turnaround 
leadership would really require is a strong commitment by the employees to 
weather together the crisis period. At times, everyone may have to do their bit of 
sacrifice for the company even ifit means getting less pay and handling increased 
job loads. 
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A. HIGH RATE OF VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION 
Only 5 of the' troubled companies' (5%) reported having a high rate of voluntary 
resignation, meaning employees left the companies on their own accord. All 5 
companies were ofthe NSTC (12% ofNSTC) and none was reported for the STC. 
A strong majority of the' troubled companies' (95 %) reported that they did not 
have a high rate of voluntary resignations. Thirty eight were NSTC 
(88% ofNSTC) and 57 were STC (100% ofSTC) (refer to Appendix D). 
B. ACCEPTING INCREASED JOB LOADS WITH SAME WAGES 
The number of 'troubled companies' reporting this were 36 or (36% of the 
'troubled companies') out of which 34 were STC (60% ofSTC) and only 2 were 
NSTC(5% ofNSTC). Twenty three companies ofthe NSTC (53% ofNSTC) 
reported that theil' employees did put up a resistance and did not accept a heavier 
job load given the same amount of wages. Forty one 'troubled companies ' (41%) 
reported that they did not take such a measure as above, out ofwhich 23 were 
STC (40% ofSTC) and 18 were NSTC (42% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix D). 
C ACCEPTING SAME JOB LOAD WITH WAGES CUT 
Eighty two ofthe' troubled companies' (82%) reported that they did not take 
such a measure. Fifty six were STC (98% ofSTC) and 26 were NSTC 
(60"/o ofNSTC). Seventeen ofthe NSTC (40"/o ofNSTC) reported that their 
employees did not accept having their wages cut for doing the same job load. 
None ofthe STC reported this. 
"' 
Only one STC reported that it did not face resistance from its employees for 
having their wages cut for doing the same job load (refer to Appendix D). 
D. TOLERATING LATE PAY 
Thirty ' troubled companies ' reported having employees that tolerated late pay 
and out ofwhich aliJO belonged to the STC (53% ofSTC). None was reported 
for the NSTC. However, 42 NSTC (98% ofNSTC) and only I STC (2% ofSTC) 
reported that their employees did not tolerate late pay. Twenty seven ' troubled 
companies ' (27%) reported that they did not resort to late pay practice, out of 
which 26were STC (45% ofSTC) and only I was an NSTC (2% ofNSTC) 
(refer to Appendix D). 
E. PARTICIPANTS SUPPORTING TURNAROUND PROCESS 
Thirty eight ofthe 'troubled companies' reported having employees who 
recognised themselves as participants supporting the turnaround process. Out of 
which 37 were STC (65% ofSTC) and one was a NSTC (2% ofNSTC). Thirty 
seven NSTC (86% ofNSTC) did not have employees who recognised themselves 
as participants supporting the turnaround process. None of the STC was reported 
for this. However, 20 SIC (35% ofSTC) and 5 NSTC (12% ofNSTC) reported 
that their employees neither felt that they were participants nor non participants 
supporting the turnaround process (neutral) (refer to Appendix D). 
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The overall commitment of employees was also analysed in tenns oft he number of 
positive responses (yes I n.a) of the STC and ofthe NSTC to the 5 inquiries above. 
It was found that the bulk of the STC (53 companies or 93% ofSTC) responded 
positively to all 5 inquiries. Only I NSTC (2% ofNSTC) was reported to be so. 
Responding positively to four inquil'ies were 4 STC (7% of STC) and none of the 
NSTC. 
Subsequently, the majority of the NSTC (38 companies or 88% ofNSTC) 
responded positively to 2 inquiries. None ofthe STC was reported here. Four 
NSTC (10% ofNSTC) responded positively to one inquiry and no STC was 
reported here (refer to Appendix I). 
Several interesting observations were made from the above. All of the STC 
(57 STC or 100% ofSTC) and a majority ofthe NSTC (38 NSTC or 88% of 
NSTC) reported that they did not have a high rate of voluntary resignation. With 
regard to accepting a greater job load for the same wages, a majority ofSTC 
(34 STC or 60% of STC) reported that their employees responded more 
positively than the NSTC. While only 17 NSTC (40% ofNSTC) reported that 
their employees responded negatively towards accepting the same job load but 
with wages cut, most oftheNSTC (26 NSTC or 600/o ofNSTC) and STC (56 
STC or 98% of STC) were not found to be involved with this issue. 
However, a majority of STC (30 STC or 53% of STC) reported that their 
employees responded positively in tenns of receiving a late payment on their 
wages compared to the majority of the NSTC (42 NSTC or 98% ofNSTC) whose 
employees did not. 
Subsequently, a majority of STC (37 STC or 65% ofSTC) reported that their 
employees felt that they were participants supporting the turnaround process 
compared to the majority ofNSTC (37 NSTC or 86% ofNSTC) whose 
employees did not. Lastly, the STC were found to have more positive responses 
from their employees than the NSTC when wmpared in tenns of the total five 
inquiries (refer to Appendix 1). 
The reasons for the above could be several. Firstly, the recessionary period which 
both STC and NSTC are facing could have discouraged the employees in the 
companies to resign voluntarily due to job security and the fear ofbeing ' worse 
off' if they were to joint oth~r companies. Simultaneously, this factor, like the 
other factors mentioned such as tolerating late pay, accepting the same job load 
with wages cut and accepting a heavier job load for tile same wages, could be 
linked to another factor, that is, employees feeling that they are participants 
supporting the turnaround process. They may feel that they are part of the 
company and would stay to weather through the toughest of times just as when 
they are with the company when times are good. 
This leads to the second possible reason. It is believed that culture, loyalty and 
relationship may have been a force behind the above behaviour. 
Abdullah (1992) mentions that: 
Very often employees are considered members of an extended 
family and the employer a good parent who will protect them. 
Malaysians live in a complicated web of kinship ties based on the 
concept of mutual and traditional obligations as demonstrated in the 
relationship especially with one's family, vilJage, state or social 
group. It is likely that an employu who has a good relationship 
with his supervisor will also be loyal to the organisation (p.\2). 
" The team members are prepared to work beyond the call of duty", 
(Manser, 1992, p.52). Abdullah and Singh (1992) also commented that in many 
instances people are willing to work themselves to death for the sake of a good 
boss. 
The explanation given above has resulted in the possibility of a third linking reason, 
that is, the leadership. 
When compared earlier, both STC and NSTC experience poor management 
problem. However, the reason behind the commitment received from the bankers 
and creditors in the STC, compared to the NSTC, is the high number of owner 
cum chairperson I CEO background. 
"' 
As mentioned earlier, these owners cum chairpersons I CEOs, whose investments 
are at stake, would have given their maximum commitment to enable the 
companies to achieve successful turnarounds. In trying to change the fate of these 
companies, the leadership themselves, would have undergone several phases of 
changes. Thus a' changed' owner, striving to keep the company anoat with 
support from the bankers and creditors may have generated the very confidence of 
the employees, leading them to feel that they are participants supoorting the 
turnaround, making them feel willing to toil and face any hardship to keep the 
company afloat. 
5.1.10 DIO. NEW COMPETENT MANAGEMENT 
Even with the commitment of the bankers, creditors, employees and the capacity 
to use multiple generic strategies for a turnaround, the company is still missing one 
of the vital factors for a turnaround success, that is a new competent management 
(or strategic turnaround leadership) who will take charge to ensure that the whole 
exercise will not end up being futile. In otherwords, a new competent management 
with the right characteristics to deliver a successful turnaround is needed. 
The turnaround management style may totally contradict the ' usual or 
traditional ' management styles because turnaround wa.-rants a dramatic change 
through the use of strong, autocratic and sometimes dictatorial approaches. 
Neither time nor circumstance will permit traditionel structures and processes. 
"' 
" Turnarounds are akin to war and the traditional participative process, so often 
effective in other situations, is apt to leave corpses sprawled all over the 
landscape" (Whitney, 1987, p. II). 
The key characteristics of a new competent management for corporate turnaround 
are analysed as follows. 
' li 
A. ABIUTY TO IDENTIFY ORGANISATIONAL PROBLEMS I SORE 
SPOTS QUICKLY 
The quicker top management are able to identi:Y the problems or sore spots in the 
organisation the faster will appropriate actions be taken to rectifY the problem. 
Seventy six ofthe' troubled cornpanies' (76%) CEOs admitted that they were able 
to identifY problems in the organisation very quickly. Among these 56 were of the 
STC (98% ofSTC) CEOs and 20 were of the NSTC (47% ofNSTC) CEOs. 
Twenty three NSTC (53% ofNSTC) CEOs and only I STC (2% ofSTC) CEOs 
admitted that they were unable to identifY problems in the organisations very 
quickly (refer to Appendix E). 
From the above, a strong majority of STC cEos were found to be able to identify 
problems in their organisations quicker than those of the NSTC. The ability to do 
so had placed them in a better position to arrest problems before it was too late. 
'" 
',I 
Thr. evidence for the above r.an be observed from the high incidence ofSTC which 
were found earlier to be in the' mild or moderate ' crisis stage compared to the 
majority ofthe NSTC found in the severe stage. 
B. 'STOMACH ' TO FIRE PEOPLE 
During the implementation of the generic strategies to turn the company around, 
especially the ' cost reduction ' strategy, there may be a need to execute a 
redundancy program. Immediate action :o reduce total labour costs is a 
characteristic of many recovery situations (Slatter, 1984). However, making 
employees redundant or firing people is a very emotional issue and it takes a tough 
minded turnaround leader to make such a decision to necessitate the turnaround 
process. 
Only 25 ofthe' troubled companies '(25%) admitted having the' stomach ' to 
fire employees or make them redundant. Twenty four of the STC (42% ofSTC) 
CEOs and only I NSTC (2% ofNSTC) CEO admitted that they had the 
'stomach' to fire employees or make them redundant. Forty two of the NSTC 
(98% ofNSTC) CEOs and 33 of the STC (58% ofSTC) CEOs admitted that they 
did not have the ' stomach' to do so (refer to Appendix E). 
The finding above is somewhat dissimilar to those of Slatter (1984). One of his 
observations includes the redundancy of25,000 workers of British Leyland in 
1979 alone. Another, is the redundancy of750 workers of one of the largest 
British companies (with sales of £ 450 million in 1979 alone). 
It could probably be true that more turnaround leaders in Britain have the 
' stomach ' to fire their employees or execute redundancy programs compared to 
their Malaysian counterpans in implementing the ' cost reduction ' turnaround 
strategy. This dissimilarity may be due to a cultural and value background. 
Abdullah and Singh (1992) stress that: 
Leadership is still paternalistic because of the hierarchical nature of 
the Malaysian sodety. There is a moral component in the 
relationship between the employers and the employees which is 
similar to the relationship of a child with the e~ttended family. There 
are mutual traditional obligations: on the side of the employer, 
protection of the employee, almost regardless of the latter's 
performance: and on the side of the employee, loyalty towards the 
employer (p. 37). 
The above could be one of the reasons why many turnaround leaders in Malaysia 
do not have the ' stomach ' to implement redundancy programs. These turnaround 
leaders could have taken advantage of the not so powerful position of Unions in 
Malaysia (as compared to their counterparts in Britain). But they did not. 
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It is also possible that they could have resorted to other alternatives such as the 
introduction of a no hiring policy, early retirement, voluntary redundancy, 
reduction of overtime, shorter working hours, longer working time with the same 
pay, work sharing, freeze in pay increase, staff transfer and a cut in wages, salaries 
and bonuses. 
C. PEOPLE USER AND NOT PEOPLES' MAN 
A turnaround leader does not take part in a popularity contest or in trying to be 
' Mr. Nice ' to every one in the company at all times. They are tough minded and 
objective driv<!n and are racing against time to ensure the successful turnaround of 
the company. 
Fifty five ofthe' troubled companies' (55%) CEOs considered themselves as a 
people user and not a peoples' man. Fifty two of these were STC (91% ofSTC) 
CEOs, who considered themselves people users, that is they got things done even 
if it required the usc of stringent techniques e.g. ' manageme11t by fear ', ' perfonn 
or leave', etc. The opposite was the case for the NSTC, where 40 NSTC (93% of 
NSTC) CEOs believed in being nice and popular with the employees and 
restrained themselves from' hurting' the feelings of their employees (refer to 
Appendix E). 
Being 'Mr. Nice ' will lead the already declining company to nowhere. Getting the 
employees' commitment is important. 
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The turnaround leadership should also be able to use their charisma with the 
employees to get them to perform their tasks as required. They must be able to 
mobilise the company resources (inclusive of human resources) and use them to 
the maximum to tum the company around. 
D. MAKING DECISIONS ON THEIR OWN 
In a turnaround situation especially in the early stages, decision making is 
centralised and most ofthe time the turnaround leader will make the decisions on 
his own. Thus participative management techniques should be avoided in the early 
stages of the turnaround (Whitney, 1987). 
Only 27 of the' troubled companies' (27%) CEOs admitted that they made 
decisions on their own compared to 73 others who did not practise such a 
behaviour. Out of these 26 CEOs were of the STC (46% ofSTC) and only 1 
belonged to the NSTC. The majority (98%) ofthe NSTC CEOs (42 CEOs) and 
54% of the STC CEOs (31 CEOs) did not result to making decisions on their 
own (refer to Appendix E). 
From the above, it can be observed that an element of participative management, 
especially in terms of consensus decision making is still the practice in the majority 
ofNSTC and STC despite being in a crisis situation. However, the practice is seen 
to be greater in the NSTC than the STC. 
'" 
It is also suspected that the 26 CEOs belonging to the STC, who made decisions 
on their own could have been of the owner cum chairperson I CEO type. 
E. OFTEN MAKING BOLD DECISIONS 
More often than not the turnaround leadership is faced with multifaceted issues 
which are complex with very little time to make decisions. By not deciding or 
resitating will worsen the situation. It is necessary in many circumstances for the 
leadership to make decisions based on little information and at times to take a finn 
stand by making bold decisions. Slatter (1984) mentions that" even in the case of 
divesting a subsidiary, the decision may be taken with virtually no analysis" (p. 
IS l). 
The majority (95%) of the NSTC CEOs (41 CEOs) and 27 STC ( 47% ofSTC) 
CEOs admitted that often they did not make bold decisions. Thirty of the STC 
(53% ofSTC) CEOs and only 2 of the NSTC (5% ofNSTC) CEOs admitted to 
making bold decisions often (refer to Appendix E). 
The reasons above could again be linked to the signiiicant number of owner cum 
chairperson I CEOs found in the STC. Also being the shareholders, they could 
have been in a better position to make decisions on the spot compared to the 
CEOs who were employed and who reported to their respective boards of 
directors. 
"' 
These CEOs would have to obtain clearance from their boards and would avoid as 
far as possible, making bold decisions on their own (as evidenced by the high 
number of CEOs who admitted to not making decisions on their own). 
F. SEITING DEFINITE TARGETS I OBJECTIVES 
The turnaround leadership must know what they are trying to do for the company. 
They must set certain targets and objectives to be achieved and when they are 
supposed to be achieved (the time frame). Definite targets I objectives serve as 
benchmarks if not guides for the company as it undergoes the turnaround process. 
Ninety nine of the' troubled companies' (99%) CEOs admitted to setting definite 
targets I objectives that were to be achieved. All 57 STC (100% of STC) CEOs 
and 42 NSTC (100% ofNSTC) CEOs admitted to having done as such. Only I 
NSTC (2% ofNSTC) CEO did not do it (refer to Appendix E). 
Both STC and NSTC CEO& acknowledged the importance ofhaving definite 
targets I objectives that are to be achieved in their companies turnaround process, 
which served as beacons or guides or even as benchmarks for assessing the 
perfonnance oftbe turnaround, 
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G. IMPOSING HWH STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
One may be excused for thinking that in a turnaround situation the standard of 
performance evaluation may be compromised as long as the turnaround leadership 
manages to get the company out of the' red' or losses. In fact, given that definite 
targets I objectives oft he turnaround are set to be achieved by the turnaround 
leadership, they will subsequently devise a control system based on high standards 
of performance evaluation to ensure that the turnaround process is on the right 
track. Stringent as it may seem to be, the intention is purely to steer the company 
out ofthe ' red ' and into a sustainable turnaround level where further growth can 
take place. 
Imposing high standards of performance evaluation is an obvious move found in 
most of the STC and NSTC CEOs. Ninety two of the' troubled companies' 
(92%) CEOs admitted to imposing high standards of performance evaluation. All 
57 CEOs of the STC (100% ofSTC) admitted that they imposed high standards of 
performance evaluation. Thirty five CEOs of the NSTC (81%) admitted to having 
done as much while the remainder 8 NSTC (19% ofNSTC) CEOs did not (refer 
to Appendix E). 
It is obvious from the above that all of the STC and most of the NSTC CEOs 
viewed imposing high standards of performance evaluation as an important 
component in the turnaround process. 
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In fact, the establishment oi performance standards plays a key role in changing the 
culture of an organisation (Slatter, 1984). 
However, it must be mentioned here that what constitutes a high standard in one 
company may differ from that of another (no data is available for this since it does 
not constitute the main interest ofthe research). 
H. SPENDING MORE TIME IN IMPLEMENTATION THAN MEETINGS 
It cannot be denied that having meetings with the operational and functional heads 
of divisions I departments is important. However, as in strategic planning, failure 
to realise what has been planned, frequently occurrs during the implementation 
phase. It is in this phase, unfortunately, that top management are found to be 
lacking emphasis on. Equally, in a turnaround process, the leadership must not 
only formulate plans and strategies to tum the company around but must spend 
more time in ensuring their successful implementation. 
Sixty five of the' troubled companies' (65%) CEOs admitted that they did not 
spend more time in implementation but regarded having meetings as a more 
strategic move, from among which 27 were of the STC (47% ofSTC) CEOs and 
38 were ofthe NISTC (88% ofNSTC) CEOs. Thirty STC (53% of STC) CEOs 
and only 5 of the NSTC (12% ofNSTC) CEOs admitted spending more time in 
implementation than in meetings (refer to Appendix E~ 
"' 
From the above, it is found that a strong majority ofNSTC CEOs spent more time 
in having meetings compared to those of the STC. Although a majority of the 
STC CEOs were found spending more time in implementing , a strong minority of 
the STC CEOs also preferred attending more meetings than implementing. 
Meetings are absolutely necessary as it represents a forum for planning and 
evaluating turnaround progress. However, as stressed by Slatter (1984), ideally the 
turnaround leader will want time to make evaluations, but crisis turnarounds 
demand analysis and actions and discussions invariably have to be cut short in 
order to start the implementation phase. 
L OFTEN WITH NEW IDEAS I TECHNIQUES OR SUPPORTED THEIR 
EMERGENCE 
Changing the' old ways' or habits of the company undergoing a turnaround 
process is unavoidable especially when the ' old ways ' or habits are part of the 
cause for decline. The turnaround leadership must be able to ' pump in ' new 
effective techniques, new ideas for chwlge and simultaneously encourage and 
support the emergence ofinnovative methods and thinking at all levels of the 
company. 
'" 
Eighty seven of the' troubled companies' (87%) CEOs admitted that they often 
did not come up with new ideas /techniques or even supported their emergence, 
out ofwhich 48 were orthe STC (84% of STC) CEOs and 39 were of the NSTC 
(91% ofNSTC) CEOs. Only a handful of the STC CEOs (9 CEOs) and the NSTC 
CEOs (4 CEOs) did otherwise (refer to Appendix E). 
Rickards (1985) identified 12 key issues with regard to innovation and one that 
may be linked to the issue above is innovation and that it involves conflict which 
must be resolved through negotiation and participation. 
Participative management as understood earlier is not one of the themes in a 
turnaround process. Equally, time is crucial and turnaround leaders would not 
want to spend a lot of time solving conflicts. Also, as observed earlier, a majority 
oftumaround leaders are found to be making decisions more on their own. 
Thus, these characteristics certainly do not support the conditions for innovation to 
prevail as described by Rickards above and explains why the existence of a strong 
majority ofboth STC and NSTC CEOs who did not often come up with new ideas 
I techniques or supported their emergence. 
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J. L-IMITED DELEGATION AND MORE OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT 
It is obvious in many turnaround situations where the power or authority of the 
whole company is centralised around the leadership, the leadership may want to be 
directly involved in every aspect of the company(' hands on approach ') and will 
limit the practice of delegating to his subordinates. 
Fifty three ofthe' troubled companies' (53%) CEOs admitted that they were 
more directly involved in every aspects of the company and limited the practice of 
del~ation Among these 37 were ofthe STC (65% ofSTC) CEOs and only 16 
were ofthe NSTC (37% ofNSTC) CEOs. Twenty seven NSTC (63% of 
NSTC) CEOs were found to practice delegating to their subordinates and did not 
get directly involved in every aspects of the company compared to 20 CEOs from 
the STC (35% ofSTC) (refer to Appendix E). 
Limited delegation and getting oneself involved in almost all aspects of the 
company may describe the turnaround leadership as being authoritarian. Like it or 
not, authoritarian leadership may be quite necessary especially in the early stages 
of the turnaround, as described by Whitney (1987)" on the one hand, it is nice, 
neat, and comfortable- for the leader and for those being led -when a clear and 
uncomplicated authority is designated to bring order out of chaos" (p. 12). 
'" 
'/ j 
' 
K. STRONG FEELINGS IN ACTIONS OR DECISIONS TAKEN OR 
ABOUT TO BE TAKEN 
The last thing a company undergoing a turnaround process needs is a turnaround 
leadership plagued with uncertainty in making decisions and in actions that they 
have taken or are about to take. As observed earlier, the turnaround leadership is 
the pivotal point of not only power but also of all other aspects of the company. 
There is simply no room for a weak and indecisive leader. 
AlllOO' troubled companies' (100%) CEOs admitted that they have strong 
feelings in actions or decisions that they had taken or about to take. None reported 
othenvise (refer to Appendix E). 
As far as the above factor is concerned, it can be observed that all turnaround 
leaders, whether STC or NSTC, believed and were committed to their decisions 
and actions. 
Two out of8 features of management required in a turnaround situation described 
by Taylor (1983), supports the above findings. They are: 
1. Decisiveness (the situation calls for speed of decision and ruthlessness in 
decision making, willing to take unpleasant decisions, and to face public 
criticism in order to ensure the continuation and recovery of the overall 
businesft). 
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2. Personal responsibility and accountability (not only at the level of the 
turnaround leadership but at all levels, for meeting the targets and 
deadlines which are necessary if the business is to suiVive). 
L. REQUIRED PLENTY OF INFORMATION TO HEI~P MANAGE THE 
ORGANISATION 
Infonnation is vital for the turnaround leadership. They would have asked many 
questions before accepting the job, analysed available financial data, have taken a 
tour of the main physical facilities, read market reports and other background data 
and from the data, the turnaround expert would have developed a feeling for the 
principal causes of decline and will have some idea about the type of recovery 
strategy required (Slatter, 1984). The more available the strategic information, the 
better it will benefit the turnaround decision making process. However, much will 
also depend on whether ti1e information is used or not. 
More than half of the' troubled companies' (53 companies or 53%) CEOs 
claimed that they did not require plenty ofinformation to help them manage the 
companies. The majority of these CEOs (37 CEOs) were from the NSTC 
(86% ofNSTC) CIT and only 16 CEOs were from the STC (28% ofSTC). The 
majority of the STC (72% ofSTC) or 41 CEOs admitted that they required plenty 
of information to help them to manage their organisation (refer to 
Appendix E). 
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Regarding information and turnaround leadership, Whitney (1987) states that 
" be must develop and use information from any source, even from sources that be 
knows will soon be terminated. Lack of information and misinfonnation are two of 
his most dang!Jrous adversaries" (p. 7). 
The importance of information cannot be stressed enough than what has been 
stated by a 1Jthors like Whitney (1987) and Slatter (1984). However, from the 
findings above, the problem that exists may not be due to the lack of information 
available but rather to not having used all information available. This was 
especially true of the majority of the NSTC CEOs. These CEOs may have their 
own reasons for not doing so but by not making use of all available infonnation 
they may be making less effective. and even the wrong decisions, during the 
turnaround process. 
In the case of the NSTC CEOs, the situation above may also be linked to the 
incidence of getting less directly involved in all aspects of the company and 
delegating more to their subordinates. If these CEOs were to be involved more 
directly in all aspects of the company and practise less delegation, most certainly 
they would require plenty of information to help them manage. However, this was 
not the case. 
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There is also the possibility that, due to the usage of plenty of information to help 
them manage, their direct involvement in most aspects of the company, and less 
delegation, the CEOs of the STC were able to make more effective decisions for 
the turnaround success and would have arrested any form of deviation as early as it 
may have appeared. 
M. SETTING TIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS AT EVERY LEVEL 
Having merely imposed high standards of performance evaluation may mean 
nothing. What is equally important is to have tight control systems at every level of 
the company to act as a ' watch dog ' or an early warning system so that the 
necessary actions can be taken to arrest the potential problem. 
Eighty two of the' troubled companies' (82%) CEOs admitted to setting tight 
control systems at every level of their companies while the remaining 18 
or (18%) of the' troubled companies' CEOs did not. Fifty seven of the STC 
(100% of STC) CEOs and 25 of the NSTC (58% ofNSTC) CEOs admitted 
having set tight control systems at every level of their companies. Eighteen of the 
NSTC ( 42% ofNSTC) CEOs admitted that they had not done so (refer to 
Appendix E). 
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It was obvious from the above that the STC and a majority ofthe NSTC CEOs 
would be in a better position to ensure that things were going according to the 
standard ofperfonnance evaluation imposed compared to the remaining 18 CEOs 
of the NSTC. They would have prevented deviations from occurring and would 
have spent more of their time managing other aspects orthe turnaround. 
N. MAXIMISING POWER BESTOWED BY THE BOARD I 
SHAREHOLDERS 
Managing a turnaround requires that appropriate changes be made to several 
critical areas of the company. In trying to do so, the turnaround leadership must be 
bestowed with the appropriate power either by the board or by the shareholders to 
immediately effect changes. In one instance, the leadership may not be fortunate 
enough to have bestowed absolute power and they may have to report every single 
matter to the board I shareholders. In another instance, the leadership may be 
~ortunate; to be bestowed absolute power to do whatever is necessary within their 
jurisdiction to make the appropriate changes for the turnaround. Ironically, there 
are some who may not maximise the power given to them to effect change. 
Sixty three of the ' troubled companies ' (63%) CEOs admitted that they 
maximised the power given to them while the remaining 37 did not, out of which 
54 ofthe STC (95% ofSTC) CEOs and only 9 oftheNSTC (21% ofNSTC) 
CEOs admitted that they did maximise the power bestowed on them by their board 
I shareholder5. 
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Thirty four of the NSTC (79% ofNSTC) CEOs did not maximise the power 
bestowed to them (refer to Appendix E). 
From the above findings, a strong majority of STC CEOs maximised the power 
given to them by their boards/ shareholders to effect all necessary changes 
required by the turnaround. 
This is only inevitable and as stressed by Whitney (1987)" leadership implies the 
use of power to take the organisation in a new direction, either agency power 
conferred on the leader or personal power that, as a result of his experience and 
skills, the leader derives from the ' consent of the governed ' " (p. II). 
However, this does not seem to be the case of the NSTC CEOs, the majority of 
whom did not maximise the power given to them. There could be many reasons 
behind this (which may warrant a whole new research in itselt) but one that was 
observed earlier and may be linked with this issue is the Commitment of the 
Shareholders of the NSTC itself, where it was found earlier that 95% ofNSTC did 
not receive the full commitment of their shareholders. 
,, 
271 
At this point it may be worthwhile to reiterate (Slatters, 1984) comments on 
shareholders in a turnaround, that is" in the absence of crisis, n new manngement 
usually has fewer wnstraints determining the recovery strategy, although it is 
hoped that management action will take place under the watchful eye of the board 
and the principal shareholders- few turnaround managers have this freedom " 
(p. 107). 
Given that turnarounds are crisis situations, it is not surprising that the board I 
shareholders of the NSTC may have been even more' watchful' over the 
turnaround leadership and although power is given to the leadership to effect the 
necessary changes, these leaders may have taken the careful attitude of not 
maximising such power bestowed on them for fear of making the wrong moves 
and would have preferred to consult the boards I shareholders on all matters. 
The situation may have been the opposite for the turnaround leadership in the 
STC. 
0. MAKING DIFFERENT DECISIONS IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS 
AND TIMES ON THE SAME ISSUES 
" Turnaround situations bring the prospect of sudden and dramatic changes" 
(Carnal!, 1990, p. 198). The turnaround leadership cannot afford to remain with 
• 
the same decision that is made pertaining to a particular issue for the rest of the 
turnaround process. 
272 
The leadership must be flexible, articulate and accommodating, given that the 
whole organisation itself is undergoing phases of change. 
Seventy nine of the' troubled companies' (79%) CEOs admitted that they did not 
make different decisions in different situations and times on the same issues. Thirty 
nine of the STC (68% ofSTC) CEOs and 40 of the NSTC (93% of 
NSTC) CEOs admitted to such practise. Only a handful of the STC (18 STC or 
32% ofSTC) CEOs and 3 NSTC (7% ofNSTC) CEOs admitted that they made 
different decisions in different situations and times on the same issues 
(refer to Appendix E). 
There is no real explanation in terms of their rigidness in not making different 
decisions in different situations and times pertaining to the same issues. 
However, this alone did not seem to affect, for example, the STC from achieving 
successful turnarounds. Subsequently, the findings above challenge several 
turnaround leadership attributes as quoted by Whitney (1987) such as adaptability 
(since the turnaround leader seldom knows what the next crisis will be or when it 
will come) and flexibility (the turnaround leader must be able to devise new 
strategies to cope with unexpected events). 
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P. ABILITY TO CONTROL MULTIPLE DIMENSIONAL 
ORGAN/SA TIONAL PROBLEMS FROM AFFECTING MENTAL 
AND PHYSICAL WELL BEING 
Stress, complexities, chaos, urgency, resistants, frustrations, to name a few, are 
characteristics of a declining company in a turnaround. And since the whole 
turnaround process pivots around the leadership, it is pertinent that the leadership 
is someone who is able to control multi-dimensional organisational problems and 
can avoid these problems from taking a to!l on their mental and physical well 
being. If the leadership succumbs to these problems, the fear is that the success of 
the turnaround will be compromised. 
One hundred of the' troubled companies' (100%) CEOs admitted that they were 
able to control multi-dimensional organisational problems during the turnaround 
process from affecting them mentally and physically. All of the STC and NSTC 
CEOs admitted having the same controUing capability (refer to Appendix E). 
Carnal! (1990) pointed out that" the effective corporate leaders bring human scale 
to risk, change, success, challenge and crisis- they translat.J the pressures that can 
confuse or paralyse so many into acceptable levels" (p. 181). 
While the statement by Carnal! may well describe the situation of the STC and 
NSTC CEOs above, it is questionable as to whether that is enough to help classify 
all of the above CEOs as effective leaders. It is felt that the components that make 
a leader effective could be more than just the above capability. 
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Q. FROM THE SAME INDUSTRY 
Not everyone can be a turnaround leader. It is believed that a turnaround leader is 
a person with substantial general man::gement skills with experiences in the same 
or similar industry. It is also believed that the leader with the same industry track 
record would understaod the' going-ons 'of the organisation better since they 
would have acquired the ' tricks of the trade ' from years of experiences, being in 
the same industry. 
On the contrary, however, Slatter (1984) stated that this will depend on the 
characteristics of the turnaround finn, whether it is a diversified or non diversified 
company. Subsequently, he also argued that the new chief executive's lack of 
industry experience tends to be less importaot in those situations where the 
turnaround finn is a diversified group consisting of a number of different 
businesses. 
Seventy four ofthe' troubled companies' (74%) CEOs were from the same 
industrial background and the remaining 26 CEOs were not. Forty nine of the STC 
(86% of STC) CEOs and 25 oft he NSTC (58% ofNSTC) CEOs were from the 
same industry. A strong minority of the NSTC (42% ofNSTC) CEOs and only 8 
of the SIC (14% ofSTC) CEOs were not of the same industry background (refer 
to Appendix E). 
When the results ofD2 (Detenninant No. Two) on Diversiiication were compared 
with the findings above, it was found that the STC, where there were more than 
half(53%) non diversified companies, 86% ofCEOs had vast experience in the 
same industry and acted us the turnaround leadership. Subsequently, for the 
NSTC (where 70% of the companies were non diversified) only 58% of the 
CEOs had experience in the same industry and who were also the turnaround 
leaders. 
Somehow, the above findings do not totally support Slatter's argument. In the 
case of the NSTC, it may be appropriate (if based on Slatter's argument) to have 
had more CEOs with similar industry background as the turnaround leaders due to 
the high number of non diversified companies. 
And subsequently for the STC, where a strong minority (47%) were of diversified 
companies, it would have been less important to have such a high number of 
turnaround leaders with similar induslty background. 
However, in either of these cases, this was not so. Having high number of 
turnaround leaders with similar industry background in the STC may have been 
one of their strong attributes for having successfultutnarounds. Similarly, with 
fewer turnaround leaders with similar industry backgr<,und in the NSTC may have 
been one of their weaknesses for not nchh:viilg S!Jccessful turnarounds. 
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Overall, It was found that the STC CEOs had more favourable characteristics of 
'new competent management' than the NSTC CEOs. Twenty one percent oft he 
NSTC CEOs were found with five favourable characteristics, 28% with six 
favourable characteristics, 12% with eight favourable characteristics and 7% with 
nine favourable characteristics. The majority (32% or the mode) of the NSTC 
CEOs had seven favourable characteristics of' new competent management'. 
None of the STC CEOs were found within these range. 
Most of the STC CEOs were found to have a number of favourable characteristics 
within the range of 12 to 15. Thirty five percent (the mode and majority of which) 
had 11 favourable characteristics, 17% with 12 favourable characteristics, another 
17% with 13 favourable characteristics, 23% with 14 favourable characteristics 
and only 8% with 15 favourable characteristics. It is obvious from the above that 
the STC CEOs possess more favourable characteristics of' new competent 
management' than the NSTC CEOs (refer to Appendix I). 
However, what is defined as' new competent management ' remains to be argued. 
Most of the previous authors and researchers such as Slatter ( 1984), Luffman, 
Sanderson, Lea and Kenny (1988), Camall (1990), Whitney (1987), 
Schendel, Patton and Riggs (1976), Bibeault (1982), and many others are of the 
opinion that a' new cOmpetent managtment' is derived from the installation of a 
new chief executive or a new leadership. 
277 
Jjt __ -
The appointment of a new chief executive is heavily emphasised by management 
gurus who suggested that the appointment of the new chief executive should take 
place well before recovery strategies are put in place. 
The findings in this research challenge previous thinldng. As observed earlier, 
61% of the ' troubled companies ' did not have change to their top management. 
In fact, 67% of the STC did not have any change in top management but this did 
not hinder them from achieving successful turnarounds. 
Furthermore, it was also observed that more than half(56%) ofthe STC were 
managed by owner cum chairperson I CEO, which was on~ ofthe contributing 
factors for no change occurring in top management in these companies. 
From the observations noted above, one would question how these companies, 
managed successful turnarounds, even without having to change their top 
management (defined as having' new competent management' by previous 
authors and researchers). 
One explanation, which may be controversial to some, lies in what really 
constitutes ' new competent management ' and that it may not necessarily be 
defined or characterised as the installation of a New Chief Executive or top 
leadership. 
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Instead, the' new competent management' mlly be the same owner cum 
chairperson I CEO who is quick to realise the devastating state the company is in 
and immediately takes the necessary action to tum around the company even if it 
means that he or she may have to change totally the methods, styles and paradigm 
of his type of management. 
Bibeault (1982) previously cited, admitted that in a company where the top person 
has a strong ownership, top management change can take place but in the form of 
the change of heart, new thrust, or an ability to make tough decisions to save the 
business. Subsequently, he also added that the leadership can also be an insider and 
does not necessarily have to be an outsider. 
Subsequently, Whitney (1987) also supported Bibeault: 
There is no prototype- the leader does not have to be a Greek God 
or Goddess- clear eyed, tall, "out thrust jaw ", stentorian voice -
he does have to know how and when to act -he must know 
business, and he must learn the new business as quickly as possible 
- he must be able to formulate and activate strategies that will 
induce understanding, inspire, respect and command dedication • 
so, whnts new? nothing, really, except emphasis! (p. 5). 
5.1.11 Dll. VIABLE CORE BUSINESS 
A common dilemma in declining companies trying to turnaround is ' cash trap ' 
situation. 
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The existence of a viable core business can, not only support the company 
financially in weathering the turnaround period but can also enable the company to 
use strategic options, such as acquisition, to help speed up the process of the 
turnaround. As mentioned in the research design, a viable core business, basically 
have five key characteristics. It is rare that a company will possess all five key 
characteristics, but it is important that a company should have at least four of the 
key characteristics to render its core business viable. 
A. POSITIVE CASHFLOW 
Out of the 100 ' troubled companies ', 84 companies or 84% were reported to 
have core businesses with positive cashflows. Fifty seven were STC (100% of 
STC) and 27 wereNSTC (63% of the NSTC). The relevance of having positive 
cash flows needs no repetition here (refer to Appendix F). As mentioned earlier 
under subchapter 4.1.2.2, working capital in the fonn of cash is vital in any 
turnaround effort. 
B. 'SALES VOLUME UMBRELLA ' 
' Sales volume umbrelia ' is the volume of sales that is more than sufficient to 
generate continuous revenue for the tumaround company while simultaneously 
covering the lack of revenue experienced by other business units within the 
compiUly. 
\\ 
Ninety three of the' troubled companies' (93%) were reported to have a 'sales 
volume umbrella', out ofthese, 56 were STC (98% of STC) and 37 were NSTC 
(86% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix F). 
While the majority ofthe NSTC were found to be enjoying a ' sales volume 
umbrella', it is important to note here that ' sales volume umbrella ' will 
eventually diminish if the companies are facing cash flow problems. Sales, unless 
on a cash basis, were not going to help 27 NSTC (63% ofNSTC) who were 
already in a ' cash trap ' situation, and who probably could not maintain their 
liquid position to meet short term obligations such as payments to suppliers for 
raw materials that would subsequently be converted into finished products for 
"'"· 
C COMPETITIVE EQUIPMENT 
Only 64 of the' troubled companies' (64%) reported having competitive 
equipment. Out of which 39 were STC (68% ofSTC) and 25 were NSTC (58% of 
NSTC) (refer to Appendix F). 
Porter (1985) stresses that" the significance of technology for competition is not a 
function ofits scientific merit or its prominence in the physical product. Any of the 
technologies involved in a finn can have a significant impact on 
competition" (p. 166). 
Thus, while one may argue that those repm1ed to have competitive equipment may 
have belonged to the manufacturing group, the non manufacturing group, such as 
trading and services, hotels and leisure businesses are also equally affected by 
competitive equipment due to advancement I changes in technology. Machines are 
beconting more and more competitive each day due to the ever changing 
evolvement in technology. 
·;··I 
Morris (1985) states that" machine technology has f~Jim!l.ny years been the 
,, 
I domain of manufacturing operations, but the so called·..' micro revolution' bas 
accelerated a trend towards automation and mechanisation in the service 
operations" (p. 95). 
Subsequently, the Trade Union Congress of Britain (1979, as cited in Morris, 
1985, p. 96) admitted that it felt fairly positive about new technology, in that it 
presented an opportunity to improve the competitiveness of business and industry, 
improved the quality of working life and provided benefits for working people. 
D. COMPETITIVE LOCATION 
There are many questions that need to be addressed in plruming the resources 
within organisational operations, one of which is location of the business 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1988). 
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Fifty one ort1S{ _troubled companies ' (51%) reported having competitive 
" - "."/ 
locations. Thirty five were STC (61% ofSTC) and only 16 were NSTC (37% of 
NSTC) (refer to Appendix F). 
From the above, it is obvious that the STC are in more competitive business 
locations than the NSTC. A competitive business location is important for most 
types of businesses such as trading and services, hotels and leisure, property 
development and manufu.cturing. 
Slatter (1984) stresses that" the location of manufacturing facilities can lead to 
significant cost disadvantages due to differences in wage rates, and differences 
in productivity which are independent of capital investments and training 
efforts" (p. 38). 
However, one needs to take extra care when reviewing this argument. 
A competitive business location may not be strategically critical to other businesses 
such as plantations, which are dependant on the availability of suitable vacant land. 
The construction business, is another example, where equipment needs to be 
moved from one construction site to another, depending on clients and contracts. 
((~ 
,l Subsequently, with the advent of multimedia computer technology and revolution, 
businesses today can operate ' virtually ' and do not necessarily have to be in 
strategic locations or near to their clients. 
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i \ E. AWARENESS OF CHANGE 
'· 
Organisations today are like living, breathing organisms that constantly evolve and 
change. They interact with their environment as internal and external changes 
occur; as markets expand or contract, as technology advances and is replaced, etc. 
Thus, even the simplest of organisations are not easy to manage today. In order to 
make the best use of capital, human and material resources, organisations require 
sound systems, policies and procedures. In other words, they need to be fully 
aware of the changes around them and subsequently manage those changes. 
Fifty eight of the ' troubled companies ' (SS%) admitted that they were aware of 
the changes in their business environment, out of which 55 were STC (96% of 
STC) and only 3 were NSTC (7% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix F). 
A company who is not aware and is not sensitive enough towards the rapid and 
harsh changes in its business environment will either be left behind, faces decline 
and crisis, and could eventually run out of business. 
However, a competent organisation will recognise early warning signs of the 
external changes so that it can promptly make internal changes designed to keep it 
viable in the changing external world. 
"' 
Therefore, competent organisations arc those that continue to change to survive 
(Goodstein and Burke, (nd) as cited in the Henley Management College's 
' Managing Strategic Change ' Module 1994). 
There is a strong indication that a large disparity in terms of the awareness of 
change exits between the STC and the NSTC. STC may have top management 
who may be sensitive and are aware of changes in their business environment. 
They will react quickly to change by taking the necessary steps to reC(lver. This 
could have been one of the reasons for their success in tunting around those 
companies compared to the NSTC. 
The other possibility could be due to the high number of STC CEOs with similar 
industry experience and background, who were then in a better position to 
recognise the obvious and not so obvious ' goings~ on ' within their businesses. 
Slatter (1984) comments that: 
At the initial stage- the hidden crisis stage -the management group 
and the organisation are unaware oft he existence of a crisis. Often, 
this is due to the lack of adequate control systems- not just 
financial control systems but more of formal systems that monitor 
and interpret unexpected environmental events. Typically, the firm 
wi\1 be complacent and may even be arrogant about its capabilities 
and market position (p. 68). 
"' 
It is also interesting to note that the problem of not being aware of changes in the 
business environment experienced above may also be linked to the problem of 
'poor management' discussed earlier, especially on the issue of ' functional 
blindness '. 
Twenty one of the 'troubled companies ' (21 %) were found to have only 2 of the 
key characteristics of viable core business, and aU 21 were NSTC (49% of 
NSTC). The number of' troubled companies ' found to have three key 
characteristics of a viable core buoiness was 22 (22%) and again all22 again were 
NSTC (55% ofNSTC). Another43 'troubled companies' (43%) were found to 
have four key characteristics and all 43 were STC (75% of STC). The balance of 
14' troubled companies' (14%) were found to have five key characteristics of a 
viable core business and all 14 companies were STC 
(25% ofSTC) (refer to AppendiK I). 
1 
From the above, it can be observed that the NSTC are companies with fewer 
characteristics ofa viable core business compared to the STC. This could also be 
~ •.• one of the reasons why STC have accomplished more successful turnarounds than 
Jl 
theNSTC. 
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5.1.12 012. BRIDGE CAPITAL 
As mentioned earlier, funds in tenns of cash generated from sales of fixed assets., 
capital injections, additional loans and even continuation in the supply of raw 
materials on credit are vital for a company experiencing a turnaround. In 
turnaround a cash crunch is almost always inescapable (Whitney, 1987), thus, any 
fund in s:~y of the fonns mentioned above wiU help to eleviate the immediate 
problem of the compati.r and further sustain it while it weathers the turnaround 
period. 
A. ADVANCES OR RIGHT ISSUES FROM SHAREHOLDERS 
Eighty two of the' troubled companies' (82%) reported having received 
additional capital injections into their paid up capital through right issues by the 
existing shareholders, out of which 47 were STC (82% of STC) and 35 were 
NSTC (81% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix G). 
Tite explanation for the above could be that irrespective of whether they were 
STC or NSTC, the shareholders of these companies were equally concerned about 
their investments and the survival of the companies, which may have been the main 
driving force for them to further inject funds in the fonn of additional paid up 
capital in these companies. 
At this point, it is also interesting to note the linkage between the tindings above 
and that of the ' paid up capital' in Chapter 4 of the research. 
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In fact, the above findings have further strengthened what was found in Chapter 4, 
where the shareholders' strong commitment to finance and support in the 
turnaround exercise was displayed by their willingness to increase paid up capital. 
The number of STC and NSTC receiving such additional increase in paid up 
capital are similar to the one above. The reason there are more STC than NSTC 
may be due to the owner cum chairperson I CEO background of the majority of 
the src. 
B. SALh"S OF ASSETS BY MANAGEMENT 
In a turnaround situation, sale of surplus and obsolete inventories, sale of plants, 
subsidiaries and any other assets of the company are ways the management oithe 
turnaround exercise may seek to raise extra funds. Actions to improve profitability 
may increase the cashflow, but a specific asset reduction strategy is likely to have 
more and maybe a traumatic impact on the finn's cash flow position 
(Slatter, 1984). 
Thirty six of the' troubled companies' (36%) embarked on this exercise to raise 
funds for thetumuound out of which 23 were STC (40% ofSTC) and 13 were 
NSTC (30% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix G). 
The suspicion that there might have been sales in assets was first detected in the 
findings in Chapter 4 under ' extraordinary items ' where 75 companies were 
detected exhibiting high occurrences of extraordinary items. 
"' 
However, it must be cautioned that gains or losses in the disposal of any fonn of 
assets are just a few of the many items termed as ' extraordinary items '. Thus, it 
docs not necessarily mean that all of the 75 companies cited above, detected for 
' extraordinary items ', were involved in disposing of their assets to raise funds. 
From the above findings, it is also interesting to obseJVe that there more STC than 
NSTC found disposing their assets to raise funds for the turnaround. One reason 
could be that, since the NSTC are more geared than the STC, their assets may not 
be free of encumbrances and may have been used as ' collateral ' against their 
borrowings. 
Luffman, Sanderson, Lea and Kenny (1988) mention that" another means of 
reducing assets is to sell some or all of the assets to a finance company and to 
lease them back. Tltis would only be possible if the assets were not being used as 
collateral for some funn ofborrowing " (p. 102). 
C BRIDGE CREDITS FOR WORKING CAPITALS FROM BANKERS 
Like the additional capital injection by the declining companies' shareholders, any 
further financial assistance from bankers, probably in the form of overdrafts for 
working capital, and additionalloa.r1s are most welcome by the management to 
sustain the going concern •Jfthe company and to weather the turnaround period. 
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Sixty five of the' troubled companies' (65%) admitted that they received 
' bridge credits for working capitals ' from their bankers. Forty five such 
companies were STC (79% ofSTC) and only 20 were NSTC (47% ofNSTC) 
(refer to Appendix G). The results above strengthen the findings in Chapter 4 
under' loan capital' where similar observations were made. 
From the above, it is also found that more STC received bridge c1 edits for working 
capital from their bankers than the NSTC. There is no one reason that c:an explain 
this situation. However, it is believed that bankers would be more comfortable 
with the STC since they (STC) are less geared, are ir. the mild or moderate crisis 
level, in attractive industries, with more committed shareholders 
(owner cum chairperson I CEOs) and have more viable core businesses than the 
NSTC. 
Thus, the bankers themselves would look into all aspects that can give some 
indication that a successful tumaround is possible. " Even bankers have heard of 
present value and compound interest tables so they can't be pushed 
too far" (Whitney, 1987, p. 74). 
'" 
l' 
.1. 
D. CONTINUATION OF RAW MATERIAL BY CREDJTOR..ifl 
Similar to the financial assistance from shareholders and bankers, the company 
wanting to tum itself around must receive a good commitment from its creditors 
(or suppliers) not only by agreeing to reschedule its previous unpaid debts but also 
to continue to provide raw materials where necessary. 
Seventy of the' troubled company' (70%) admitted that they received this type of 
support from their creditors, out of which 57 were STC (IOO% ofSTC) and only 
13 were NSTC (30% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix G). Thus, the STC were found 
to have received more support in terms of the continuation ofraw materials from 
their creditors than the NSTC. 
Reasons behind this can again be linked to .~everal determinants and probably 
similar to those of the bankers cited earlier. STC, who are in a better financial 
position (less geared) and have more viable core businesses that can allocate cash 
for the payment of the raw materials, are preferred by the creditors. 
Simultaneously, STC are also enjoying better commitment from the shaoeholders 
(whom, the majority are owners cum chairpersons I CEOs), their bankers 
(providing bridge credits) could have also made creditors felt more comfortable to 
dca1 with them and as such they would have agreed to continue the supply of raw 
materials. The similar situation may not have prevailed for the NSTC. 
"' 
Overall, both STC and NSTC received some form of bridge capital to weather the 
turnaround period. However, the difference between them is in the number of 
sources of bridge capital received. Those admitted receiving from only one source 
consists of 4 STC (7% ofSTC) and 26 NSTC (60% ofNSTC). Thirteen STC 
(23% ofSTC) and 12 NSTC (28% ofNSTC) admitted receiving bridge capital 
from 2 sources. The bulk oft he STC (28 companies or 49% of STC) and 3 NSTC 
(7% ofNSTC) received bridge capital from 3 sources. Finally, 12 STC 
(21% ofSTC) and only 2 NSTC (5% ofNSTC) admitted that they received 
bridge capital from 4 different sources (refer to Appendix I). 
As mentioned in the research methodology, having to depend on only one 
particular source of bridge capital may not be prudent. It is wiser to have 2 or 
more sources of bridge capital such that if any event stops one of the sources, 
there is always another to fall back on. The reason STC have more sources of 
bridge capital than the NSTC needs no further explanation since it has been 
described in detail when the individual sources were discussed above. 
5.1.13 D13. REALISTIC TURNAROUND PLAN 
"The things to do with the future is not to forecast it, the objective of planning 
should be to design a desirable future and to invent ways to bring it about" 
(Ackoff, (n.d), as cited in Riggin and Vincze, 1986, p. 69). 
;i 
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" We plan for the future, because people who stay in the present will remain in the 
past " (Abrahllffi Lincoln, (n.d), as cited in Higgin and Vincze, 1986, p. 180) . 
As the saying goes" failing to plan is planning to fail " the management attempting 
to turnaround a declining company must have a plan to rescue it. The process of 
turning around a company is not simply a ' blind leap ' i.e. without critical 
thinking, proper planning and usage of appropriate strategies to ensure the 
turnaround success. Through the turnaround plan the turnaround management may 
be able to convince the stakeholders such as the shareholders, bankers, creditors 
and, even the employees, that the company can survivr~ and has got a future. 
Furthermore, the turnaround plan acts as a detaikd guidance for the whole 
turnaround process. It is thus pertinent that a ~ealistic (logical and workable) 
turnaround plan with clear sets of objectives, strategies, tactics and effective 
control systems exists before any turnaround efforts are initiated. 
Jh\erms of the availability of a turnaround plan, all STC and NSTC claimed that 
they had one (refer to Appendix H). But whether the plans were realistic or not 
will depend on the plans satisfYing the following criteria. 
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A. SPECIFIED OBJECflJIES I TARGETS 
When asked in tenns ofhaving specified objectives /targets, it was found that 70 
of the ' troubled companies ' (70%) admitted that .their turnaround plans had 
specified objectives/ targets, out of which 57 were STC (1000/o of STC) and only 
13 were NSTC (30% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix H). 
Whether qualitative alld or quantitative, objectives serve as a fonn of an internal 
benchmark for the company. Objectives are also reference points for corporate 
perfonnance and as such they need to be clearly identifiable, and to be of most use, 
objectives should be measurable, achievable, realistic and communicable 
(Luffinan, Sanderson, Lea and Kenny, 1988). 
Johnson and Scholes (1988) stressed the importance ofhaving objectives 
especially in a turnaround situation. They stated that there are times when specific 
objectives are required and these are likely to be used when urgent action is 
needed, such as in a crisis or at times of major (usually strategic) transition, and it 
becomes essential for management to focus its attention on a limited number of 
priority requirements. An extreme example would be in a turnaround situation. If 
the choice is between getting out ofthe business or surviving, then then: in no 
latitude for vaguely stated requirements. 
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It is obvious from the above findings that the majority of the NSTC did not specify 
objectives I targets to be achieved in their turnaround plans. 
By not having such, NSTC will not have a reference point to evaluate the progress 
that they have made. They would probably want to get the company out of trouble 
but as stated by Johnson and Scholes above, this cannot be done through vaguely 
stated requirements. 
B. STRATEGIES TO BE USED 
Having specified objectives I targets to be achieved is not an end in itself. It will 
not help to turnaround the company unless the means by which these given 
objectives can be achieved are elaborated i.e. the strategies to be used. Thus, 
strategy is concerned with integrating company activities and allocating scarce 
resources so that the present objectives can be met (Luffinan, Sanderson, Lea and 
KeMy, 1988). 
All 57 STC (1000/o ofSTC) and 43 NSTC (100% ofNSTC) admitted to having 
clearly defined the strategies used in their turnaround exercises 
(refer to Appendix H). 
Slatter (1984) states that" the management actions needed to effect a turnaround 
involves deciding upon the appropriate set of turnaround strategies and 
implementing strategies in as short a time span as possible "(p. 103). 
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The research agrees with what Slatter ( 1984) has stated about effecting 
lill'11&round by implementing strategies in the shortest time span possible, but the 
research also views it as a pitfall for many corporate turnarounds. In the 
theoretical framework, it has been stressed tha~ previous work on turnaround has 
ignored the ' missing link ' or ' gap ' between declining problems and turnaround 
strategies (which the research tenned as' the feasibility for corporate 
turnaround '). 
Similar patterns of action would have been taken by the NSTC as stated by Slatter 
above, where they would have emphasised more heavily on the turnaround 
strategies (but ignored the' feasibility' issue) even at the expense of not having 
specified objectives /targets. Thus, the turnaround strategies they may have 
employed may have not been guided by specified objectives while simultaneously 
ignoring the requirements oftumaround feasibility. 
C TACI'JCS/DETAJLS ON HOW STRATEGIES ARE TOBE 
IMPLEMENTED 
Tactics are simply details or action plans on how the strategies are to be 
implemented. Tactics merely interpret the strategic framework into detailed plans 
(Strategic Management Module, Henley Management College, 1990). 
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Sixty eight ofthe' troubled companies' (68%) admitted having detailed strategies 
or tactics for implementation, out of which 56 were STC (98% or 
STC) and only 12 were of the NSTC (28% ofNST) (refer to Appendix H). 
Slatter (1984) stresses that" once the turnaround manager has decided on the 
appropriate recovery strategy, he must develop an actbn plan in conjunction with 
his management team" (p. 145). He also states that action planning assists by 
providing a framework far implementation. 
Thus, from the above citation, what can be inferred is that by just having sets of 
strategies for turnaround is simply not enough. Strategies must be transfonned into 
action plans, detailing specifically what is to be done, by whom, how and by when 
in order to smoothen the implementation process. 
From the above findings, the majority ofNSTC did not have details on how the 
strategies they had chosen were to be implemented. They lacked the action plan or 
tactics, and it wiU not be surprising if the strategies chosen did not work effectively 
to help tum around their companie:;. 
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D. REVIEW AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
There must be continuous monitoring of progress and of analysis and feed back 
concerning the variations, not only with respect to performance but also with 
respect to the assumptions on which the strategies are based. Thus, the existence 
of effective review and control systems is inevitable. 
Eighty nine of the' troubled companies' (89%) admitted having effective review 
and control systems, out of which 57 were STC (!00% ofSTC) and 32 were 
NSTC (74% ofNSTC) (refer to Appendix H). 
Johnson and Scholes (1988} stressed that systems of control are particularly 
important in complex organisations to ensure that the various parts of such 
organisations are integrated sufficiently to implement corporate strategy. 
When the organisation becomes involved in the real problems ofimplementing 
strategic change, managers therefore need r.ome means of identifying how 
implementation is proceeding and the extent of the variances from the plan. 
From the above, all STC and the majority cfthe NSTC admitted to having review 
and control systems. However, it is important to note here that an effective review 
and control system may be rendered use!est: if there are no benchmarks such as 
specified objectives I targets to compare with. This was the case for the NSTC. 
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Overall, it was found that 56 of the' troubled companies' (56%) had all4 
pertinent features (as discussed in detailed above) of a realistic turnaround plan. 
All 56 companies belonged to the STC (I 00% of STC) anJ none was observed 
for the NSTC. Sixteen of the' troubled cornpunics' (16%) were observed to have 
3 pertinent features, out of which IS were NSTC (35% ofNSTC) and only 1 was 
an STC. The majority of the NSTC (28 companies or 65% ofNSTC) are observed 
to have 2 pertinent features of a realistic turnaround plan. None of the companies 
was observed h$ving only one pertinent feature (refer to Appendix I). 
The STC, who have more pertinent features of a realistic turnaround plan, as seen 
above, are in a better position to turn around than the NSTC. As mentioned 
earlier, a realistic turnaround plan can help further convince stakeholders such as 
shareholders, bankers and creditors to gain their support and commitment to help 
tum around the company. It is also felt that the reason NSTC have less pertinent 
features of a realistic turnaround plan than the STC is connected to the weak 
features of their leadership observed earlier under ' new competent management '. 
Steiner {1972) outlined ten reasons which caused planning to fail (will not be 
elaborated here). Howe·;er, ifthe ten reasons are to be carefully analysed, one 
cannot help but to observe that bad leadership in management is practically behind 
those ten pitfalls for planning. This could have been the case for the NSTC but not 
for the STC. 
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5.2 IDENTIFYING THE EXISTENCE AND 1CHE 
STATE OF EXISTENCE OF THE KEY 
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY IN SUCCESSFUL 
AND NON SUCCESSFUL TURNAROUND 
COMPANIES 
The observations, findings and interpretations discussed earlier have to a great 
extent revealed valuable insights and details pertaining to the key detenninants of 
corporate turnaround feasibility. At this point, che research attempts to further 
identitY the existence and the state of existence of the 13 key detenninants of 
corporate turnaround feasibility. It is envisaged that this will enable the research to 
achieve not only its main purpose and one of its objectives but it will also help to 
answer the research hypotheses. Using the 1rbitrary cut off points as set in the 
research methodology, specifically for phase two, the following findings were 
obtained (refer to Appendix 1) in accordance with the key detenninants categories. 
5.2.1 CATEGORY A: STATE OF EXISTENCE 
(FAVOURABLE I NON FAVOURABLE) 
As mentioned earlie; in the hypotheses, the research is interested in identifYing 
these detenninant state of existence in successful and non successful turnaround 
companies, whether they are favourable or non favourable states of existence. 
JUO 
5.2.1.1 Dl. CAUSES OF DECLINE 
Fifty six of the' troubled companies' (56%) had favourable states of existence as 
headed in D 1 and the remaining 44 ' troubled companies ' ( 44%) had non 
favourable states of existence. With the exception of one STC, all other 56 STC 
(98% of STC) had favourable states of existence as headed in Dl. All43 NSTC 
(100% ofNSTC) did not have favourable of existence. 
5.2.1.2 D2. SEVERITY OF CRISIS 
Fifty seven of the' troubled companies' (57%) had favourable states of existence 
as headed in D2. The remaining 43 'troubled companies' (43%) had non 
favourable state of existence. A majority ofSTC (38 STC or 67% ofSTC) had 
favourable states of existence as in D2 while the majority of the NSTC (24 NSTC 
or 56% ofNSTC) had non favourable states of existence ofD2. 
5.2.1.3 D3. COMPANY'S HISTORICAL STRATEGY 
The majority of ' troubled companies' (60 companies or 60%) had a non 
favourable state of existence as headed in D3. The remaining 40 ' troubled 
companies ' ( 40%) enjoyed a favourable state of existence. Thirty STC (53% of 
STC) and 30 NSTC (70% ofNSTC) had a non favourable state of existence. Only 
27 STC (47% of STC) and 13 NSTC (30% ofNSTC) had a favourable state of 
existence as in D3. 
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5.1.1.4 D-1. INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTJC:S 
The majority of the' troubled companies' (63 companies or 63%) had a 
favourable state of existence as describ~d by 04. The remaining 37 ' troubled 
companies ' (37%) had a non favourable state of existence. Those enjoying a 
favourable state ofexistent'e as in 04 were 37 STC (65% ofSTC) and 26 NSTC 
(600/o ofNSTC). Twenty STC (35% ofSTC) and 17 NSTC (40% ofNSTC) 
experienced a non favourable state of existence as in 04. 
5.2.1.5 D5. COMPANY'S COST PRiCE STRUCTURE 
Seventy five of the' troubled companies' (75%) experienced a non favourable 
state of existence as in D5 and the remaining 25 ' troubled companies ' (25%) 
enjoyed favourable states of existence as in D5. Thirty two STC (56% of SIC) 
and all43 NSTC (100% ofNSTC) had a non favourable state of existence in D5. 
Only 25 STC (44% ofSTC) had a favouruhle state of existence in 05. 
5.2.1.6 D6. COMMITMENT OF SHAREIIOLDERS 
Fifty nine of the' troubled companies' (59 Yo) enjoyed a favourable state of 
existence ll!l in 06 ood the remaining 41 ' troubled companies ' (41 %) had a non 
favourable state of existence in 06. All 57 STC (100% ofSTC) and only 2 NSTC 
(5% ofNSTC) enjoyed a favourable state of existence in D6. Forty one NSTC 
(95% ofNSTC) experienced a non favourable state of existence in 06. 
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5.2.1. 7 D7. COMMITMENT OF JJANKt.'RS 
Seventy one of the ' troubled companies ' (71 %) enjoyed a favourable-'statc of 
existence in 07 and the remaining 29' troubled companies' (29%) experienced a 
non favourable state of existence in 07. All 57 STC (100% ofSTC) and only 14 
NSTC (33% ofNSTC) had a favourable stat~ of existence in 07. Twenty nine 
NSTC (67% ofNSTC) had a non favourable of existence in 07. 
5.21.8 DB. COMMITMENT OF CREIJITORS 
Sixty six of the' troubled companies' (66%) experienced a favourable state of 
existence as in 08 and the remaining 34 ' 11 oubled companies ' (34%) had non 
favourable state of existence in 08. All 57 STC (100% ofSTC) and only 9NSTC 
(21% ofNSTC) enjoyed a favourable state of existence in DB. Thirty four NSTC 
(79% ofNSTC) had a non favourable statt~ of existence in 08. 
5.2.1.9 D9. COMMITMENT OF EMPLUI'EES 
Fifty eight of the' troubled companies' (5!1%) enjoyed a favourable state of 
existence as headed in 09 and the remaining 42' troubled companies' (42%) had 
non favourable state of existence in 09. All 57 STC (100% ofSTC) and only I 
NSTC (2% ofNSTC) experienced a fuvourable state of existence in 09. Forty two 
NSTC (98% ofNSTC) had a non favourable of state of existence as in 09. 
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5.2.2 CATEGORY B: EXISTENCE (EXISTS I NON 
EXIST ANT) 
As mentioned earlier in the hypotheses, the research is interested in identifying 
these determinants' existence in successful and non successful turnaround 
companies, whether they exist or do not exist (non existant). 
5.2.2.1 Dl 0. NEW COMPETENT MANAGEMENT 
010 existed in 57 ofthe 'troubled companies '(57%) but did not exist 
(non existant) in the remaining.43 'troubled companies' (43%). All 57 STC 
experienced the existence ofD10. But DlO did not exist (non existant) in all43 
NSTC (100% ofNSTC). 
5.2.2.2 Dll. VIABLE CORE BUSINESS 
011 existed in 57 of the' troubled companies' (57%) and did not exist 
(non existant) in the remaining 43 'troubled companies' (43%). All 57 STC 
(100% of STC) experienced the existence ofD11. But Dll did not exist 
(non existant) in all43 NSTC (100% ofNSTC). 
5.2.2.3 Dl2. BRIDGE CAPITAL 
012 existed in seventy of the' troubled companies ' (70%) and did not exist 
(non existant) in the remaining 30 'troubled companies '(30%). 
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Fifty three STC (93%) and only 17 NSTC (40% ofNSTC) experienced the 
existence ofD12. But D12 did not exist (non existant) in 26 NSTC (60% of 
NSTC) and 4 STC (7% ofSTC). 
5.2.2.4 D13. REALISTIC TURNAROUND PLAN 
DB existed in 56 of the' troubled companies' (56%) and did not exist (non 
existant) in the remaining 44' troubled companies ' (44%). Fifty six STC 
(98% ofSTC) experienced the existence ofD13. But D13 did not exist (non 
existant) in all43 NSTC (100% ofNSTC) and 1 STC (2% of STC). 
From the findings above and with reference to determinants under category A 
[(with the exception of determinants D3 (company's historical strategy), 
D4 (industrial characteristics), and D5 (company's cost price structure)], all other 
determinants were found to be in a favourable state of existence in the STC 
compared to the NSTC. 
The situations for D3, D4 and DS are also hereby explained . For D3 for instance, 
even though a strong minority of STC (47%) enjoyed a favourable state of 
existence ofDJ, a majority of the STC (53%) on the other hand were in a similar 
position as the NSTC i.e. experiencing non favourable state of existence in DJ. 
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Similarly forDS, although a strong minority ofSTC (44%) were found to be 
enjoying a favourable state of existence inDS, the majority of the STC (56%) were 
in a similar position as the NSTC i.e. experiencing a non favourable state of 
existence in DS. In both of these cases, the majority ofSTC were found to be 
experiencing a non favourable state of existence and there is no significant 
difference in their position compared to the NSTC. 
However, for D4, the case has a slightly different twist. Here, the majority ofboth 
STC (65%) and the NSTC (60%) enjoyed a favourable state of existence inD4. 
But again, there is no significant difference between them since the majority of 
both were in a similar position. It is interesting to note that while the majority of 
the NSTC had a favourable state of existence in D4 just as did the STC, it did not 
give any real help to the NSTC in terms of the overall turnaround feasibility. 
Overall, there is a need to observe the number of occurrences of favourable state 
of existence and non favourable state of existence for the majority of STC and 
NSTC, for determinants under category A. Observations will also be required for 
the number of occurrences of existence (exists) and non existence for the majority 
of STC and NSTC, for determinants under category B. The total number of 
occurrences for determinants under category A will be at 9 and for determinants 
under category B the number of occurrences will be at 4. 
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Subsequently, the following findings arc rqwmd iOr the above (refer to 
Table 27): 
Table 27 
No. Of Occurrences in' Troubled Comg;!Jli_r;L 
Determinants 
Categorr A 
Favourable State or 
Es.istenee 
Non Favourable State 
or Es.isteoee 
Categorv B 
Exists 
Non EWtaot 
STC 
7outof9 
2outof9 
4outor4 
Ooutof4 
NSTC 
1 out or9 
8 out of9 
Ooutor4 
4outor4 
Based on the above, it can be observed tlmt the determinants under category A 
have a favourable state of existence that occurred more frequently in the STC than 
in the NSTC, where 7 out of9 occurrences were observed for the STC and only I 
out of9 for theNSTC. 
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The determinants under category A also ~·~pc1 icnt.:cd a non favourable state of 
existence that occurred more frequcnlly in tlw NSTC than the STC, where 8 out of 
9 occurrences were observed for the NSTC and 011ly 2 out of 9 were observed for 
the STC. 
For category B, it was observed that the occurrences of the determinants' 
existence (i.e. exists) were found more Ji·cquently in the STC than the NSTC, 
where 4 out of 4 occurrences were observed fOr the STC and none for the NSTC. 
The occurrences of the detenninants' non existence were frequently found more in 
the NSTCthan the STC, where 4 out of 4 occurrences were observed for the 
NSTC and none for the STC. 
With reference to the research hypotheses and to the above observations, it is 
believed that the high occurrences of the tilvourable state of existence and the 
existence (i.e. exists) of the key determinants of turnaround feasibility in the STC 
have enabled the STC to achieve successt\11 corporate turnarounds. 
Subsequently, it is also believed that the high occurrences ofthe non favourable 
state of existence and the non existence oft he key determinants of turnaround 
feasibility in the NSTC have impeded the NSTC from achieving successful 
corporate turnaround. 
J08 
These findings and observations above suppurt all4 hypotheses oftiJe research 
and reaffirm that: 
I, The favourable state of existence uf the determinant! of turnaround 
feasibility enables ~:ompanies to al'IJicve a successful corporate turnaround. 
l. Tbe non favourable state of existenn· of the determinant! of turnaround 
feasibility impedes companies from nchieviug n successful corporate 
turnaround. 
3. Tbe exbtence (i.e. exists) of the lh:tenninnnts of turnaround feasibility 
enables .:ompanies to achieve n sun·essful corporate turnaround. 
4, The non existence of the determin:mts of tumnround fea&l'bility impedes 
companies from achieving s successful turnaround. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
When causes of decline were analysed, it was found that the STC faced fewer 
causes of decline than the NSTC. More NSTC were also found to be in the severe 
crisis stage th110 the STC. However, the NSTC were found to be more non 
diversified than the STC. 
Although both STC and NSTC were found to have high occurrences offavourable 
industry characteristics. the NSTC were found not to have benefited from this 
feature. When the company's cost- price structure was analysed, a majority of 
NSTC and STC had an equal or higher cost price structure than their industry. 
J09 
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STC were also found to have received vc1y ~uppmlive commitment from their 
bankers compared to the NSTC. Subs~qu~11tly, wl1~1\ the commitment of creditors 
was analysed, again the STC were found tu ha\·e 1 ,·ccived a stronger commitment 
from their creditors compared to the NST<' Tl1e mujurity of the STC were also 
found to have received a stronger commitment from their employees compared to 
theNSTC. 
In addition, the STC CEOs were also found to have a higher number of 
favourabie characteristics of new competent management when compared with the 
NSTC. 
Subsequently, STC have been found to have more key characteristics of viable 
core business, received bridge capital from more than one source and they have 
more realistic turnaround plan pertinent reaturcs tlmn the NSTC. 
It was also found that the STC had high occurrences offavourab!': sta~es of 
existence for the key determinants under cntcgory A and experienced high 
occurrences of existence (exists) in the key determinnnts under category B 
compared to the NSTC. These findings and observations have thus supported all4 
hypotheses ofthe research. 
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CHAPTER 6 
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3ll 
DEVELOPING THE CORPORATE 
TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY MODELS 
Chapter 6 presents the findings and interpretation on the development of the 
qualitative ' Feasibility Intensity Level ' model and the empirical model for 
predicting corporate turnaround feasibility using the multivariate logistic regression 
technique. 
The application assumptions for using the multivariate logistic regression model 
were tested to ensure that its usage was appropriate for the study. Several 
multivariate logistic regression models were analysed in terms of their logic, 
appropriateness and suitability for predictive usage using test and diagnosing 
statistics as set forth in Chapter 3 to find the" best" and final model. 
Subsequently, the model was tested for its validity and predictive power using the 
Data Splitting technique and the Lachenbruch method. 
6.1 REALISATION OF A QUALITATIVE 
CORPORATE TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY 
MODEL 
As stated earlier, one of the main objectives of the research was to develop an 
empirical model consisting of the key determinants of corporate turnaround which 
could be used to predict the feasibility of corporate turnarounds. 
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This will be dealt with in this chapter and will be based on the findings and 
observations reported in Chapter 5. The findings and observations reported in 
Chapter 5 have also led to the realisation of a qualitative corporate turnaround 
feasibility model which is subsequently discussed. 
6.1.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
The qualitative model (refer to Figure 3) was named as the' Corporate 
Turnaround Feasibility Intensity Model ', since it is concerned with the different 
levels of feasibility intensity of corporate turnaround. 
The model consists of 10 ' inner cores ' or 10 feasibility intensity levels 
(FIL I to FILIO) and I' outer core' which consists of the 10 key success factors 
or detenninants of corporate turnaround feasibility (excluding 03, 04 and 05). 
These 3 detenninants are not included in the model since it was found in 
Chapter 5 that there were no significant differences between the STC and the 
NSTC as far as these determinants were concerned. Thus it would be pointless to 
have them included. The 10 determinants included in the model are as follows: 
• Dl - Causu of Decline 
• D2- Severity of Crisis 
• D6 - Commitment of Shareholders 
• D7- Commitment of Ban ken 
• DB- Commitment of Credit on 
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• D9- Commitment of Employees 
• DIO- New Competent Management 
• Dll- Viable Core Bu!iness 
• 012- Bridge Capital 
• DIJ- Realbtic Turnaround Plan 
There are a1together 20 directional pointers (arrows) categorised into 2 basic 
types; the ones pointing toward the determinants (inquiring function), and the ones 
pointing toward the feasibility intensity levels (responding function). 
6.1.2 WORKINGS OF THE MODEL 
Inquiries will be made according to the detenninants and their categories. For 
instance Dl is a detenninant under category A where an inquiry is made pertaining 
to the (Causes of Decline) state of existence in the company. If the state of 
existence is found favourable, then the feasibility intensity level one or FIL 1 is 
shaded. Similar inquiries will be made of all other determinants under category A 
If the state of existence is found to be non favourable for any one oft he 
determinants, the corresponding feasibility intensity level will be left unshaded and 
the inquiry moves on to the next detenninant. 
Similarly, for the determinants under category B, inquiries will be made of their 
existence in the company. 
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If a particular determinant is found to exist, the next available corresponding 
feasibility intensity level is shaded and if it is non existant, the corresponding 
feasibility intensity level will be left alone and the inquiry moves to the next 
determinant and so on. 
It is cautioned here that the ' inner cores ' or feasibility intensity levels do not 
correspond rigidly to any one particular detenninant. If a particular feasibility 
intensity level is not shaded due to a negative response of a particular determinant 
inquired, it will be left unshaded and will be used cubsequently for the next 
detenninant inquiry. 
Corporate turnaround feasibility intensity can be observed from the number of 
successful feasibility intensity levels shaded. The higher the number of feasibility 
intensity levels shaded, the greater the corporate turnaround feasibility intensity. 
6.1.3 BRIEF EXAMPLE OF THE WORKINGS OF THE 
MODEL 
Two ' troubled companies' are taken at random, one is an SIC and the other is an 
NSTC. Both are tested with regard to the state of existence and the existence of 
the corresponding lO detenninants using the' Corporate Turnaround Feasibility 
Intensity Model ' and their results are depicted in Appendix K, Figure 4 and Figure 
s. 
liS 
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I!isl.l.ml. Corporate Turnaround Feasibility Intensity Model 
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Figure 4. Corporate Turnaround Feasibility Intensity Model 
Test for an STC 
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Figure 5. Corporate Turnaround Feasibility Intensity Model 
Test for an NSTC 
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From Figure 4, it can be observed that the STC scored every corporate turnaround 
feasibility intensity as a result of the I 0 accumulated feasibility intensity levels, 
given its positive response toward all \0 determinants. Conversely, the NSTC 
(as in Figure 5) managed to acquire up to the second feasibility intensity level and 
resulted in a very low corporate turnaround feasibility intensity, given its positive 
response to only 2 determinants. 
Subsequently, 86 pairs of' troubled companies' (consisting ofSTC and NSTC) 
were tested for their feasibility intensity levels. Their results are in Table 28: 
Table 28 
Feasibilitv Intensity Level Test Results 
Feasibilil;i Intensity = 
NSTC 
Levels 
0 nil 13 
I nil 13 
2 nil 5 
3 ., ruo 10 
4 nil 
6 nil 
9 7 nil 
10 36 nil 
Total 43 43 
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From the above, it can be observed that most STC have nccumulated feasibility 
intensity levels of9 and 10 (in the upper intensity level range), whereas the NSTC 
have accumulated feasibility intensity levels ranging from 0 to 6 (with majority of 
them arc in the lower intensity level range). 
On the whole, a guide for using the model can be that the higher the corporate 
turnaround feasibility intensity, the more feasible it will be for a successful 
turnaround, and the lower the corporate turnaround feasibility intensity, the less 
feasible it will be for a successful corporate turnaround. 
6.2 THE QUANTITATIVE CORPORI\.TE 
TURNAROUND FEASIBILITY MODEL 
The following are findings and interpretations on the results obtained from 
modelling the multivariate logistic regression. 
6.2.1 APPLICATION ASSUMPTIONS 
The dependent variable (refer to Appendix L) which is FNF or Observed Feasible 
Turnarounds (Successful Turnarounds) I Non Feasible Turnarounds 
(Non Successful Turnarounds) is in the nominal scale with dichotomous I binaty 
response (0, I), as explained earlier under the scale of measurement in the 
methodology. 
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When Ei {the error term) was tested for its normality by plotting a llistogram 
(with the nom1al curve superimposed ) orits unstandardized residuals, Ei was 
found to be not normally distributed (refer to Appendix P). 'fhis was further 
reaffirmed by plotting the Normal Probability and Detrended Normal Probability 
plot of the deviances, where it was found that the deviances did not appear to be 
normally distributed {refer to Appendix Q and Appendix R). 
A test on the constraint of the logistic response function was also undertaken to 
confirm whether the asymptotes were at 0 and 1 by plotting the Histogram 
(with the nonnal curve superimposed) of the response function. Variables from the 
Data Splitting model were used for this purpose. The Histogram plot confinned 
that the logistic response function's asymptotes were at 0 and 1 
(refer to Appendix S) and reaffinned that the mean responses were constrained by 
Os:E{Y)=7t:!i:l 
Further tests were undertaken to confirm whether the logistic response function 
was curvilinear in shape (sigmoidal) by plotting the response function against..Z 
(the value of its linear combination). The logistics response function was found to 
be curvilinear and sigmoidal in shape (tilted' S ').Its asymptotes were at 0 and I, 
which also reaffirmed the above mean responses constraint (refer to 
Appendix T). 
J2l 
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The above tests have satisfied the application assumptions of the multiva11do: 
;.\, 
logistic regression model and confirmed the usage of the multivariate logintic 
regression model for this study to be appropriate. 
6.2.2 MODEL BUILDING CHRONOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Twenty eight multivariate logistic regression models were run, tested and analysed, 
and their results are in Appendix M Each of the models was tested and analysed 
using the relevant test and diagnostic statistics (as stipulated in the methodology) 
for their appropriateness, suitability and logic. 
The findings and interpretation ofthe results are as follows: 
Modell consisting of all the predictor variables (COD, SOC, COST, NCOM, 
VCB, BCAP and RTP) with 86 cases I observations inclusive of the intercept 
(INTP) was run using the Enter procedure. Subsequently, the same variables were 
modelled (Model2 and 3) using the Forward and Backward Conditional Stepwise 
procedures respectively. With the exception ofthe Score statistics in Model2, 
which were found to be significant at the 0.05 level for variables not in the 
equation, the overall results for the first three models were basically similar i.e. 
they faced computational prOOlems where the covariance matrices were not able to 
b~ computed and all other statistical results omitted. 
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Subsequent models (Model 4, 5 and 6) were run using the Enter, Forward and 
Backward Conditional Stepwise procedures without the intercept (INTP). With 
the exception ofthe Score statistics that were found to be significant at the 0.05 
level in ModelS for all variabl•!s not in the equation and the significant Wald 
statistics for variable COST at the 0.05 level, further computational problems, 
similu to Model I, 2 and 3 and the omission of other statistics were met. 
For Model 7 onwards, it was decided that each predictor variable be entered into 
the equation one at a time using the Enter procedure. Only when a prospective 
model Wllll found, would the Forward and Backward Conditional Stepwise 
procedures then be applied to reaffirm results obtained using the Enter procedure. 
In Model 7, the predictor variables entered were COD and SOC. The intercept 
(INTP) was reintroduced into the equation. Reading for the -2 loglikelihood was at 
18. 17, while the Model and Improvement Chi-Square was significant at the 0.05 
level. The model had a 98.8% Correct Classification for Feasible and Non Feasible 
Corporate Turnaround. While all coefficients in the equation were found to have 
the correct a priori sign, the Wald statistic for SOC was found to be not significant 
at the 0.05 level. By excluding the intercept (INTP) again, another model (Model 
8) wu run and it was found that the Wald statistics for COD and SOC were 
significant However, the value for -21oglikelihood had increased to 70, with an 
86% Correct Classification despite the significance ofthe Model and Improvement 
Chi-Square. 
Subsequently, for Models 9, 10, II and 12, variables such as COST, NCOM, VCB 
and RTP were entered and eliminated from the equation one at a time to obtain 
their results. It is unfortunate that all four models suffered from computational 
problems with similar symptoms as some of the models before. 
Another model {Model IJ)was run with variables COD, SOC and BCAP. The -2 
loglikelihood was 25.76 with significant Model and Improvement Chi-Square at 
the 0.05level. The model had a Correct Classification of95.3%, correct a priori 
sign Md significant Wald statistics. The variable RTP wa:; then added to th~; 
equation ofMode\13 when Model 14 was run. Unfortunately, Model14 suffered 
similar computational problems as some of the models before. 
A decision to drop the variable COD and to ignore the Wald statistical results was 
made for subsequent models (Models 15 to 25). Predictor variables were again 
entered and eliminated from the equation one at a time. Those that contributed to 
the significance ofthe test statistics were allowed to remain in the equation. The 
reason for ignoring the Wald statistic was due to some undesirable property that it 
is said to have. Hauck and Donner (1993, as quoted by Norusis, 1994) stated that 
when the absolute value of the regression coefficient became large, the estimated 
standard error would also be large, producing Wald statistics that were too smaU 
leading one to iLccept the null hypothesis when the coefficient is 0, when in fact 
one slx1uld reject it. Therefore, whenever there is a large coefficient, one is advised 
not to rely on the Wald statistic for hypothesis testing. 
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Model IS was run with variables SOC and COST. Both the Model and 
Improvement Chi-Square were fuund to be significant at the 0.05 level, with 79. 15 
for the -2 loglikelihood . The model had a Correct Classification of 70.9% and 
unfortunately suffered from having the incorrect a priori sign for SOC. There were 
also two cases of outliers. 
When the variable NCOM was included in the equation ofMode\15 for Model \6, 
the -2loglikelihood improved from 79.15 to 48.05 with a significant Model and 
Improvement Chi-Square. The model ability to Classify Correctly also improved to 
90.7%. However, the coefficient of NCOM suffered from havins the incorrect a 
priori sign. 
Subsequently, the variable VCB was entered into the equation ofMode\16 for 
Mode\17. The -2 loglikelihood improved slightly to 41.86 with significant Model 
and Improvement Chi-square at the 0.05 level. The Correct Classification remained 
at 90.7%. Unfortunately, Mode\17 suffered computational problems as did some 
ofthe earlier models. Variable BCAP was entered into the equation ofModel 17 
for Model 18. Unfortunately again, it suffered from similar computational 
problems. 
The variable BCAP was then eliminated and the variable RTP entered into the 
equation of Mode\18 for Model19. The -2loglikelihood improved to 35.07 with 
significant Model and Improvement Chi-Square. 
The model had a Correct ClllSsification of94.2% but suffered from having the 
incorrect a priori sign for the coefficients ofVCB and RTP. 
With the exception of Model 18, all models from 15 to 19 resulted with several 
cases of outliers. The outliers were addressed where model diagnostic statistics 
were used 10 identify significant outliers. All 86 cases were observed and 
compared in tenus ofthe Cooks Distance, Logit Residuals, Studentized Residuals 
and Deviances, Standardised Residuals and the Dfbetas. Three significant outliers 
were found i.e. cases 8, 42 and 86. 
A simple remedial measure WIIS taken by eliminating the outliers above. Both 
Lapin (1993) and Norusis (1994) recommended the elimination of outliers by 
removing the data for the said cases I observations in situations where the number 
of the overall ca'ICs I observations was large enough to warrant the elimination to 
take place. In the situation above, it wllS found appropriate to eliminate the cases 
with the significant outliers since the overall number of cases I observations which 
were 86, were more than the minimum requirement for model building data sets. 
Data sets which should be at least between 30 and 50 cases I observations in view 
ofS predictor variables in the equation. 
It must aJso be stressed here that the elimination of the cases I observations with 
significant outliers must be done in pairs with a view of maintaining the balance in 
number between the STC and NSTC in the data set. 
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Thus the elimination of6 cases I observations (3 pairs) would result in a remainder 
of 80 cases I observation in the data set for the modelling. 
Model 20 onwards were run with SO cases I observations in the data set. The 
-21oglikelihood was 7.47 with significant Model and Improvement Chi-Square at 
the 0.05 level. The model had a Correct Classification of 97.5%. However, all of 
the coefficients suffered from having the incorrect a priori sign. When the 
Backward Conditional Stepwise procedure was applied for the same variables in 
the equation ofModel20 for Model21, the -2loglikelihood became 8.82 with an 
insignificant Improvement Chi-Square at the 0.05 level. The model has a Correct 
Classification of 96.2%. Model21 similarly suffered from having the incorrect a 
priori sign for all coefficients and even the loglikelihood ratios were not significant 
at the 0.05 level for 2 variables (NCOM and VCB). Residual Chi-Square for 
variables not in the equation was also not significant at the 0.05 level. 
The Forward Conditional Stepwise procedure was also applied for the same 
variables as in Model 21 for Model 22. Similar results were obtained for Model 22 
as far as the -2 loglikelihood, Correct Classification and the Residual Chi-Square 
were concerned. No beta coefficients were available for 2 ofthe variables 
(NCOM and VCB) while RTP had an incorrect a priori sign. Although the Score 
statistics for variables not in the equation were significant at the 0.05 level, the 
loglikelihood ratios for 2 variables (NCOM and VCB) were not computed. 
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The reason was because these two variables were found to be insignificant at the 
0.05 level, and as such under the Forward Conditional Stepwise they were 
excluded from the equation. Overall, no significant outliers were found in the three 
models abt, "'.e. 
From the test statistics in Model 21 two variables i.e. NCOM and VCB were 
highligllted as not being significant. Similarly, in Model22, several test statistics 
were not computed since the variables were excluded from the equation. 
Both variables (NCOM and VCB) were eliminated from the equation for Model 
23. The results in terms ofthe -2loglikelihood, Model and Improvement Chi-
Square and the Correct Classification did not differ from those ofModel22. Apart 
from the above, the coefficient for RTP suffered again from having the incorrect a 
priori sign. 
The Backward and Forward Conditional Stepwise procedures were applied for the 
variables in the equation of Model23, respectively. With the exception of the 
significance ofthe Score statistics for all variables not in the equation in Model 25 
and the loglikelihood ratios in both Models 24 and 25, the results of other test 
statistics inclusive of the beta coefficients remained unchanged. Similarly, no 
significant outliers were found. 
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After 25 models were run, it was felt that there must be an underpinning cause for 
the illogicalness, inappropriateness and unsuitability of the models. From the 
symptoms indicated by several test statistics, it was suspected that the models 
suffered from the problem of 'multicollinerity' i.e. where high correlations existed 
between several predictor variables. 
The evidence is the incorrect a priori sign of the coefficients suffered by several 
predictor variables which had opposite signs from what would logically be 
expected, large standard errors making the Wald statistic insignificant and 
computational problems for the covariance matrices as observed in most of the 
models. Furthermore, the large beta coefficients in the h1ter models posed 
additional computational difficulties in terms of the expom.•ntial of the linear 
' 
combinations if they were to be calculated. 
Aldrich and Nelson (1984) stated that the assumptions for logit and probit models 
were exactly the same as those made for OLS (Ordinruy Least Squares), and that if 
near though not exact linear dependencies exited (collinearity), then problems of 
computational imprecision and unstable estimates may occur. 
They also stressed that the !ogit and probit models suffer the same problems of 
multicollinearity as does the OLS models. 
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In the study by Peel and Wilson ( ]988) for liquidation I merger alternative of 
distressed companies, 54 logistic models were run using 18 predictor variables to 
find logit estimates that could best predict distressed companies that were 
successfully acquired and tho~e that failed. Multicollinearity problems were 
encountered. As a result, one of their most successful models was based on only 4 
predictor variables (since the introduction of additional variables resulted in 
multicollinearity problems). 
It must be stressed here also that the existence of multicollinearity problems in 
most of the above models in this study is not incidental and probably unavoidable. 
Recall in the findings of Chapter 5, that the detenninants or key success factors 
for feasible corporate turnaround are not totally unrelated. In the STC for instance, 
the Commitment of Bankers and Creditors was also related to the Commitment of 
the Shareholders and the existence ofthc owner cum chairperson I CEO 
management. Similarly, any additional funds in the fonn of either bridge capital 
from the bankers or allowable deferred payment from the creditors was also found 
to be related to the existence of the owner cum chairperson I CEO in the STC 
compared to the NSTC. 
Although it would be impossible to totally eliminate the problem of 
multicollinearity in the modelling attempt of this study, the priority, however, is to 
find a reasonably balanced model with a reduced impact of multicollinearity and 
while being logical, appropriate and suitable for its predictive usage purposes. 
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While suggestions on how the multicollinearity problem can be reduced includes 
the change of the equation structure by dividing some series to both lefi and right 
hand variables or to construct several composite variables in place of the existing 
predictor variables (as proposed by several statistical authors), it was felt that these 
suggestions would only increase the complexity and introduces greater 
complications for usage of the ultimate model. The model reflects a more 
theoretical than practical one as such compromising a significance of this research 
is trying to achieve i.e. a wholesome and realistic model for predicting the 
feasibility of corporate turnaround. The practical aspects of the model would 
contribute new approaches and knowledge not only to the academic world but will 
find its usefulness in the corporate world as one of the tools to facilitate the 
making of the right decisions. This can avoid costly errors in terms of money, man-
hours, physchological turmoil and wasteful resources. 
A simple conventional yet effective approach (similar to that used by Peel and 
Wilson, 1988), is to eliminate several highly correlated predictor variables. 
Howower, in the last model run i.e. Model 25, there were only 3 predictor variables 
used in the equation out of the total of7 predictor variables, meaning, 4 other 
predictor variables had already been eliminated from the equation. 
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Reobservation of all the 25 models indicated that one ofthe more appropriate, 
suitable, logical models with the correct a priori sign for all coefficients in the 
equation, with reasonable results for its test statistics was Model JJ, containing the 
variables COD, SOC and BCAP. 
A decision was made to run a model with the above predictor variables, this time 
using 80 cases/ observations in the data set (as in Models 20 to 25) and bringing 
back into cognisance the Wald statistic for Model26. The Enter procedu~ was 
used and the results found confirmed the above decision. The -2 loglikelihood was 
19.43 with significant Model and Improvement Chl-Square at the 0.05 level. The 
model had a Correct Classification of 91.2% with significant Wald statistic at the 
0.05 level. The beta coefficients too had the correct a priori sign and even the 
value ofthe partial correlations were more apparent. 
The variables in the equation ofModel 26 were used in Models 27 and 28 using 
the Backward and FoJWard Conditional Stepwise procedure respectively and 
similar results were obtained. The loglikelihood ratios, significant at the O.OSlevel, 
in Models 27 and 28 confirmed that of the Wald ststistics. Furthennore, no 
significant outliers were found. Results of the correlation matrix indicated that 
COD and SOC were highly correlated but not enough to cause intense 
multicollinearity problems, such as computational problems with the covariance 
matrices and the omission of test statistics, resulting in incorrect a priori signs. 
332 
No doubt there were only 3 predictor variables in these models but they appeared 
more appropriate, suitable and logical. 
Lapin (1993) advises to" keep the regression equation simple. In a multiple 
regression, this is achieved by minimising the number of predictors. Limiting the 
numbers of predictors gives stability to predictions made from diffi:rent 
data sets" (p. 507). 
Thus, the final linear combination of the logistic regression model equation 
estimates is as follows: 
Z = -2.2250 COD+ 3.6892 SOC+ 3.7575 BCAP 
Whe~~~laced within the logistic regression function the ultimate model reads as: 
Feasible I Non Feasible Corporate Turnaround= 
-2,22SO COD +3,68!12 SOC+ 3.7!i7!i BCAP 
e 
-2.2250 COD+ 3.68!12 SOC+ J. 7!i7!i BCAP 
1 + e 
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The interpretation of the above model is ; The feasibility of corporate turnaround is 
dependant on the base of natural logarithm~ to the power of the logistic 
regression model linear combination i.e. negative 2.2250 COD (Causes or 
Decline} plus 3.6892 SOC (Severity or Crisis) plus 3.7575 BCAP (Bridge 
Capitals}, divided by One plus the base or natural logarithm~ to the power of the 
logistic regression model linear combination i.e. negative 2.2250 COD 
(Causes of Decline) plus 3.6892 SOC (Severity of Crisis) plus 3. 7575 BCAP 
(Bridge Capitals). 
6.2.3 MODEL VALIDATION RESULTS 
The multivariate logistic regression model was tested in terms of its robustness, 
predictive ability and accuracy through the Data Splitting and the Lachenbruch 
validation technique. 
6.2.3,1 DATA SPLITTING TECHNIQUE 
Two sets of data were obtained, each with 40 cases I observations when the data 
set used in developing the final logistic regression model (i.e. containing 80 cases I 
observations) was split equally into two. Each of the data set consists of20 pairs 
ofSTC andNSTC. One data set was used for model building purposes and the 
other for data validation or prediction test purposes. 
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The model was run using the Enter procedure and the linear combination of the 
logistic regression model equation estimates for the Data Splitting technique was 
as fbllows: 
Z = -2.0385 COD+ 4.891 SOC+ 3.9228 BCAP 
The ~21oglikelihood was 8.87 with significant Model and Improvement Chi~ 
Square at the 0.05 level. The model had a 92.5% Correct Classification, with 
correct a priori sign for all coefficients and without any significant outliers 
reported. 
Subsequently, the model robustness, predictive ability and accuracy were tested by 
obtaining the linear combination or Z value of each of the cases J observations 
using the validation data set, after which the logistic response probabilities were 
calculated. A comparison between the values of the observed FNF (the dependent 
variable) and the Probability ofFNF (the values of the logistic response 
function) was made (refer to Appendix N). 
The model Correct Classification I Prediction was then calculated as follows: 
Model Correct Classification I Prediction: 
01=20 
02=-16 
N=40 
"' 
• Total Percent of Correct Classification I Prediction: 
nt +Dl 
• 
N 
20+ 16 
---;;,--~ 100% 
40 
= 90% 
The model Total Error Rate was also calculated and the result was as follows: 
Total Error Rate= ( I - Total Correct Classilicatinn ) ~ I 00% 
= (1-0.90)"100% 
"'10%. 
Subsequently, there was a need to accertain that the proportion of the Correct 
Classification was not due to a 50"/o chance. This test as applied to a classification 
problem was proposed by Frank, Massy and Morrison (1965, as quoted by Peel 
and Wilson, 1988) and Morrison (196~, as quoted by Wilson, 1989). 
The results were as follows: 
Tut of significant difference from a 50% cbance at the 0.005 level where Z = 
2.57581 Q = 0.9, P = 0.5 and'·N = 40. 
(Q-P) 
Z= 
VP(l-P)/N 
0.4 0,4 
z- z- Z = 5.0597 
..; 0.5(0,5)/40 0.079056 
'" 
• Critical point of90% at 0.005level was Z"" 5.0597, beyond the critical point of 
the 50% chance where Z = 2.5758. 
The overall prediction accuracy for using the Data Splitting technique validation 
test for the model equalled to 90% when the 0.5 cut-off point was applied. 
Twenty Observed Feasible Corporate Turnaround cases were correctly classified 
as Feasible Corporate Turnarounds and 16 Observed Non Feasible Corporate 
Turnaround cases were correctly classified as Non Feasible Corporate Turnaround 
out of20, making the overall Total Predictive Error Rate of the model at 10%. 
And the test proportion indicate that the proportion ofCorr~ct Classification 
(90%) was significantly different from a 50% chance at the 0.005 level. 
6.:Z.3.2 LACHENBRUCH METHOD 
Out of the total 80 cases I observations in the data set, a single case I observation 
was taken out randomly for the validation test at every one time (n - I), the model 
reestimated and the linear combination (Z values) and the logistics response 
probabilities calculated. Details of the results are in Appendix 0. Overall the 
models were observed to be relatively stable and were not significantly different 
from the original model. The r.ame linear combination of the logistic regression 
model equation estimates i.e. Z = -:Z.:Z:Z50 COD +3,689:Z SOC+ 3,7575 BCAP 
was used. 
/; 
/1 
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The Correct Classification I Prediction was calculated as follows: 
Model Correct Clauificatlon I Predkt!on: 
Dl =37 
N=80 
111 Total Correct Classification I Prediction: 
01+ 02 
N 
37+ 35 
-=-
111 100°!. 
80 
90% 
The Total Error Rate was also calculated and the result is as follows: 
Total Error Rate= ( 1- Total Correct Classification) • 100% 
= (1-0.90) 111 100% 
= too/. 
As in the Data Splitting technique, there was a need to accertain that the 
proportion of the Correct Classification was not to a 50% chance. This test as 
1l~ppUe~ to a classification problem was proposed by Frank, Massy and Morrison ~--ll 
(1965·, as quoted by Peel and Wilson, 1988) and Morrison (1969, as quoted by 
Wilson, 1989). 
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The results were as follows: 
Test or signilicant difference rrom 1 50"1. chance at the 0.005 level where Z = 
2.5758, Q = 0.9, P = 0.5 and N"" 80. 
( Q- P) 
Z= 
VP(l-P)/N 
0.4 0,4 
Z= Z= ,, z = 7.1556 
v 0.5 ( 0,5 ) /80 --"--0,05590 
* Critical point of90% at 0.005 level is Z = 7.1556, beyond the critical point of 
the 50% chance where Z = 2.5758. 
The overall prediction accuracy using the Lachenbruch method for validation of 
the model equalled 90% when the 0.5 cut~olfpoint was applied. Thirty seven 
Observed Feasible Corporate Turnaround cases were correctly classified as 
Feasible Corporate Turnarounds out of 40 and 35 Observed Non Feasible 
Corporate Turnaround cases were correctly classified as Non Feasible Corporate 
Turnaround out of 40, making the overall Total Predictive Error Rate of the model 
at 10%. And the test proportion indicate that the proportion of Correct 
Classification (900/o) was significantly different from a 50% chance at the 0.005 
level. 
'" 
6.3 SUMMARY 
In the empirical modelling work, the logistic application assumptions were tested 
for the multivariate logistic regression model and the test results satisfied the 
logistic application assumption and confirmed the appropriateness of its usage for 
this study. 
A total of28 multivariate logistic regression models were run, tested and analysed 
using the Enter procedure as the base procedure and reaffirming results ofthe 
Enter procedure by the Backward and Forward Conditional Stepwise procedures. 
Remedial measures taken included the elimination of the cases I observations with 
significant outliers and the exclusion of several predictor variables to reduce the 
multicollinearity problem. 
Models 26, 27 and 28 with COD, SOC and BCAP in their equations have good 
test statistics results with no significant outliers and with :ess of a multicollinearity 
problem. Thus the final logistic model es,timates are: 
' 
Feasible I Non Feasible Corporate Turnaround= 
·2.U50 COD+ 3.6892 SOC+ 3.7575 BCAP 
e 
----.1,2250COD +3,61192 SOC +3,7~7!§ BCAP 
t + e 
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The mode! validation tests were carried out using the Data Splitting technique and 
the Lachenbruch method. Both validation tests confirmed the 90% Correct 
Classification I Prediction power of the model, the I 0% Total Error Rate and that 
the proportion of Correct Classification (90%) was significantly different from a 
50% chance at the 0.005 level. 
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CHAPTER 7 
342 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 RESEARCH SUMMARY 
The objective of this research was to identify the key determinants of corporate 
turnaround feasibility. This was measured by examining two aspects, namely, their 
existence and the state in which these determinants exist in Successful Turnaround 
Companies (STC) and Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
(NSTC). The ultimate aim was the development of an empirical model of the key 
success factors or determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility capable of 
predicting the feasibility of corporate turnarounds. 
Two hundred and eleven publicly listed companies of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange were shortlisted through observations in their share price performance, 
using the Financial Times Extel. The companies were further observed in tenns of 
their EBIT (earnings before interest and tax), EAIT (earnings after interest and 
tax) and earnings after minority interest and extraordinary items or earnings 
distributable to shareholders. Subsequently, the 211 companies were tested using 
the PNB Score (Malaysian Z - Score), a failure detection model to help further 
shortlist the confinned ' troubled companies '. 
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One hundred ' troubled companies ' were identified and further demarcated into 
Successful Turnaround Companies and Non Successful Turnaround Companies by 
a comparative analysis of their last financial year ROSF (return on shareholders 
fund) with the Commercial Banks deposit rates. The result identified 57 
Successful Turnaround Companies (STC) and 43 Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies (NSTC). 
Other interesting observations were also made. Extraordinary items were found to 
be part and parcel of possibly several generic turnaround strategies being 
implemented. Thus, it was felt that the usc of the earnings after minority interests 
and extraordinary items and distributable to shareholders were more appropriate 
for comparison with the Commercial Banks deposit rates. 
The trough period was similar to those as described by Hoffman (1989) and it 
was found that 40 technically insolvent companies were the Same companies which 
later experienced successful turnaround (the STC group). The NSTC were found 
have higher gearing (more fmancialleverage) than the STC in the Upturn period 
but gearing was also observed to have increased despite no additional borrowings, 
which was due to the decline in earnings, which reduced the Total Shareholders 
Fund. STC were also found to be able to obtain more borrowings than the NSTC 
because bankers could have been more comfortable with their turnaround 
potential. 
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Strong shareholder commitment was also found in 47 STC and 35 NSTC in the 
form of an increase in paid capital to support the turnaround exercise. 
Different corporate strategies were found to be used on their own or in 
combination with others for turnaround by both STC and NSTC. 
Acquisitions were more frequently used than other corporate strategies in view of 
the crucial time frame in turnaround situations. It was also interesting to note that 
15 STC and 12 NSTC, through their efforts to tum around, ended up in the total 
change of their original core businesses to new ones. 
When causes of decline were analysed, it was found that the STC faced fewer 
causes of decline than the NSIC. It was also interesting to observe that both 
NSTC and STC faced more internally generated causes of decline than externally 
generated ones. More NSTC were also found to be in the severe crisis stage than 
the SIC. However, it was interesting to note that 19 STC, who were in the severe 
crisis stage did eventually have successful turnarounds. A majority of the STC and 
the NSTC were found to be non diversified companies. However, the NSIC were 
found to be more non diversified than the SIC. 
Both SIC and NSTC were found to have high occurrences of favourable industry 
characteristics but the NSTC were found not to have benefited from this feature 
and it is believed that there are other influential factors involved that can determine 
successful turnaround. 
'" 
When company cost - price structures were analysed, it was found that the 
majority ofNSTC and STC had an equal or higher cost price structure than their 
industry. High cost price structures were also found to exist not only due to being 
at a cost disadvantage but also due to the intense competition and shrinking 
markets in the recession period. STC were found to have always received the 
commitment of their shareholders compared to the NSlC. STC were also found to 
have received very supportive commitment from their bankers compared to the 
NSTC. 
Subsequently, when the commitment of creditors was analysed, again the STC 
were found to have received a stronger conunitment from their creditors compared 
to the NSTC. The majority of the SIC were also found to have received a stronger 
commitment from their employees compared to the NSTC. 
In the analysis of the above detenninants (commitment of shareholders, bankers, 
creditors and employees, also known as the commitment of the stakeholders), an 
interesting finding believed to have contributed towards the strong commitment 
received by the STC compared to the NSTC, was the high number of owners cum 
chairpersons I CEOs in the background oftbe STC. 
In addition, the STC CEOs were also found to have a higher number of favourable 
characteristics of new competent management when compared with the NSTC. 
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Another interesting argument setforth here is that new competent management did 
not necessarily have to be characterised by the installation of a new CEO. It could 
also be the same owner cum chairperson I CEO, who is taking every possible steps 
to save the company to tum it around, even if it meant that he or she may have to 
totally change the methods, styles and paradigms of his ways of managing. 
Subsequently, STC have been found to have more key characteristics of viable 
core business compared to the NSTC. More STC are also found to have received 
bridge capital from more than one source and they have more realistic turnaround 
plan pertinent features than the NSTC. 
In identifYing the existence and the state of existence ofthe key determinants of 
corporate turnaround feasibility in the STC and the NSTC, it was found that the 
STC had high occurrences of favourable states of existence for the key 
determinants under cal>;:gory A than the NSTC. Similarly, the STC were also found 
to experience high occurrences of existence (exists) in the key detenninants under 
category B compared to the NSTC. These findings and observations have thus 
supported all4 hypotheses of the research. 
The findings and observations in Chapter 5 have also led to the realisation of a 
qualitative corporate feasibility model named as the ' Corporate Turnaround 
Feasibility Intensity Model ', that can be used to test the corporate turnaround 
feasibility intensity. 
(\ 
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The higher the corporate turnaround feasibility intensity, the more feasible it will 
be for a successful turnaround and the lower the corporate turnaround feasibility 
intensity, the less feasible it will be for a successful corporate turnaround. 
In the empirical modelling work, the logistic application assumptions were tested 
for the multivariate logistic regression model, its error term and deviances were 
found not to be nonnally distributed. The asymptotes of the logistic response 
function were found to be at 0 and 1, confirming the mean response constraints 
while a scatter plot of the logistic response function against Z (the values of its 
linear combination) confirmed its curvilinear sigmoidal shape. Furthermore, the 
dependent variable was also in a nominal scale with a dichotomous I binary 
response (0, 1 ). The above test results satisfied the logistic application assumption 
and confirmed the appropriateness of its usage for this study. 
A total of28 multivariate logistic regression models were run, tested and analysed 
using the Enter procedure as the base procedure and reaffirming results of the 
E11ter procedure by the Backward and Forward Conditional Stepwise procedures. 
A majority of the models faced computational problems, omission of the test 
statistics and having incorrect a priori signs for several of the coeffiaients. A major 
problem encountered was ' multicollinearity ' and several significant outliers. 
'" 
However, this was not incidental and could have been due to the relationship 
between the dctenninants or key success factors of Corporate Turnaround 
Feasibility, as found the earlier part of the study. 
Remedial measures taken included the elimination of the cases I observations with 
significant outliers and the exclusion of several predictor variables. 
Reobservations were also made on all available models and Model 13 (with the 
best statistical results among the first 25 models) was rerun using 80 cases 
I observations in the data set for Models 26, 27 and 28. 
Results for Models 26, 27 and 28 were basically similar, except for the difference 
in the procedure used to run the models. Models 26, 27 and 28 with COD, SOC 
and BCAP in their equations have good test statistics results with no significant 
outliers and with less of a multicollinearity problem. Tluls the final logistic model 
estimates are: 
Feasible I Non Feasible Corporate Turnaround= 
·12250 COD +J,6S!Jl SOC +J,757!1 PCM> 
e 
-1.1150 COD+ J,li89l SOC+ J. 7!175 BCAP 
1 + e 
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The model validation tests were carried out using the Data Splitting technique and 
the Lachenbruch method. Both validation tests confinned the 90% Correct 
Classification I Prediction power of the model, the I 0"/o Total Error Rate and that 
the proportion of Correct Classification (90%) was significantly diftCrent from a 
SO% chance at the 0.005 level. 
7.2 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
This research has shed new insights as far as the feasibility of corporate turnaround 
of an organisation is concerned. The identification of thirteen key success factors 
or determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility contributes to solving the gap 
or' missing link' that exists between the' moment of truth' in the Management 
of Change stage and the point where decisions are made as to the type and 
combination of strategies to be implemented to tum around the company in the 
Analysis I Evaluation stage. 
Deeper understanding of each of the thirteen key success factors or detenninants 
of corporate turnaround feasibility in Successful (STC} and Non Successful 
Turnaround (NSTC) Companies was not made by previous authors and 
researchers, whereas in this study an attempt was made to analyse their impact in 
the sample of companies. 
"' 
The key success factors or determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility must 
be taken seriously not only because they are able to influence the decision making 
process as to the type or combinlllion of strategies to be used to turn around the 
company but also because a turnaround effort can be highly risky in their absence. 
They have however, as mentioned earlier, been ignored by previous authors and 
researchers. 
Simultaneously, the research has also contested previous authors and researchers 
such as Slatter (1984), Porter (1980), Luffinan, S[{nderson, Lea and Kenny 
(1988), George and Jail (1988), Hofer (1980), Schendel and Patton (1975), 
Ramanujam (1984), Pant (1986), Arkaradejdachachai (1993) and several others. 
These authors and researchers found variables such as Industrial Structure 
(or several compor.ents oflndustrial Structure), Company's Historical Strategy' 
and Cost·Price Structure as variables that can determine an organisation's 
performance in an industry. Some of them regarded these as detenninants of 
corporate turnaround and others have included them in their corporate turnaround 
models. 
However, in this research the 3 detenninants above were not significant between 
Successful Turnaround Companies (STC) and Non Successful Turnaround 
Companies (NSTC). 
The study confirms that the feasibility of corporate turnaround of an organisation 
is dependent on the state of existence (whether favourable or non favourable) of 
determinants or key success factors such as Causes of Decline , Severity of Crises, 
Commitment of Shareholders, Commitment of Bankers, Commitment of Creditors 
and Commitment of Employees. 
Subsequently, it is also dependent on the existence (whether they exist or 
,, 
doni exist) of the detenninants or key success factors for corporate turnaround 
feasibility such as New Competent Management, Viable Core Business, Bridge 
Capital and Realistic Turnaround Plan. 
Subsequently, it also confinns the apparent differences orthese determinants or 
key success factors of corporate turnaround feasibility in both Successful 
Turnaround Companies (STC) and Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
(NSTC). An organisation with the potential for a feasible corporate turnaround is 
likely to have a favourable state of existence for determinants such as Causes of 
Dec tine (i.e. fewer causes of decline), Severity of Crises (i.e. at the mild or 
moderate crisis levels), Commitment of Shareholders (i.e. committed always), 
Commitment ofBankers (i.e. supportive or very supportive), Commitment of 
Creditors (strong commitment), and the Commitment of Employees (strong 
commitment). 
"' 
An organisation with a potential for a feasible corporate turnaround is also likely 
to have the existence of determinants such as New Competent Management, 
Viable Core Business, Bridge Capital (i.e. with at least 2 sources) and a Realistic 
Turnaround Plan, compared to an organisation that does not have the potential for 
a feasible corporate turnaround. 
An important element found in the research in relation to determinants such as the 
Commitment of Shareholders and New Competent Management, that acted as a 
pulling factor, especially for rallying commitment from Bankers, Creditors and 
Employees in feasible corporate turnarounds, is the existence of an owner cum 
chairperson I CEO structure. While this may not have been taken into cognisance 
in previous corporate turnaround studies and may not have played any significant 
role in the corporate turnaround feasibility of organisations in other cultures, it is 
apparent in this research and that it is found to have played a significant role and 
contributed to the corporate turnaround feasibility of organisations in the Asian 
Business Community such as that of Malaysia. 
The organisation's corporate turnaround feasibility intensity level can subsequently 
be tested using the ' Corporate Turnaround Feasibility Intensity Model '. The 
qualitative model can reaffirm the feasibility of an organisation's corporate 
turnaround from its detenninants or key success factors existence and state of 
existence, which are transformed into a graphical depiction in tenns oft he intensity 
levels of its corporate turnaround ft"asibility. 
lSl 
The empirical model or the multivariate logistic regression model can then be 
applied to finalise and reaffinn the feasibility of the corporate turnaround oft he 
organisation. Although with only 3 detemtinants or key success factors of 
corporate turnaround feasibility (where the other 4 detenninants were excluded 
from the model due to the constraints of multicollinearity problems in logistic 
regression), it was powerful enough to correctly classify or predict a corporate 
turnaround feasibility by a 90% rate of accuracy. This warrants its usage for future 
testing of corporate turnaround feasibility of other ' troubled ' organisations. 
Both qualitative and empirical models can be used complementary to each other or 
on their own to test the feasibility of corporate turnaround. 
The availability of both qualitative and empirical models above to test and to 
predict the feasibility of corporate turnaround from this research may now help to 
solve the biggest dilemma facing numerous shareholders, top management, 
management consultants and bankers, that is in deciding whether to go ahead with 
the turnaround process or not. Other than helping to save costly errors in tenns of 
money, man-hours, psychological tunnoil, time and wasteful resources due to 
wrong decision making, the models are also a new contribution to knowledge. 
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7.3 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The first limitation of this research pertains to the information gathered through 
the questionnaire interviews with the CEOs (Chief Executive Officers) of the 
'troubled companies'. The accuracy and validity of the information gathered rest 
on the honesty, sincerity and integrity of each of the CEOs responding to the 
questions. While 61% of the 'troubled companies' CEOs were the same CEOs 
who tried to tum them around, the others were new CEOs, either promoted 
internally or through external recruitment, brought into the organisations to help 
either turnaround the organisations or just to succeed a CEO who has 
accomplished the turnaround process (replacement may be due to organisational 
politics). Those who are successors to the former CEOs after the process of 
corporate turnaround may claim that they have full knowledge of how the 
organisation got into trouble in the first place and how turnaround took place. But 
the basic question that remains is that they are not the same CEOs responsible for 
the corporate turnaround process. 
The second limitation could be due to the type of' troubled companies ' that were 
studied. All of the' troubled companies' are public listed companies on the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange. The reason for studying ' troubled ' public listed 
companies is because infomtation (both qualitative and quantitative) of private 
limited companies are either incomplete in nature, hard to obtain or even 
unavailable. Infomtation on public listed companies are more readily available and 
are published in Malaysia. 
"' 
The third limitation of this research could be due to the fact that the study was 
made based on the general public listed companies of the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (excluding the Financial and Extractive Industries) and was not 
according to their respective industrial sectors (as this was not the main intention 
of the research) due to constraints on resources and time. This limitation also 
applies for both Qualitative and Quantitative Models found in this stuJy. 
The fourth possible limitation is related to the element of culture found in this 
research that has played a signiftcant role in detenninants such as Commitment of 
Shareholders, Bankers, Creditors and more specifically in the relationship between 
the employees and the leadership of the organisation. There may be a need to 
specifY the uniqueness of culture (whether it is totally Asian or a hybrid of Asian 
and Western) and how extensive its influence is on the decision making process, 
commitment of stakeholders, loyalty, etc. in (! corporate turnaround process. The 
fifth possible limitation could be the exclusion of government influence in the 
corporate turnaround process in this re~earch, where ensuring a feasible corporate 
turnaround depended on the injection of ' Mega Projects ' (multi-rnil!ion of dollar 
projects, generally above 100 million Malaysian Ringgit) into certain' troubled 
companies ' which are politically linked with the ' powers that be '. 
Creative accounting and ' window dressing ', although hard to pinpoint, especially 
when public listed companies' accounts are usually verified by external auditors, 
can still take place in these accounts. 
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This is viewed as the sixth limitation as far as using the financial information from 
these companies is concerned and it would be almost impossible to pinpoint unless 
one has total access to all ' hidden ' accounting books ofthese companies. Again, 
if this is possible, the tasks of going through these books would be insurmountable. 
The seventh limitation, possibly the last foreseen limitation, is that the whole 
research, its findings and outcomes are based on the Malaysian context. One may 
have to be cautious when making use ofits findings and interpretations for 
interpolating corporate turnaround feasibility conditions of organisations of other 
countries with differing cultural background and corporate practices. 
7.4 FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
Several issues discussed under the research limitations are also seen as possible 
extensions and opportunities for future research. Further research could be 
undertaken to study differences as far as the detenninants of corporate turnaround 
feasibility are concerned, in the various industrial sectors. The aim would be to find 
out whether there are real differences within the industry and inter industry 
pertaining to their existence and state of existence in Successful Turnaround 
Companies and Non Successful Turnaround Companies. 
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Similarly, qualitative and empirical models that are capable of testing and 
predicting the feasibility of corporate turnaround in each of the industrial sectors 
could be built, if the number of cases/ observations in the data sets permits the 
development of the models. 
It is also obvious that the element of culture as stated in the limitation can be 
further explored and analysed. Can culture truly make an impact on employee and 
organisational leadership relationship and how extensive and powerful is it as a 
cohesive force to keep loyalty, confidence and perseverance in an organisation 
undergoing a turnaround process? Is it uniquely Asian or a blend of Asian and 
Western? Is it uniquely the culture in general or culture embedded in organisational 
values and practices? These are some of the areas that could be explored further in 
future research. 
Simultaneously, another research project could concentrate on analysing the 
governmental influence in deciding the fate of ' troubled companies '. Can the 
injection of ' Mega Projects ' truly open a ' new life ' or make corporate 
turnaround feasibility possible for' troubled companies ' that are politically linked 
and connected? Because of the injection of the' Mega Projects' or governmental 
influence, will financial institutions e.g. banks, who were hesitant in giving 
additional form of borrowings earlier, now go against their earlier decision? 
Would they now offer even millions of dollars in loans (even ifit means bankers 
raising money through loan syndication) to these' troubled companies' despite 
the latter's existing financial positions? 
Research could also be undertaken on similar grounds as this for privately owned 
limited companies. This could open up a whole new perspective in terms of the 
existence and the state of existence of the determinants of corporate turnaround 
feasibility in privately owned limited companies that are in trouble. 
Finally, the study could be replicated in countries with different cultural 
backgrounds and corporate practices. Modification of the existing determinants or 
finding a total new set of determinants of corporate turnaround feasibility for that 
particular country may be required. Subsequently, a different model for testing the 
feasibility of corporate turnaround for the country may be realised, and this is not 
uncommon since the original Altman's Bankruptcy Model (or Z Score) has been 
modified multiple times to suit an individual country's financial and corporate 
practices. 
"' 
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Appendix B 
Causes OF De~ 
Troubled 
Com anies 
No. % No. 
Internal Causes 
Poor management 100 100 57 
Inadequate 
financial control 
" " 
16 
Marketing 
problem 30 30 II 
High cost structure 
" " 
27 
Mistaken 
acquisitions 3 3 0 
Problems with big 
projects 13 13 I 
Overtrading 
EIIemal Causes " " 
II 
Decline of market 
Competitive 
" " " preuure 
81 81 
" Product life cycle 
Other 
" " 
8 
environmentAl 
fact on 
I I 0 
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STC NSTC 
% No. % 
100 43 100 
" 
33 17 
19 19 
" 
47 42 
" 
0 3 7 
, II 30 
19 
" " 
" 
38 88 
" 
42 
" 
14 to 23 
0 I 2 
Appendix C 
Industry Characteristics 
Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anie! 
Characteristics No. % No. % No, % 
I. Nature of product 
• Consumer 
product 
11 11 4 7 7 16 
• Industrial 
"' '" 
30 
" 
20 47 
product 
• Both products 39 39 
" 
40 16 J7 
• Highly 
differentiated 
A. Yes 
B.No 
16 16 11 
" 
5 12 
84 84 46 
" 
38 88 
• L~s price 
sensitive 
A. Yes 
D.No 8 8 0 0 8 
" 
l. Market " " 
57 100 
" 
81 
segmentation 
• Highly 
aeamented 
A, Yes 
B.No " " 
,. 
" " 
77 
II II I 
' " " 
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Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anles 
Characteristics No. % No. % No. % 
3. Relative tize & 
strenllth or 
comoetitors 
• Industry 
fra(lllented? 
A. yes J6 J6 
" 
J3 17 40 
B.No 
" 
64 38 67 
" " 
4. Entry barriers 
• Easy entrance 
into industry 
A. Yes 
4l 4l 
" 
39 11 49 
B.No 
57 S7 
" 
61 
" " 5. Elit barriers 
• Easy uit out of 
industry 
A. Yes 
" " " " 
13 53 
B.No 
.. 48 
" 
49 
'" 
47 
6, Rate or 
technological change 
• R11te of 
teclmoloi)' 
ehanzes 
frequently i,' 
A. Yu 
7 7 4 7 3 7 
D.No 
" " 
53 
" 
40 
" 
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Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anieJ 
Characteristics No. 'I· No. % No. % 
7. Threat of 
retaliation 
• Competitors rate 
of reaction 
A. Slower 1l 1l J8 67 
" 
79 
B. Quicker 
" 
28 19 JJ 9 
" 
8. Daraainina power 
of supplier 
• No. ohuppliers 
A.<':S 
96 96 56 98 4Q 
" A.<S 
4 4 I 
' 
3 7 
9. Baraainina power 
of customers 
• No. of customers 
A.;:.:s 
" " 
47 82 
" 
98 
8.<5 
II II 10 18 I 
' 10. Industry erowth 
~ 
• Introduction 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
• Growth 
• Mature 
" " 
.. 
" 
35 
" 
• Dei:line 19 19 II 19 
' 
19 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix D 
Commitment Of Employees 
Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anies 
Reactions No. % No. o/o No. % 
High rate or 
voluntary 
resignations 
YB 
' ' 
0 0 
' 
12 
No 
" " " 
100 J8 88 
Accepting more job 
load with same wages 
y., 
No 36 
" 
34 
" 
2 2 
N.• 
23 23 0 0 23 
" 
41 41 23 40 18 42 
Acceptina JIUile job 
load with wages cut 
y., 
No I I I 2 0 0 
N.• 
17 17 0 0 17 
" 
" 
82 
" 
98 26 2 
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Troubled 
Com anies 
Reactions No. % No, 
Tolerating late pay 
y~ 
., 
"' "' No 43 
" 
I 
N.• 
" 
27 26 
Participant! 
supporting 
tump.round Process 
y~ 
38 38 37 
No 37 37 0 
N.• 
" "' " 
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NSTC : Non Successrul Turnaround Companies 
"' )) 
STC NSTC 
% No. % 
" 
0 0 
2 42 98 
4S I 2 
" 
I 2 
0 37 
" 
" ' 
12 
Appendix E 
New Competent Management 
Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anies 
Characteristics No. % No. % No. % 
1. Ability to identil'y 
ora;aniutionaJ 
problems I sore spots 
quiekJy 
A, Yes 76 76 ' 
" 
98 10 47 
' ,, 
B.No 24 24 ' I 
' " " 
'
2. Stomach to fire 
~ 
A. Yes 
" " 
24 
" 
I 
' 
B,No 
" " 
ll 
" " 
98 
3, People user and 
"'' peoples' man 
A. Yes 
" " " 
91 3 7 
B.No 
45 45 
' ' " " 4. Makin& deeigion 
on thtir own 
A. Yes 
27 27 
" " 
I 
' B.No 
"13 7J 31 
" " 
98 
S. Often makina; bold 
decigions 
A. Yes 
B.No " " 
30 
" ' ' 
.. 
" 
27 47 41 
" 
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Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anies 
Characteristics No. % No. % No. % 
6. Settin£ definite 
tar£etS I objectives 
A. Yes 99 99 S7 IOo 42 
" B,No 1 I 
7. Imposing high 
0 0 1 
' 
standards of 
performance & 
evaluation 
A. Yes 
" " 
S7 too 
" 
81 
B. No 8 8 0 0 8 19 8, Spending more 
time in 
implementation than 
meetings 
A. Yes 
" " 
J() 
" ' " B. No 
9. Often with new 
" " 
27 47 38 .. 
ideas I techniques or 
supported their 
emergence 
A. Yes 
13 13 9 16 • 9 B,No 
07 87 
" 
.. 39 91 
lO.·!,United 
delegati'B.n and more 
of direct L•wolvement 
A. Yes 
" " 
37 
" 
16 37 
B.No 
47 47 
" " 
27 63 
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. 
Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anies 
Characteristics No. % No. % No. % 
11. Strong feelings in 
action or decisions 
taken or about 
to be taken 
A. Yes 100 100 
" 
100 43 100 
B.No 
' ' ' ' ' ' 
12. Required plenty 
of inronnalicm to 
help mma~te 
onaniz.ution 
A. Yes 47 47 41 7l 6 14 
B.No 
" " 
16 28 37 86 
13. Setting tigl1t 
control systems at 
everv level 
A. Yes 
" 
82 
" 
100 25 
" B.No 18 18 
' ' 
I8 42 
14. Muimizing 
power bestowed by 
board I shareholders 
A. Yes 
63 63 
" " ' 
21 
B.No 
J7 J7 3 
' " " 
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Troubled 
Com· anies 
Characteristics No. % No. 
15. Makin~~: different 
decisions at different 
situations and time 
.. 
the same isme5 
A. Yes 23 23 18 
B.No 79 79 
" 
16, Ability to control 
multiple dimensional 
or~~:anization 
problems from 
affectin11: mental 
lllld physical 
well being 
A. Yes 
1110 100 
" B.No 
0 0 0 
17. From tbe same 
industrv 
A. Yes 
74 74 
" B.No 
" " 
• 
STC : Succe5sful Turnaround Companies 
NSTC : Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
"' 
STC NSTC 
% No. % 
32 
' 
7 
68 
'" " 
1110 .,o 1110 
0 0 0 
86 
" " 
14 18 
" 
Viable Core Business 
Troubled 
Com anies 
Features N• % No. 
Positive tashftow 84 84 
" 
Sales volume 
umbrella " " " 
Competitive 
equipment .. 64 
" 
Competttive location 
" " " 
Awareness of change 
" " " 
STC : Successful Turnaround Companies 
NSTC : Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
"' 
STC NSTC 
% No, % 
100 27 6J 
" 
J7 86 
" " " 
61 16 37 
" 
3 7 
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Appendix G 
Bridge Capital 
Troubled 
Com anies 
Sources No, % No. 
Advances or '::ght 
lssuell froi n 
shareholdeh 
" " 
47 
Sales of assets by 
" " " management 
Brid~~:e credits for 
workin11: capits.l from 
bankers 
" " " 
Continuation ofraw 
material supply by 
creditors 70 70 
" 
. 
STC : Suctessful Turnaround Companies 
NSTC : Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
'" 
STC NSTC 
% No. % 
" " 
81 
40 13 30 
79 20 47 
100 13 30 
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Realistic Turnaround Plan 
Troubled 
Com anies 
Features No. % No, 
Availability of 
turnaround plan 100 100 57 
Specified objectives f 
tara:;ets 70 70 57 
Strategies to be used 
100 100 57 
Tactics I details on 
how strategies are to 
be implemented 
" " " 
Review and control 
systems 89 89 
" 
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STC NSTC 
% No, % 
100 
" 
100 
100 13 30 
100 4l 100 
" 
12 
" 
100 Jl 74 
Appendix I 
Consolidated Results 
Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anies 
Determinants No. % No. % No. % 
Dl. Causes 
of decline 
{no. of causes) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 10 10 17 0 0 
4 46 46 ... 81 0 0 
s 10 10 0 0 10 lJ 
6 19 19 1 l 18 42 
1 11 11 0 0 12 28 
8 2 2 0 0 2 s 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 1 1 0 0 1 2 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
D4. Industlj' 
cba~acteristics 
(no. o£favourable 
octurrences) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
l 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 6 6 1 2 s 11 
4 14 14 10 17 4 9 
' 
17 17 9 16 8 19 
6 19 19 12 22 1 17 
1 12 12 1 ll s 11 
8 18 18 8 14 10 23 
9 ll ll 10 17 2 s 
10 2 2 0 0 2 s 
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Troubled STC NSTC 
Com anies 
Determinants No. % No. % No. % 
D9. Commitment of 
employees 
(no, of positive 
responses (yes l l 
1 4 4 0 0 4 10 
2 J8 J8 0 0 J8 88 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 4 4 7 7 0 0 
' " " " 
93 1 2 
DlO. New competent 
managemeot 
(no. of favourable 
characteristics ) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
' 
9 9 0 0 9 21 
6 12 12 0 0 12 
" 7 14 14 0 0 14 32
8 
' ' 
0 0 
' 
12 
9 3 3 0 0 3 7 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 20 20 20 
" 
0 0 
12 10 10 10 17 0 0 
13 10 10 10 17 0 0 
14 13 13 13 23 0 0 
15 4 4 4 8 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Troubled 
Com anies 
Characteristics No. % No. 
Dll, Viable core 
business (no, of 
characteristics) 
1 0 0 0 
2 21 21 0 
3 22 22 0 
4 43 43 43 
5 14 14 14 
Dll. Bridge capital 
(no. o£sources) 
1 30 30 4 
2 25 25 13 
3 31 31 28 
4 14 14 
" 
Dl3, Realistic 
turnaround plan 
(no. of pertinent 
features) 
1 0 0 0 
' " " 
0 
3 16 16 1 
4 56 56 56 
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STC NSTC 
% No. % 
0 0 0 
0 21 49 
0 22 51 
75 0 0 
" 
0 0 
7 26 60 
" " " 49 3 7 
21 
' 
5 
0 0 0 
0 
" 
65 
' 
15 35 
98 0 0 
Appendix J 
Determinants: Identifying The Existence And The State Of 
Existence 
Troubled STC 
Com nnies 
Determinants No. % No. % No. 
Dl. Causes of decline 
• Favourable " " " " ' 
• Non favourable 
" 
44 I 1 43 
Dl. Severity of trisis 
• Favourable 
" " " 
67 19 
• Non favourable 43 4J 
" 
J3 14 
D3. Company's 
historicaJ strategy 
• Favourable 
40 40 17 47 1J 
• Non favourable 
" " " " " 
D4. Industry 
characteristics 
• Favourable 
" " 
37 
" 
16 
• Non favourable 
37 37 
" " 
17 
' 
'" 
NSTC 
% 
' 
"' 
" 
" 
" 
70 
" 
40 
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Troubled STC Nf,TC 
Com anies 
Determinants No. % No. % No, % 
05, Company's cost-
price stmcb1re 
• Favourable lS lS lS 44 0 0 
• Non f:avour~blt! 
" " 
32 
" 
4J 100 
06, Commitment of 
shareh!!l!lt:rll 
• Favourable 
" " " 
100 .'!', 2 
' 
• Non favourable 41 41 0 0 41 
" 
,. 
07. Commitment of 
l!!!ilim 
• Favourable 
71 71 
" 
100 14 J3 
• Non favourable 
" " 
0 0 
" 
67 
08. Commitment of 
cre!litm 
• Favourable 
" " " 
100 
' " • Non favourable 34 34 0 0 J4 79 
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Troubled 
Com anies 
Determinants No, % No, 
D9. Ccmmitment of 
~mJllo):eeS 
• Favouuble "' "' " 
• Non favourable 41 41 0 
010. New competent 
mana1ement 
• ~its 
" " " 
• Non aistence 
" " 
0 
DU. Viable core 
business 
• Exits 
" " " 
• Nonexistence 
43 43 0 
Dll, Bridle capital 
• Exits 70 70 
" 
• Non existence 
,. 30 4 
013, Realistic 
turnaround plao 
• EDo 
" 
,. ,. 
• Non existence 
44 44 I 
STC : Succ:esarul Turnaround Companies 
NSTC : Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
"' 
STC NSTC 
% No. % 
""' 
I I 
0 41 
'" 
... 0 0 
0 43 ... 
100 0 0 
0 43 100 
9J 17 40 
7 26 60 
'" 
0 0 
2 43 100 
Appendix K 
Corporate Feasibility Intensity : Results For The STC and NSTC 
Tests 
Determimmts STC 
D1 Favourable State of 
Existence 
D2 Favourable State of 
Existence 
D6 Favourable State of 
Existence 
D7 Favourable State of 
Existence 
D8 Favourable State of 
Existence 
D9 Favourable State of 
Existence 
DIO Exists 
DU Exists 
D12 Exists 
D13 Exists 
STC : Successful Turnaround Companies 
NSTC : Non Successful Turnaround Companies 
'" 
NSTC 
Non Favourable State 
of Existence 
Non Favourable State 
of Existence 
Non Favourable State 
of Existence 
Favourable State of 
Existence 
Non Favourable State 
of Existence 
Non Favourable State 
of Existence 
Non Existence 
Non Existence 
Exists 
Non Existence 
Appendix L 
Th D e en en d t Variahle en 
1 1 26 0 51 1 76 0 
2 0 
" 
1 52 0 77 1 
' 
1 : 28 0 53 1 78 0 
4 0 29 1 54 0 79 1 
5 1 I w 0 55 1 80 0 
6 0 
" 
1 ! 56 0 61 I 
7 1 32 0 57 I 
" 
0 
8 0 
" 
1 58 0 I " 1 ' 9 I 34 0 59 I 84 0 
' 
10 0 35 1 ., 0 85 1 
11 I 
" 
0 61 I 86 0 
12 0 
" 
I 62 0 
-
" 
I 
.38 0 63 I 
14 0 39 I 64 0 
" 
I 
" 
0 65 I 
16 0 41 I 66 0 
17 I 42 0 67 I 
18 0 
" 
I 
" 
0 
19 I 44 0 69 I 
20 0 
" 
I 70 0 
21 I 46 0 71 1 
22 0 47 1 72 0 
" 
I 48 0 73 I 
24 0 49 1 74 0 
25 I iO 0 75 1 
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M d I B 'ld' R It o e Ul m~: esu s 
M.N NOI VAR p R W1111: s.s LOG E,• -lLL Mx"sl c.c 
•• LR It
2 slg 
,,, ,,, 
I 
" 
INTP NFA ,\iF A NFA NFA NFA N.A N.A N,A N,A 
COD 
soc 
COST 
NCOM 
VCB 
BCAF 
RTP 
2 lD INTP NFA NFA NFA N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 
COD 
'" soc 
,,, 
COST lig 
NCOM ,,, 
VCD ,,, 
BCAF ,,, 
RTP ,,, 
3 
" 
INTP NFA NFA NFA NFA NFA N,A N.A N.A N.A 
COD 
soc 
COST 
NCOM 
VCB 
BCAP 
RTP 
4 
" 
COD NFA NFA NFA NFA NFA N.A N.A N.A N.A 
soc 
COST 
NCOM 
VCB 
BCAF 
RTP 
5 2<i COD N.A N.A N.A lig N.A ,,, N.A N.A N.A 
soc N.A N.A N.A lig N.A 
COST 
·" ·" 
,,, ,,, Jig 
NCOM N.A N.A N.A ,,, N.A 
VCB N.A N.A N.A lig N.A 
BCAP N.A N,A N.A ,,, N.A 
RTP N.A N,A N.A ,,, N.A 
< 21 COD NFA NFA NFA NFA NFA N.A N,A N.A N,A 
soc 
COST 
NCOM 
VCB 
BCAP 
RTP 
'" 
Appendix M ( Contd' ) 
M.N NOI VAR ~ R w ... !i; ~~" Ex• I -lLL '"'' ~'· c.c ,,, f):2 !ig 
7 7 r~ 21.84 ~~: ::; I NFA I NFA N.A I'"·'' ::: 19~i: -:.-:; 
' ' ~ ~ ::: ~:: NFA I NFA N.A "·" ::: :: 9 " NFA I NFA I NFA N.A N.A N.A I N.A 
-i-10 2J I NFA I NFA NFA I NfA ... N.A N.A N.A N.A .~"oC, 
II 2J COD I N>A ... NFA NFA I NFA N.A N.A N.A I N.A 
~~~ 
" " ~~ I NFA NFA NFA I NFA I ••·• N.A N.A N.A N.A ~ 13 7 I ·:.:,: :-:: ::: I NFA I NFA N.A "·" ::: 19~3 BCAP 3,07 
·" 
.. 
" ~g~ I NFA I NFA NFA I NFA I NFA N.A N.A N.A I N.A 
oi.: 
" 
4 !!?~ I -~;'; ::: •: I NFA I NFA N.A "·" •! '~: t ' .. ' :;: ::; -~~ I NFA I NFA N.A "·" ,; I ~i.7 ,, -,68 -.30 
"' 17 
' ~g~ U9 :~ :.~ I NFA I NFA N.A "·" ::: I ~7 2.32 
N~~: 1-0,49 ~ ~!. 18 l4 ~g~ I NFA I NFA N.A N.A N.A N.A 
NCOM 
VCB 
a 19 • ~;; ::: ~~~~ I NFA NFA N.A "·" ::: 9~2 
·" 
.00 
""' VCB 
'" 
.oo nalg 
RTP -2.90 -.14 
"' I 
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M,N NOI VAR p R I w "' !;; I 't'.G Ex• I -lLL ~;:,·;~ I c.c 
~ ,, 
" 
14 ~gs~ ~~:~! :::: :::· NFA N.A 7.47 ::: I ';';' 
NCOM -.82 ,00 :~ ~~ _-,~~0 .00 .00 
"' 21 iJ ~gi-r 13.35 .00 ::: NFA ::~ "'' 8,82 ;:~. 1 9~2 13.14 .00 
NCOM -.82 ,00 :::g ::~ VCB -1.69 .oo 
RTP ·18.40 ,00 nslg ,, 
, 14 ~gs~ ~::~: ::: ~~ ,, 5:; .. ,, "·" ::: I 9~2 NCOM N,A N.A :: VCB -~i.~ ~~ :~ ~ ~ 
" 
IJ 
COST ~!:~~ ~:: :::: N.A 8.82 ::: I '~' 
RTP ·21.44 0.00 n1lg 
,. 
" ~~~ -~;:~: :::: "'' NFA N.A "·" ::: 19;2 ·~ • •:o._ 
" " I gg~ -~t~?. ;:;; ::~ ·~ ::: N,A 8,82 ::: 1'~2 ,, aiP ! •• ' " 7 COD -:·:: :: NFA NFA N.A 19.43 ,,, 91,2 :gi. ::~: ,,, % 
" 
7 COD -Lll 
-:;: " 
NFA ~· N.A 19.43 sig 91.2 ~ !:~ " ,,, % ·" " ' :1: :~: : ::: : N.A 1 "·" ::: I'~.' 1:~ 
'" 
Appendix M ( Contd' ) 
NOTE: 
M,N- MODEL NUMBER 
NOI- NUMBER OF ITERATIONS 
VAR- VARIABI,ES IN MODEL 
p -BETA COEFFICIENTS 
R- PARTIAL CORRELATIONS 
W &it- WALD'S SIGNIFICANCE 
S.S 1ig- SCORE STATISTICS SIGNIFICANCE 
LOG L.R 1lg- LOG LIKELIHOOD RATIO SIGNIFICANCE 
Ex•- RESIDUAL CHI SQUARE SIGNIFICANCE 
-lLL- GOODNESS OF FIT ( -1 LOG LIKELIHOOD) 
M,;2 1ig- MODEL CHI SQUARE SIGNIFICANCE 
I,;1 1ig- IMPROVEMENT CHI SQUARE SIGNIFICANCE 
C.C- CORRECT CLASSIFICATlON 
N.A- NOT APPLICABLE I AVAILABLE FOR CORRESPONDING VARIABLE 
NFA -NOT APPLICABLE/ AVAILABLE FOR ALL VARIABLES 
sig- SIGNIFICANT AT 0,0.5 LEVEL 
nsig- NOT SIGNIFICANT AT 0,05 LEVEL 
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Appendix N 
Model Validation: Data Splitting Test 
CAS~~~~~· IN MUPEL e'/l+e' 
SCORE 
I -UJ85COD+ I 0.99979668 FEASIBLE 
' 
~nc~ 
. 5CIJ~: 0 NON I 
J -2.0385 COD+ I 
4.8910SOC+ 
• ~ 0 
' 
~ I 
' 
~ 
' 
NUN I 
' 
~ I 
3.9118 BCAP 
8 -Z.OJBS COD+ 0 0.!>271761~ 
9 ~. I 
10 ~ 0 
II -2.03115 COD+ I 
4.8!HO SOC+ ~ " 0 
ll ~ I 
14 ~ 0 NON I 
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Model Validation: Data Splitting Test 
MODEL 
1}.999797668 
FEASWLE 
400 
,-, .. --c.,, . =·~----. ·-· ,_. __ 
' ,,_ 
Appendix N ( Contd') 
Model Validation: Data Splitting Test 
MODEL 
.. /I 
401 
--"Appomliix 0 
- ,,- " '·--~ -
Model Validation: Lachenbruch Test 
402 
_ A~P.~~diJ~; 0 ( CQx~td' ) 
,'· ·-,, 
Model Validation: LaC::tenbruch Test 
O,!Xll4tiJ361 
.. , 
Appendix. 0 ( Contd'} 
MO-dEi Validation·: ·:c.acbenbrUCh-TeSt 
IN e' /I+ 
MODEL 
0 
0 
. ! •· .•. 
Appendix 0 ( Contd' ) 
. 
"ODEL e'/l+e' 
MODEL 
" 
·UISI COO< I FEASIBLE 
44 -~;::~ 0 
" 
.;,,.~ I O.!J!)!)94557J 
3:7573 BCAP 
.. -:~=~~OD+ 0 
47 ~ I 
,:moscA. 
48 -2,2207 COD+ 0 
" 
-~m~ I 
'" ~ 0 i NUN> 
" 
~;~+ I I NON> 
'"" BCAP 
" 
~:~~~.COD+ 0 0.000316586 NONFEASDLE 
iii66 ~~';.; 
" 
~2.1779 ~~!' + I 
::::seA. 
" 
_,,,. ~!'~ + 0 I NON 
" 
>+ I 
J:iii4 
" J:iiiisoc+ 
0 I NON 
'" 
Appendix 0 ( Contd' ) 
Model Validation: Lachenbruch Test 
Appendix 0 ( Contd') 
Model Validation: Lnchenbruch Test 
MODEL 
0 
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Appendix P 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
HISTOGRAM: UNSTANDARDIZED RESIDUALS 
WITH NORMAL CURVE 
std. Dev = .20 
Mean= .01 
---.r--~::::::::=;:::::=....--...--_.IIJIIII N = 80.00 
-.50 -.38 -.25 -.13 0.00 .13 .25 .38 .50 .63 . 75 
Residual 
Histogram ofUnstandardised Residuals with Normal Curve 
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Appendix. Q 
Normal P~P Plot of Deviance 
>.oo,-----------., 
.. 
. m .. . . 
~ .··· .. 
E 
0 .~ 
L 
000 .~ .m 
·" 
>.00 
Cbserwd CUm Prob 
rr 
Normal P~P Plot of Deviance 
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Appendix R 
Detrended Norrral P-P Plot of Deviance 
_,,_--------------------, 
_, 
_, 
•' 
~ 
_, 
j ., 
.. 
:; ,, 
L 
__ , 
" 
•• •• •• 
,_, 
'' 
Cllse!Wd Cum Prob 
Detrended Normal P-P Plot of Deviance 
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Appendix S 
CONFIRMATION ON 
ASYMPTOTES AT 0 & 1 
0.00 .13 .25 .38 
PROB 
.50 .63 .75 .88 
Confirmation on Asymptotes at 0 & 1 
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1.00 
std. [)ey = .46 
Mean= .61 
N =40.00 
Appendix T 
SCATTER DIAGRAM: CONFIRMATION ON 
SIGMOIDAL RESPONSE FUNCTION 
... ,---------~----~-~~~------, 
•• 
•• 
' 
I ;I •• 
·' 
; :: ~&-----~,.~---~.~----~,.----~~ 
..... , 
Confirmation on Sigmoidal Response Function 
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Appendix U (Questionnaire) 
IMPORTANT: Note whether there has been an organisation change! 
Dl. CAUSES OF DECLINE 
Ql. Are any of the following responsible for the decline of the organisation: 
lntunal Causes: 
• Poor Management 
Poor management (if new top management) 
autocratic ceo, combined chairman and ceo, ineffective board of directors, 
management neglect core business, lack of management depth ... 
Poor management (if top management hasn't change) 
miscalculation, misinterpretation, non awareness, misguided .. 
• Inadequate Financial Control 
poorly designed management accounting systems, management accounting 
information poorly used, organizational structure hinders effective control, 
methods of overhead allocation distorts the costs ... 
*Marketing Problem 
poorly motivated salesforce 
non aggressive sales manager 
efforts not targeted on key customers and products 
poor after sales service 
Jack market research I knowledge 
outdated /lack of promotion 
weak I non existant new product development 
413 
* High Cost Structure (Cost Disadvantage) 
inability to achieve economies of scale 
competitors controlling strategic variables 
due to diversification 
due to management style and organisational structure 
operational inefficiencies 
unfavourable government policies 
• Mistaken Acquisitions 
acquisition of losers 
paying too much for the acquisition 
poor-post acquisition management 
• Problem With Big Projects 
underestimating capital requirements 
start up difficulties 
capacity expansion 
market entry costs 
major contracts 
• Overtrading 
going for sales growth regardless of profitability 
going for sales growth despite small capital base 
E:dernal Causes: 
• Decline ofMarket 
secular decline in demand 
cyclical market decline 
changing pattern of demand 
• Competitive Pressure 
product competition 
price competition 
414 
• Product Life Cycle 
same product too long in the market 
saturated sales declining 
secular demand decline 
• Other Envinmmental Factors 
catastrophe 
w..-
ciVJl riots 
legislation 
politics 
diseases 
pressure group 
Measurement 
1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 ll 
1" level: Frequency of occurrence (:0::: 4 favourable, :>4 non favourable) 
2nol level: ___ Favourable ___ Non-Favourable 
Dl. SEVERITY OF CRISIS 
QI. Which of the following key symptoms the organisation was facing: 
MUd 
losing market leadership or position 
declining market share 
declining margins 
declining profitability 
lower return on capital employed 
strong balance sheet 
Moderate 
at least one year ofloss 
prospect for more losses 
balance sheet deteriorating 
margins unsatisfactory 
decreasing return on capital employed 
unused production capacity 
decreasing equity I funds 
Sevue or SurvjvaJ 
balance sheet 'shaky' or in a mess 
debt piling up 
equity I funds nearly exhausted 
negative returns on capital employed 
liquidity problem I crisis 
loss threatening existence 
danger ofbankruptcy 
morale low 
Measurement 
I st level: Mild or Moderate. __ _ 
Severe or Survival __ _ 
zM level: ______ Favourable ___ Non-Favourable 
D3, COMPANY'S IDSTORICAL STRATEGY 
Ql. Is the corporate structure of the organisation divided to strategic business 
units according to their different product-market scopes or divisionalized. 
If Yea ___ Diversilied Company 
IfNo Non Diversilied Company 
416 
Measurement 
I" level: Diversified Company -;;;;;y===--
Non Diversified Company 
2..a level: ___ Favourable Non Favourable 
D4. INDUSTRY CHARACfERISTICS 
Ql. Can you confirm the following industry characteristics in terms of their 
breakdow,Js: 
• Nature of Product 
Q2. Are they Consumer Products ___ Favourable 
or Industrial Products Non Favourable 
or both Favourable 
QJ. Are they highly differentiated -==~Y~es {Favourable) 
No (Non Favourable) 
Q4. Are they less price sensitive --==~Yes {Favourable) 
No (Non Favourable) 
>=2 Favourablcs {Favourable) 
<2 Favourables (Non Favourable) 
• Market Sesmentation 
QI.Is the market highly segmented(> I segment) 
___ Yes {Favourable) 
___ No (Non Favourable) 
417 
• Relative Sjze And SJ[ength Of Competitors 
QI. Ia the industty fragmented (not dominated by & few powerful competitors but 
many players) 
___ Yes (Favourable) 
___ No (Non Favourable) 
.!....E_ntry Barriers 
QI. Is it easy for any organisation to enter into the industty (no need for high 
capital intensity, patents or licenses or governmental controls I regulated) 
___ Yes (Favourable) 
___ No (Non Favourable) 
• Eldt Barriers 
Ql. Is it easy for any player in the industry to exit out of the business 
(business or assets easily disposable) 
___ Yes (Favourable) 
___ No (Non Favourable) 
* Rate Of Teclmotog,icy.l Change 
QL In this particular industry does the rate of technology changes too frequently. 
___ Yes (Favourable) 
___ No (Non Favourable) 
418 
• Threat Of Retaliation 
Ql. How do you find the rate of reaction by your competitors towards your 
change 
in product~market emphasis, are they quicker to react or slower. 
___ Slower (Favourable) 
___ Quicker (Non Favourable) 
• Bargaining Power Of Suppliers 
QI. How many suppliers are you depending on for raw material or production 
materials(~ 5 for lower bargaining power) 
~ 5 Favourable 
< 5 Non Favourable 
• Bargaining Power Of Customers 
QI. How many customers are you depending your sales on. 
(<!: 5 for lower bargaining power) 
:2: 5 Favourable 
< 5 Non Favourable 
• Indystry Growth Rate 
Ql. At what stage is the industry I Market life cycle. 
Introduction'~~~~ Growth 
Mature 
Decline 
419 
___ Introduction or Growth stage (Favourable) 
___ Mature or Decline stage (Non Favourable) 
Measurement 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
111 level: Frequency of favourable occurrences (:S 5 non favourable, >5 
favourable) 
2nd level: ___ Favourable ___ Non-Favourable 
DS. COMPANY'S COST-PRICE STRUCfURE 
Ql. How would you classifY your cost structure in terms of percentage of costs 
over sales as compared to the industry. 
___ lower than industry 
___ equal or higher than industry 
Measurement 
111 level: Lower than industry 
Equal or higher than industry 
2"" level: ___ Favourable ___ Non Favourable 
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06. COMMITMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS 
Ql. b the top management ofthis organisation given the absolute, proper power 
and confidence to implement the turnaround strategies they observed fit for 
the exercise by the ~hareholders. 
Measurement 
1>~1evel: Never (0) Not Always (I) Always (2) 
2"" level: Favourable Non Favourable 
D7. COMMITMENT OF BANKERS 
Ql. Does or do the banker I bankers support the turnaround I rescue exercise by, 
for example, defecri.!lS the time for interest and principal payments and I or 
rescheduling the loan. 
Measurement 
111 level: Not Supportive At All (0) Not So Supportive (I) 
Supportive (2) Very Supportive (3) 
21>1 level: ___ Favourable ___ Non Favourable 
DB. COMMITMENT OF CREDITORS 
Ql, Did the creditors agreed to rescheduled and I or deferred payments and have 
periodical meetings with top management (creditors committee?) 
Measurement 
1st level: Yes, _____ No _____ _ 
21101 level: --~Favourable ___ Non Favourable 
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D9. COMMITMENT OF EMPLOYEES 
Ql. Was there a high rate of voluntary resignation 
y.,, __ _ 
No 
NA-::_--:_--:_--:_ 
Q2. Given the same wages did the employees in general accepted higher job loads 
easily 
v .. 
No:::::::: NA __ 
Q3. Given the cut in wages did the employees in general accept the same job load 
easily 
y., 
---No __ 
NA __ 
Q4. Did the employees tolerate delays in getting their pay 
y"-=== No_ NA __ 
QS. Overall did the employees feel that they are participants in supporting the 
turnaround process '':..·_. 
v .. __ _ 
No_ 
NA_ 
1• leVel: Number ofYes/NA ~ 3 ___ _ 
Number ofYes/NA < 3 __ _ 
'2'"' level: ___ Favourable ___ Non Favourable 
'' 
" 
'i ,, 
'I 
'! 
010. NEW COMPETENT MANAGEMENT 
Q. Kindly respond to the following questions: 
\. Are you able to identil)r problems I sore spots in the organisation very quickly 
No 
2. Do you have the 'stomach'to fire people 
Yes No 
3. Would you consider yourself a people user and not the people's man 
Yes No 
4. Do you make decisions on your own 
Yes No 
5. Do you often make bold decisions 
Yes No 
6. Do you set definite targets I objectives to be achieved 
Yes No 
7, Do you impose high standards of performance and evaluation 
Yes No 
8. Do you spend more time in implementing things than having meetings 
Yes No 
9. Did you often come up with new ideas and techniques or support their 
emergence 
Yea No 
10. Did you practise limhed delegation and involve yourself directly in a lot of the 
organisational issues 
Yes No 
II. Did you feel strongly in the decisions or actions that you are about to take or 
have taken 
Yes No 
12. Did you require plenty of information in helping you to manage the 
organisation 
Yes No 
13. Did you set and exercise tight control systems at every level of the 
organisation (eg by hard policies, early warning systems ... etc) 
Yes No 
14. In exercising t1ne turnaround process, did you maximise the power given to 
you by the sh2creholders I board 
Yes No 
15. Did you always make different decisions at different situations and time 
pertaining to the same issues 
Yes No 
16. Were you able to control the multiple dimensional problems of the 
organisatioll from affecting you mentally and physically 
Yes No 
17, Are you from the same industry as the existing one 
Yes No 
Total number 4lfYes __ _ 
"' 
Measurement 
12 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 II 1213 14 IS 16 17 
I" level: >10 
SIO 
zod level: ___ Exists ___ Non Existant 
Dll. VIABLE CORE BUSINESS 
Ql. Did the core business have the following features: 
• Positive Cashflow 
• Sales Volume Umbrella 
• Competitive Equipment_ 
• Competitive Location_ 
• AwarenessofChange_ 
(recent, past or near future) 
Total occurrences __ _ 
Measurement 
I" level: >4 occurrences __ _ 
<4 occurrences __ _ 
zoo! level: ___ ElCists ___ NonExistant 
"' 
/ 
012. BRIDGE CAPITAL 
QI. Did any of the following exist: 
Advances or rights issues from shareholders __ 
. ·, 
Sale$ of assets by management __ 
Bridge credits for working capital from bankers __ 
Continuation of raw materials supply by creditors __ 
Total occurrences __ _ 
Measurement 
1• level: <!: 2 
<2 
2nd level: Exists Non Existant 
-- --
Dl3, REALISTIC TURBAROUND PLAN 
QI. Was a turnaround plan available 
Yes_ (goto Q2) 
No Non Existant 
Q2. Did the turnaround plan have the following features: 
Specified objectives or targets __ 
Strategies to be used __ 
Tactics or details on how strategies will be implemented __ 
Review and control systems __ 
"' 
Total f'eatures __ _ 
I" level: =4features-===-
< 4 features 
2od level: ___ Exits, ___ Non Eltistant 
\ 
